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FOREWORD
This study seeks to address a number of rising policy concerns from the
aftermath of the recent subprime crisis. Did foreign bank lending decline sharply
and transmit the financial shocks from the advanced economies to the SEACEN
emerging markets? Was the decline driven by the drying-up in supply of cross-
border loans or more by the sharp decline in the demand for this funding? Does
greater exposure of foreign banks to a host economy lower the sensitivity of its
claims to shocks originating from their own economies? Are bank claims on an
economy affected by the aggregate changes in claims on another economy?
How about the stability of these flows? In short, this study aims to ascertain the
multi-faceted aspects of international bank lending.
This collaborative research was led by Dr. Victor Pontines and Dr. Reza
Siregar, Senior Economist (on secondment from Bank Negara Malaysia) and
Director of the Research and Learning Contents Department of The SEACEN
Centre respectively.  It was participated by 11 project team members  of 8
SEACEN member central banks. The SEACEN Centre wishes to express its
sincere gratitude to the participating member central banks and their project
team members for actively participating in this project and preparing their
respective project papers. The project team members are namely Mr.  Souk
Mann and Ms Chea Vuthy of the National Bank of Cambodia;  Mr. Bokyong
Jung  and  Mr. Dongwoo Kim of The Bank of Korea; Mr. Piter Abdullah of
Bank Indonesia; Ms. Allison Loke Yen San of Bank Negara Malaysia; Win
Htein Min of Central Bank of Myanmar; Dr. Veronica B. Bayangos of Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas; Mr. M.R.M. Abeyratne of Central  Bank of Sri Lanka and
last but not least, Ms Huey-Ming Chen and Mr. Chien-Yeh Yang of Central
Bank, Chinese Taipei. The assistance of staff members of the Research and
Learning Contents Department of The SEACEN Centre is also gratefully
acknowledged. We would also like to gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments
received from Dr. Tony Cavoli, Senior Lecturer, School of Commerce, University
of South Australia, on the integrative report.iv
The views expressed in this study, however, are those of the authors and
do not necessarily reflect those of The SEACEN Centre or the SEACEN member
central banks/monetary authorities.
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The role of international banking and lending to the emerging markets has
been long debated. To date, the balance of evidence supports the view that
foreign bank entry into the domestic banking system has been largely a positive
one. The liberalisation of local banking systems and the presence of foreign
banks have, indeed, been contended to promote institutional and regulatory/
supervisory improvements and have also resulted in more efficient allocation of
productive resources in globalised economies. Likewise, foreign banks have been
touted as a stabilising force for host markets. Yet, this proclaimed stabilising role
may seem at odds with the view that activities of the global banks have spread
profound difficulties in international financial markets, including the SEACEN
economies, during the recent subprime financial crisis period.
The objective of this research project is to evaluate a number of perspectives
on the presence and bearing of the global banks in SEACEN economies. In
particular, it seeks to address a number of rising policy concerns from the
aftermath of the recent subprime crisis. Did foreign bank lending decline sharply
and transmit the financial shocks from the advanced economies to the SEACEN
emerging markets? Was the decline driven by the drying-up in supply of cross-
border loans or more by the sharp decline in the demand for this funding? Does
greater exposure of foreign banks to a host country lower the sensitivity of its
claims to shocks originating from their own economies? Are bank claims on an
economy affected by the aggregate changes in claims on another economy?
How about the stability of these flows? In short, this study aims to ascertain the
various aspects of international bank lending.
The main findings of the project indicate that the recent sub-prime crisis
has forced a rethink on the mandate of central banks in the area of financial
stability. Prior to the latest financial crisis, the primary mandate in most central
banks in Asia was on monetary policy stability, in particular price stability. The
recent crisis has demonstrated that years of monetary stability during the period
of great moderation did not safeguard economies from financial instabilities. It
was clearly illustrated as well that the globalised banking system played a crucial
role in transmitting the crisis from the advanced economies to various parts of
the world, including the emerging markets of East and Southeast Asia.
For policy makers, it is no longer adequate to view the domestic banking
system and financial system as being separate from the domestic economy. The
increasing interconnectedness of domestic banking liquidity to the global fundingxiv
environment enhances the links between domestic financial stability and adverse
developments emanating outside the domestic economy. The study also examined
the role of international bank claims, in particular cross-border lending, as a
critical channel of transmission of worldwide financial shock on the local economy.
Focus was given to the recent crisis period to gather greater appreciation of the
exposure of the local financial system to these external shocks. The findings
indicate that  bank exposure and home country fundamental variables are
significant factors and confirm the role of international bank lending as a channel
of shock transmission from the home countries to host economies. Furthermore,
the common lender effect — whereby movements in international banks’ claims
on one economy may be transmitted to other economies that owe claims from
the same international banks—underscores the spillover effect that was evident
as well during the 1997-98  Asian financial crisis.
The influence of the globalised banking system will likely continue to spread
and deepen in the SEACEN economies. Understanding their network of dealings
and anticipating their bearings in these economies will undoubtedly improve the
authorities’ capacity to manage them and mitigate, if not, eliminate potential shocks
coming from the financial sector in the near future.  Going forward, more in-
depth research on the roles, activities and impacts of global banks on the local
economy, including local policies, should be carried out.1
___________
1. Victor Pontines and Reza Siregar are Senior Economist (on secondment from Bank Negara
Malaysia) and Director of the Research and Learning Contents Department of The SEACEN
Centre respectively.  (E-mail: victor@seacen.org and reza@seacen.org). The views expressed
in this study are those of the authors and may not necessarily represent those of The
SEACEN Centre or SEACEN member central banks/monetary authorities.
2. We would like to gratefully acknowledge the helpful comments received from Dr. Tony
Cavoli, Senior Lecturer, School of Commerce, University of South Australia on an earlier
version of this integrative chapter.
Chapter 1
CROSS-BORDER BANK LENDING TO SELECTED SEACEN
ECONOMIES: AN INTEGRATIVE REPORT
By
Victor Pontines and Reza Y. Siregar1,2
1. Introduction
The role of international banking and lending to the emerging markets has
been long debated. To date, the balance of evidence supports the view that
foreign bank entry into the domestic banking system has been largely a positive
one. The liberalisation of local banking systems and the presence of foreign
banks have, indeed, been contended to promote institutional and regulatory/
supervisory improvements (Mishkin (2009)), and have also resulted in more
efficient allocation of productive resources in globalised economies (Goldberg
(2009)). Likewise, foreign banks have been seen as a stabilising force for host
markets. Yet, this proclaimed stabilising role may seem at odds with the view
that activities of the global banks have spread profound difficulties in international
financial markets, including the SEACEN economies, during the recent subprime
financial crisis period.
This integrative report is part of a research project conducted at The
SEACEN Centre to evaluate further a number of perspectives on the presence
and bearing of the global banks in SEACEN economies. In particular, it seeks
to address a number of rising policy concerns from the aftermath of the recent
subprime crisis. Did foreign bank lending decline sharply and transmit the financial
shocks from the advanced economies to the SEACEN emerging markets? Was
the decline driven by the drying-up in supply of cross-border loans or more by
the sharp decline in the demand for this funding? Does greater exposure of2
foreign banks to a host country lower the sensitivity of its claims to shocks
originating from their own economies? Are bank claims on a country affected
by the aggregate changes in claims on another country? How about the stability
of these flows? In short, this study aims to ascertain the various aspects of
international bank lending.
To address the above set of relevant topical and policy questions, we offer
next a more in-depth review of the rising role of international bank lending
activities in SEACEN economies. The discussion unveils some of the domestic
factors that have been catalytic in attracting these international banks. In this
Section, we will also compare and contrast lending activities of banks from major
developed economies, such as Japan, the UK and the US during different periods
since the early 1990s. More importantly, the recent subprime crisis period will
be the focal point of the discussion to introduce preliminary stylised facts on
basic features and trends of these international bank lending. A more discerning
observation underscores the role of cross-border lending vis-à-vis local lending
of these international banks. In particular, in some of the SEACEN economies,
cross-border lending has, indeed, been the source of volatilities in these flows
whereas local lending by these international banks remains robust.
To further substantiate our analyses, Section 3 of the paper first introduces
the empirical model and panel testing that we will undertake as far as the
determinants of international bank claims allow, and elaborates in detail the key
findings.  To demonstrate the key features of international bank lending in our
region, we will focus on the lending activities of banks from Japan, UK and US
to five SEACEN economies, namely Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines
and Thailand. These five SEACEN economies have arguably been subjected to
both massive inflows and sudden outflows of international bank lending since
the mid-1990s.  The Japanese, UK and US banks, on the other hand, have been
the major lenders to these economies during the past two decades.
The section of the paper that integrates the findings of the individual research
papers coming from the research project is presented in Section 4. Essentially,
it summarises and brings to light a number of common and contrasting findings
from the experiences of economies included in the research project. The diversity
of the experiences and stages of financial market developments in these
economies does not only strengthen the previous discussion as far as the findings
of the empirical panel testing undertaken in this paper are concerned, but, more
importantly, it enriches the analyses on the set of policy questions posted earlier.
Given what we have learned from the experiences of the SEACEN economies
in particular, a number of policy recommendations to better manage the activities3
and presence of the global banking system will be put forward in Section 5 of
the paper. A brief concluding Section ends this integrative report.
2. Stylised Facts and Motivation
Foreign banks’ operations in emerging markets across the global banking
system, including those of the Asian economies, increased dramatically starting
the second half of the 1990s. The emerging markets, in general, do not rely on
foreign deposits for funding, but they usually turn to international banks for credit
lines for exports (Mihaljek (2010)). For most of the eight SEACEN economies
in the study, the rise of the international banks’ presence started with the first
phase of reform and deregulation of the banking sector in the late 1980s and
early 1990s. For instance, as reported in Table 1, the total foreign bank claims
of four of the eight SEACEN economies, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Korea
and Thailand, grew at an annual average of between 16 to 30 percent for the
period of 1989-1996. This is not to mention that prior to this period, total foreign
bank claims to Chinese Taipei grew at an annual average of around 19 percent
between 1983 and 1988, and slightly tapering off to around 10 percent by the
same period of 1989-1996. It is ironic, however, that with the exception of
Malaysia which continued to experience strong international bank inflows,
Thailand, Korea, Indonesia and to some extent Chinese Taipei, experienced the
most severe declines in foreign bank claims across the eight SEACEN economies
around the time of the peak of the 1997 East Asian financial crisis.
During the time of the reversal of the IT bubble in the US in 2001-2002,
the likely retreat of foreign banks’ claims on these same eight SEACEN
economies were also observed. However, this presumed impact was quite uneven.
For example, Indonesia and Thailand experienced a substantial negative
contraction in international bank lending during this period. Meanwhile, Malaysia,
the Philippines and Sri Lanka experienced a slowdown in international bank
lending after coming-off from around the time of the East Asian financial crisis
virtually unscathed (Table 1). On the other hand, however, international bank
flows to the economies of Korea and Chinese Taipei were resilient from the
recent adverse economic episode in the US as well as from the earlier East
Asian financial crisis, with the posting of positive annual average growth rates
during both crisis.
The loosening of ownership regulation in most SEACEN economies post
Asian financial crisis had also significantly facilitated the rise in the activities of
international banks in Asia. Indonesia, South Korea and Thailand, for instance,
have raised the allowance for foreign equity participation in local banks by up4
to 100 percent. Meanwhile, the Philippines permitted 60 percent foreign
ownership. As a consequence, the significantly more liberal ownership policy
which facilitated an aura of stability and confidence in the respective economies’
banking system has frequently been recognised as an important contributing factor
to the return of sustained surges of foreign bank inflows not only to these above-
mentioned four SEACEN economies from 2003 to 2007 but also across the
board for the wider spectrum of SEACEN economies, just before the outbreak
of the recent sub-prime crisis in the US (Table 1).
The total foreign claims of international banks, in general, continued to sustain
strong momentum in some of the emerging markets of the Asian region even
until the first half of 2008. However, only during the immediate weeks and months
following the Lehman Brothers debacle, were six of the eight SEACEN
economies engulfed in a sharp and sudden reversal of international bank claims.
The unforeseen and sheer size of these reversals in international bank flows out
of these six SEACEN economies saw the annual growth rate of these flows
hitting negative territory by end-of 2008, with the exception of Thailand and Sri
Lanka.3 More recent data reveals that for almost all of the eight SEACEN
economies, inflows of international bank lending had again returned to these
economies (Table 1).4
As for the sources of these international bank flows, it is interesting to note
that during the pre-Asian financial crisis, Japanese banks were the largest sources
of funding for the banks and corporations in the eight SEACEN economies.5
For example, at its peak for the period of 1989 to 1996, Japanese lending
amounted to 56 percent and 54 percent of total foreign lending in Thailand and
Indonesia, respectively (Table 2).6 Not far from these two economies are Korea
and Malaysia which recorded lending of 28 and 40 percent of total foreign lending
by Japanese banks during the same years, respectively. As presented in Table
2, in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, a consistent waning in the share
of lending by Japanese banks were experienced by all of the eight SEACEN
economies. The dominance in lending by Japanese banks have been taken over
________________
3. Thailand only experienced a very marginal increase in international bank inflows.
4. The only exception is Sri Lanka, which presumably suggest that the adverse effects of the
Global Financial Crisis impacted the economy with a lag.
5. Exceptions are the Philippines and to some extent, Chinese Taipei, which are both dominated
by lending of US-owned banks.
6. See, for instance, Siregar and Choy (2010) which examines the driving factors behind the
total claims of seven OECD countries’ banks to nine East and Southeast Asian economies.5
recently to some extent by UK banks and ever consistently by US banks.7 The
critical influence of Japanese, UK and US owned-banks has meant that the
combined lending of these three big economies account for at least up to half
of the combined lending by developed countries into each of these eight SEACEN
economies (Table 2).
As discussed above, while international bank lending retreated substantially
in almost all of the eight SEACEN economies in the immediate aftermath of the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, it could still be possible that a key component
of these international bank lending in the form of the local claims of the foreign
banks operating within the domain of these SEACEN economies, remained strong
and were less adversely affected by the external shock that originated from the
US. As depicted in Figure 1, while these local claims booked by offices of
foreign banks receded in Indonesia, Korea, Philippines and Thailand, such was
not the case for Malaysia and Chinese Taipei in 2008.8
In retrospect when we look back at previous crises such as the Asian financial
crisis and the 2001-2002 collapse of the IT bubble in the US, almost all of the
eight SEACEN economies experienced sharp reversals in total international bank
flows during the two separate crisis periods, very similar to the recent global
financial crisis (GFC) at end-2008.  However, remarkably, the local claims
continued to register positive average annual growth rates during the past two
crisis episodes, namely the 1997 East Asian crisis and the 2001-2002 IT bubble.9
In addition, more recent data in the post-GFC period indicate that the local claims
of foreign banks recovered immediately and grew positively in six of the eight
economies with the only exceptions being the Philippines and Chinese Taipei
(Figure 1).
In summary, the cross-country experiences of our six economies highlight
the seeming indisputable evidence that global banks act as a channel of financial
shock transmission from the global financial markets to the local economy.
Formally testing this hypothesis as well as significantly identifying the possible
________________
7. An interesting observation is the heavy dominance in lending by UK-owned international
banks to Sri Lanka beginning in the mid-1990s and onwards.
8. In the case of Sri Lanka, while local claims booked by offices of foreign banks decreased
more on average than total international bank claims in 2008, the reverse was true in the
following period.
9. The only exception is the case of the Philippines which, during the 2001-2002 period, also
saw the local claims by international banks contract along with total foreign bank claims.6
driving factors behind this international bank lending are therefore imperative
and will be the primary objective of the empirical works of this study.
3. Measurement and Empirical Results
Our baseline general econometric model lays out the possible determinants
of international bank claims represented by the following dynamic panel equation:
(1)
where i,j represents economy pairs i and j, and i = 1 to 3 denotes the major
BIS-reporting home country banks of Japan, UK and the US, while, j = 1 to
5 denotes the  SEACEN host economies  of Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,
Philippines, and Thailand. The dependent variable, ΔlogClaimsij,t,  is the
logarithmic differences of total foreign bank claims10 from banks in home country
i to host economies j; ΔlogClaimsij,t-1 is the lagged of the dependent variable.
In Equation 1, we assume that νij,t contains the following two effects: (i) the
unobserved time-invariant country-pair specific effect, çij,, and (ii) a stochastic
error term åij,t, varying across time and cross-section.11
We follow the voluminous literature on the fundamental determinants of
capital flows by accounting for in our empirical model, the home or push and
host or pull factors that figure prominently in this extensive literature. On this
basis the respective real GDP growth of the host economy is j (growthratej,t)
and home country i (growthratei,t).12 We expect a positive coefficient on the
real GDP growth of host economies as higher returns in these economies should
then lead to a rise in international bank flows to these economies. Whereas,
there is ambiguity as to the expected sign of the real GDP growth in home
________________
10. Total foreign bank claims are the sum of international claims and local claims in local
currency; while, international claims are comprised of cross-border claims in all currencies
and local claims in foreign currencies.
11. The technical details of the dynamic panel estimation undertaken in this integrative chapter
are presented in the Appendix.
12. We also include in the estimation, the nominal interest differential between the host economy
j and home country i. However, this variable surprisingly came out with the opposite
expected sign as it was highly correlated with one of the factors and therefore was entirely
omitted from the estimations.7
countries as, on the one hand, recessionary economic conditions in home countries
entail lower profit opportunities at home, which should then encourage foreign
banks to seek better or higher returns abroad in which case, we expect a negative
coefficient on the growthratei,t  variable. On the other hand, weak economic
conditions in the home countries may signal a worsening of the capital position
of foreign banks which should then discourage, or worse, retrench their lending
overseas.
Apart from considering the impact of traditional push and pull factors on
international bank claims, we also take into account a measure of the state of
the global financial market, the S&P 100 Volatility Index (VIXt) of the Chicago
Board Options Exchange which is widely used as an indicator of expected short-
term volatility of the global financial market. A high value of the VIX indicates
more volatile market expectations and as such we expect a negative coefficient
on the VIX variable as greater global volatility should lead to a reduction in
international bank flows to host economies (Hermann and Mihaljek, 2010).13 In
line with the well-cited study of van Rijckeghem and Weder (2003), we also
include in our empirical model, a measure of the potential contagion or spillover
of changes in international bank flows from one economy to another, denoted
by the Clenderij,t variable. More popularly known as the common lender effect,
this argues that movements in international banks’ claims on one economy may
be transmitted to other economies that owe claims from the same international
banks (Peria, et al, 2005). We follow Peria, et al (2005) in accounting for this
effect and thus operationalise Clenderij,t as the changes in claims from home
country i banks to all the five SEACEN host economies other than that of the
individual SEACEN host country j.14,15 We should then expect that if the common
lender effect works, the coefficient on Clenderij,t would be positive and significant.
Turning finally to our main variable of interest, that is, testing the impact of
the financial crisis on the stability of international bank lending to our respective
SEACEN host economies, we interact our home economies’ real GDP growth
________________
13. It is also based on this expected relation that the VIX is construed as a factor that measures
the global supply of international bank lending. Higher volatility corresponding to a high
value of the VIX makes it more difficult for banks to raise additional capital (Takats, 2010).
14. As pointed out by Peria, et al (2005), in an ideal sense, the common lender effect can be
equated to a portfolio allocation choice wherein changes in values of claims trigger an
adjustment in other assets or claims. The limitation of working then with aggregated economy
level data on international bank claims is that it obscures this portfolio allocation decisions
at the individual bank level.
15. These major East Asian host economies are China, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines,
Singapore and Thailand.8
rate variable, growthratei,t, with a measure of foreign banks’ exposure to our
individual host economies, noting that we measure foreign bank exposure as the
ratio of home country i’s international bank claims on host economy j to the
total worldwide claims of home country i’s banks.16,17 Since the crisis coincide
with deterioration in macroeconomic fundamentals such as real GDP growth
rates as was what happened in developed markets during the recent global
financial crisis, this interaction variable recognises the idea that crisis are basically
indistinguishable from downturns in GDP. This allow us to test, depending on the
sign and significance of the interaction term, the impact of foreign bank exposure
from a shock originating from their own economy. A priori, if higher exposure
translates into stable international bank lending, we should expect the interaction
between home country foreign banks’ real GDP growth rate and its exposure
to be positive.
The estimation results of three alternative specifications of the dynamic
panel model for the whole sample period of 2000Q1 to 2010Q3 are summarised
in Table 3. Altogether, with the exception of the growth rate in home country
variable i, which came out only significant in specification (3), all of the estimated
coefficients are significant and came out with their expected signs. Several key
findings are worth highlighting. To start with, we find evidence that international
bank flows increase (decrease) their claims on host markets once these same
economies experience stronger (adverse) macroeconomic growth performance.
This result confirms the presence of ‘demand factor’ influencing the flows of
these claims. All of the five SEACEN economies experienced slower growth,
particularly during the peak of the recent global financial crisis, translating into
weaker demand for funding from the international banks.
Similarly, we find a number of ‘supply side factors’ have also come into
play. First, the negative coefficient (as mentioned only although insignificant in
specifications (1) and (2)) on the home countries’ real GDP growth rate indicates
that foreign banks’ behaviour is veered towards seeking better or higher returns
________________
16. Certainly, an alternative and common approach to assess the stability of international bank
lending is by focusing on a volatility measure, such as the variance of the flows —or what
is often referred to as second moment analyses.
17. This measure of foreign bank exposure is similar to that of Peria, et al (2005). Based on
some unique reason pertaining to the Latin American context, they measure the numerator
as home country i’s international bank claims on the private sector of host economy j. In
this paper, however, we do not make that distinction between private and non-private
sectors.9
abroad when domestic economic conditions are weak and fragile. The results
confirm that weaker economic outlook in the home country translates into a rise
in the foreign bank claims’ on the host economy.
Second, we also find evidence in support of the common lender effect in
view of the positive and significant coefficient on changes in international bank
claims in other economies.18 This seems to support the argument for the presence
of contagion effect in international banking. In particular, it demonstrates that
changes in foreign bank claims on one economy might spill over to other
economies that hold claims from the same banks (van Rijckeghem and Weder
(2003)). Third, consistent with theoretical expectation, a rise in the expected
short-term volatility of the global financial market, as proxied by the widely used
S&P 100 Volatility Index (VIXt) of the Chicago Board Options Exchange, has
indeed adversely contributed to the overall sharp decline in the total claims of
the foreign banks. The overall robustness of the supply side factors substantiates
the role of international bank claims as a key transmission channel of the impacts
of a distressed banking sector in the advanced economies into the emerging
markets of SEACEN.
Finally, the positive and significant coefficient on the main variable of interest,
the interaction between home country foreign banks’ real GDP growth rate and
its exposure suggests that controlling for macroeconomic conditions in developed
economies, crisis episodes or shocks that originate from developed economies
do not necessarily translate into less stable financing in international bank claims
for host economies in SEACEN. This is in contrast, however, with the earlier
preliminary examination of the flows in international bank claims wherein we
observed a sharp and sudden reversal during the global financial crisis. Perhaps
one reason for this seemingly conflicting result is that the foreign bank claims
data used in this analysis is not a ‘pure’ cross-border claim data. This is due
to the fact that the foreign bank claims data as consolidated by the BIS is not
just comprised of the cross-border claims but also the local claims of the foreign
banks’ offices on residents of the economy the foreign bank is located. Thus,
it is highly likely that the local claims component in the data maybe mitigating
this effect since this particular component of foreign bank claims held up well
during the global financial crisis.
________________
18. One possible extension here, as suggested by an external examiner, is to add an interactive
variable between the common lender variable and that of the growth rate of home economies.
The result may further reveal the important role of the supply side in explaining fluctuations
in international bank lending. That is, if the common lenders are those economies suffering
economic slowdown, the impact of international bank lending to host economies are even
more significantly magnified.10
4. Lessons from the Research Papers
The research papers summarised in this Section is a study in contrast in
terms of their economies’ approach or stance to relaxation of capital flows. The
SEACEN economies examined here range from the relatively ‘stricter’ approach
to capital flows, e.g., Myanmar, Sri Lanka to relatively more open and liberal
stance to capital flows, e.g., Chinese Taipei and Korea. As summarised in Table
4, while the research papers employ a variety of data structure from macro-
panel (Cambodia, Chinese-Taipei19, Indonesia, Korea, Sri Lanka) to time-series
(Cambodia, Philippines and Myanmar) as well as in the period of observations
that either includes both the Asian and global financial crisis (Cambodia, Indonesia,
Korea, Philippines) or to one that examines the beginning of the early part of
2000s till the recent global financial crisis (Chinese Taipei, Sri Lanka, Malaysia
and Myanmar), the research papers were almost unanimous in using the growth
rate of foreign claims as the dependent variable in their various econometric
regressions.20 In addition, with the exceptions of Cambodia, the Philippines and
Myanmar, most papers have employed bilateral claims that comprise the top-
four sources of international bank lending in the respective economies, and as
we stated in the earlier discussions, bilateral claims of US, Japanese and UK
banks are always included.
To be consistent with our own empirics undertaken in the previous Section,
most of the research project papers provide in their respective empirical model,
the home (push) and host (pull) factors of international bank flows by including
for the most part, explanatory variables such as the GDP growth rates of the
home and host economies as well as the interest rates of the home and host
economies. Out of the nine regressions reported in total, the home country real
GDP growth rate came out statistically significant five times. The home economy
interest rate on the other hand, was weakly significant, on average. It was reported
as significant in only one of the four regressions that this variable was included.
Likewise, the host economy’s real GDP growth rate turned out to be significant
in five of the nine regressions that included this variable. However, the host
economy interest rate turned out to be insignificant in all four regressions that
________________
19. The Chinese Taipei paper also employs a micro-panel data structure as well as that of the
Malaysia paper.
20. The only exceptions are the Malaysia paper which uses loans over deposit in an exclusive
micro panel and the Philippines paper which uses the gross international claims data. In
addition, as presented in Table 4, the Indonesia paper estimates separate regressions for
the growth in foreign claims and growth of local claims. Similarly, the Philippines paper
estimates separate regressions for gross international claims and cross-border lending.11
included this as an explanatory variable in the model. These results are suggestive
of the distinguishing characteristics of international bank flows into some of the
SEACEN economies. In particular, the procyclicality of these flows, i.e., better
(worse) economic conditions in the host (home) economies lead to greater bank
flows into some of these SEACEN economies, whereas, the role of ‘liquidity’
conditions both in the home and host economies does not matter much as a
fundamental driver of these flows.21
In contrast to the strong and robust results obtained with the variable on the
expected short-term volatility of the global financial market in Section Three of
this Chapter, only one of the research papers (Philippines) actually included this
important variable in their estimations. The variable turned out to be highly and
negatively significant as expected for this case, which again strongly suggests
that global supply factors have a role to play in determining bank flows from
developed to emerging economies.
Turning now to the impact of crisis episodes on the direction of these bank
flows, a dummy variable was created for this purpose in all the research papers.
The papers that included the period of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-98 have
unanimously found that the crisis episode had a negative effect on this type of
flows. However, the papers that tested the impact of the recent global financial
crisis on these flows arrived at conflicting results. While the global financial
crisis dummy was significantly negative in the case of Indonesia and Korea, the
same dummy variable was insignificant in the case of Chinese Taipei and
Myanmar and significantly positive in the case of Cambodia. The more interesting
question, therefore, is whether greater exposure on the part of major foreign
banks, as analysed in this Chapter as well as in the other research papers, has
a crisis-mitigating impact or, in other words, has a stabilising effect on these
bank flows in times of financial turmoil. To answer this question, an interaction
variable, i.e., product between the appropriate crisis dummy and exposure was
created. The balance of the evidence appears to suggest that greater exposure
on the part of major foreign banks in these selected SEACEN economies fulfill
a stabilising or crisis-mitigating role during periods of financial distress. In
particular, the interaction term between the Asian financial crisis dummy and
exposure while insignificant in the case of Indonesia, turned out to be significant
in the regression for the Philippines. More telling, the interaction term between
the global financial crisis dummy and exposure was only insignificant in three
________________
21. This then corroborates the results of our own set of empirics in Section 3 wherein a
measure of interest rate differential turned out to have weak explanatory power in almost
all the regressions.12
of the eight regressions tested. This latter result, more importantly, again
corroborates the earlier empirical results undertaken in the previous section.
Four of the project papers have also further considered interesting and related
aspects of the issues at hand. For instance, the Chinese Taipei paper undertook
separate micro-panel regressions on a very large number of observations and
found evidence which support the above stabilising argument.22 Similarly, the
Malaysia paper also exclusively estimated micro-panel regressions and found
very interesting results. Though it obtained inconclusive evidence on the stabilising
property of international bank lending, this may be suggestive of the emphasis
of the Malaysian banking system on local incorporation of foreign banks.
Moreover, it found revealing results that profitability and assets size are both
important factors in driving foreign banks’ lending activities in Malaysia. The
Indonesia paper also estimates a separate regression using the same set of
explanatory variables but with the growth of local claims as the dependent variable
and should therefore be viewed as an alternative angle to robustly ascertain the
stabilising role of international foreign bank lending. The paper obtained results
wherein the interaction term between the crisis dummies and exposure was
insignificant in both fixed and random-effect regressions, which in turn can be
interpreted as confirming the result obtained for the stabilising role of international
bank flows when total international bank claims was used instead.
The Philippines paper also considered the alternative angle of robustly
ascertaining the stabilising role of international foreign bank lending by estimating
separate regressions using confidential cross-border lending data from the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) as the dependent variable. The result obtained is
intriguing wherein the interaction term between the Asian financial crisis dummy
and a measure of exposure turned out to be positive and significant (again,
confirming the stabilising role argument) while the interaction term between the
recent global financial crisis and exposure was negative and significant, in direct
contrast to the earlier results. The Philippines paper also interestingly examines
the question of whether greater trade openness has a crisis-mitigating impact on
international bank flows. However, the interaction variable between the crisis
dummies and a suitably measured variable for trade openness was insignificant
in the regressions.
________________
22. Specifically, interaction variables between the GFC dummy and country dummies were
included in the regression along with a number of balance sheet indicators of domestic and
foreign banks in the sample. Results showed that the interaction variables were positive
and significant with the exception of the UK dummy. This can be interpreted as being that
greater exposure of major foreign banks has a stabilising role on domestic loans as a ratio
of deposits (dependent variable) during crisis times.13
5. Policy Challenges Going Forward
The era of great moderation (low inflation) across the globe has been found
to be gravely inadequate to safeguard much-needed stability in the financial
sector.  Even during periods of sound macroeconomic conditions, the financial
system was subject to various self-amplifying mechanisms such as upward trends
(bubbles), downward trends (busts) and phases of the credit cycle. There has
been growing appreciation and acceptance of the role of the central bank to
extend to financial stability in addition to monetary authority.
New responsibilities will come with new challenges. In this study, we highlight
the role of lending activities of international banks, particularly cross-border lending,
as a potential source of financial instability. Going forward, a number of policy
responses to manage potential risks associated with international bank lending
have been tabled and debated. The following sub-sections will elaborate on some
of them.
5.1 Cross-border Supervision
Cross border banking with the presence of multinational banks (including
the newly emerging regional multinational banks) enhances the
‘interconnectedness’ factor. It is now a well known fact that globalised banks
play a crucial role in the international transmission of monetary policies and
economic shocks globally. At the first instance, the lack of cross border supervisory
cooperation has resulted in asymmetric information on cross-border risk exposures
leading to an under-appreciation by supervisors and regulators of underlying
systemic risks and connections (Kodres & Narain (2009)). In addition, it is rather
obvious that the existence of asymmetric information among supervisors in
different jurisdictions, leads to untimely and uncoordinated responses (Nijathaworn
(2010)). Furthermore, adequate cross-country supervisory cooperation and
coordination are necessary to overcome loopholes such as currency substitution,
or switching from domestic lending in foreign currency to direct foreign credit.
One potentially effective method to facilitate cross-border policy cooperation
and coordination is through the college of supervisors.23  The college of supervisors
is defined as a “permanent, although flexible, structure for cooperation and
coordination among the authorities of different jurisdictions responsible for and
involved in the supervision of the different components of cross-border banking
groups, specifically large group” (The Committee of European Banking
________________
23. As of September 2009, there are more than 30 colleges to supervise complex institutions.14
Supervisors (CEBS (2009)). As a general rule, the establishment of a supervisory
college should be considered for significant financial institutions in terms of size,
interconnectedness with other components of the financial system and/or the
roles they play in the market which may cause systemic impact on the economy’s
financial system, hence affecting the region’s financial stability.
A recent survey has identified a number of regional and global banks that
have strong presence in major Asian economies (Siregar & Lim (2010). The
Hong Kong Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC), Citibank and the Standard
Chartered Bank are among the three major international banks that have wide
and extensive branch networks in the Asian region (Table 5). In addition to
these three international powerhouses, the South East Asian region has also
witnessed the emergence of its own multinational banks. In Malaysia, banks
such as the Malayan Banking Berhad (Maybank), Commerce International
Merchant Bankers Berhad (CIMB) and Rashid Hussain Berhad (RHB) have
expanded their networks beyond Southeast Asian economies. A number of
Singaporean banks, namely the Development Bank of Singapore (DBS), the
United Overseas Bank (UOB), and the Overseas Chinese Bank Corporation
(OCBC) have achieved similar success in their efforts to become regional banks.
As of May 2010, a number of major central banks in Asia have been invited
to participate in colleges of supervisors. Bank Negara Malaysia, for instance,
is involved in the colleges of supervisors organised by the Financial Stability
Agency of United Kingdom for the Standard Chartered Group, the BaFIN for
the Deustche Bank Group and the OFSI for the Bank of Nova Scotia Group.
Similarly, the Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) and Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas have also participated in a number of colleges of supervisors set up for
major European and the US banks. In addition, under the foreign banking law
of a number of Southeast and East Asian economies, one of the conditions for
the foreign bank to establish its subsidiary domestically is that the home-supervisor
of that particular foreign bank must sign a MOU with the host central banks.
This MOU facilitates bilateral exchanges of data and information between the
two bank supervisors. However, as of late 2010, there has not been any
arrangement for supervisory colleges for Asian regional multinational banks such
as Malaysian and Singaporean banks discussed earlier.
5.2 Reducing the Complexity of Large Cross-Border Banks through
‘Subsidiarisation’
An important cross-border banking issue is the relationship between the
home- and host supervisory agencies and central banks. In the event that a15
foreign bank which is systemically important in a host economy finds itself in
a crisis, this could lead to potential conflicts between authorities in the home-
and host economies. These conflicts could be particularly significant if the relative
size of the parent bank and its overseas affiliate is substantially different, or if
the economic importance of the overseas affiliate to the parent bank is mainly
marginal, e.g., funding of the overseas affiliate is mainly sourced from local
deposits. For instance, home-economy authorities will not be keen on supporting
a small overseas affiliate, or the overseas affiliate will receive less attention
from the parent bank or home supervisor as the impact of such failure of the
overseas affiliate is relatively low or immaterial on the financial group’s overall
position. This is even in the case if the troubled overseas affiliate is relatively
systemically important for the host economy. Moreover, authorities of the host
economy could find it politically difficult to use public or taxpayers’ resources
to support a foreign-owned bank when it gets into trouble.
One of the answers to such a challenge of a systemically-important foreign
bank failing in a host economy is to ascertain local incorporation as a subsidiary
rather than as a branch. All else being equal, local incorporation gives host
authorities greater supervisory control over local operations by making it more
difficult for assets to be moved from local operations to the parent bank, i.e.,
ring-fencing. Furthermore, it enables the possible imposition of specific capital-
related prudential requirements which can provide some separation between the
subsidiary and the parent bank, thus reducing intra-group contagion risk (Mihaljek,
2008).
5.3 Other Policy Considerations
5.3.1 Increasing Capital Levels and Buffers.
Introduced as part of the new capital standard under Basel III, ‘ample’ or
conservation buffers reflect the large perceived negative externality associated
with a failure of a large cross-border bank and as such should be available to
enable banks to maintain large enough capital levels to offset losses in times of
adverse financial shocks. Countercyclical capital buffers, on the other hand, rests
on the concept that banks should build-up extra capital in times of excessive
credit growth and as such, banks can tap the buffer during periods of financial
distress without having to raise new capital immediately. Implementing such types
of capital buffers can improve the banking sector’s resilience to financial crises
as well as mitigate its impact on the entire economy.16
5.3.2 Deposit Insurance Scheme
Deposit insurance coverage could be lowered for large cross-border banks.
There is a perception that large cross-border banks pursue scale, e.g., mergers
and acquisitions, in order to become ‘too big to fail’. In order to mitigate such
an incentive, a spreading or sharing of the risk in the official financial safety-
net (a form of co-insurance) can be introduced by reducing the deposit insurance
coverage for large cross-border banks. This will also reduce the scope for free-
riding on the part of large cross-border banks as far as the financial safety net
mechanism of the banking sector is concerned.
5.3.3 Establishment of Cross-border Collateral Arrangements
This involves the central bank in one jurisdiction providing domestic currency
liquidity to eligible financial institutions against collaterals placed by their offices
in another jurisdiction into the liquidity-providing central bank’s account at the
local central bank. In essence, this is another way for central banks to provide
a cross-border bridge to support funding requirements in another jurisdiction should
interbank cross-border intermediation become impaired (CGFS-2010).
5.3.4 A Systemic Risk Charge or a Systemic Risk Levy on ‘Too-Big
    To Fail’ or ‘Systemically Important’ Cross-Border Institutions.
The bigger the financial institution, the higher is the likelihood that it will be
rescued in times of financial distress. In other words, the cost of the financial
rescue is directly related to the systemic relevance or size of the financial
institution. One solution is a systemic risk charge that mainly depends on the
size of the cross-border bank. This follows on from the basic principle of the
theory of externalities, which suggests that a polluter should be charged with a
tax that is equivalent to the social costs of the pollution. We can then regard
the systemic instability created by the cross-border bank’s activities as an
externality and a systemic risk charge could be regarded as a way to ‘internalise’
this problem of too-big to fail.
One such suggested approach is for regulators to assign systemic risk ratings
to a financial institution and then assess a capital or systemic risk surcharge
based on this rating. Banks with higher systemic risk rating would receive higher
capital or risk surcharges. In short, the surcharge is based on the financial
institution’s corresponding contribution to systemic risk. In principle, under certain
assumptions, a surcharge on capital is equivalent to a levy on capital in terms
of stifling the incentive for large cross-border banks to engage in systemic risk17
activities. However, an important difference between the two is that a levy
removes the funds from the financial institutions balance sheet, whereas a capital
surcharge leaves the funds under the control of the financial institutions (Doluca
et al, 2010).
In view of this difference, the advantage of the levy is that it can be used
to fund a ‘Systemic Stability Fund’ that would act as a private safety net in the
event of a financial crisis. The idea is that the accumulated levies can then be
re-invested into ‘convertible’ or liquid instruments by the Systemic Stability Fund
into the same financial institutions that had paid these levies. These liquid
instruments serve to fulfill the financial rescue role that in the event a large
cross-border banks gets into trouble, these same instruments can be used by the
supervisory authorities to ‘bail-in’ the weakened cross-border bank without
resorting to the use of public or taxpayer resources.
6. Concluding Remarks
The recent sub-prime crisis forces a rethink on the mandate of central
banks in the area of financial stability. Prior to the latest financial crisis, the
primary mandate in most central banks in Asia was on monetary policy stability,
in particular price stability. The recent crisis has demonstrated that years of
monetary stability during the period of great moderation did not safeguard
economies from financial instabilities. It was clearly illustrated as well that the
globalised banking system played a crucial role in transmitting the crisis from
the advanced economies to various parts of the world, including the emerging
markets of East and Southeast Asia.
For policy makers, it is no longer adequate to view the domestic banking
system and financial system as being separate from the domestic economy. The
increasing interconnectedness of domestic banking liquidity to the global funding
environment enhances the links between domestic financial stability and adverse
developments emanating outside the domestic economy. Our study examined
the role of international bank claims, in particular cross-border lending, as a
critical channel of transmission of worldwide financial shock on the local economy.
We focused on the recent crisis period to gather greater appreciation of the
exposure of the local financial system to these external shocks. In addition, we
looked into a number of home-country indicators of economic fundamentals.
The exposure and home country fundamental variables have been found to be
significant factors and confirmed the role of international bank lending as a
channel of shock transmission from the home countries to host economies.
Furthermore, the common lender effect — whereby movements in international18
banks’ claims on one economy may be transmitted to other economies that owe
claims from the same international banks—underscores the spillover effect that
was evident as well during the 1997-98  Asian financial crisis.
Going forward, more in-depth research on the roles, activities and impacts
of these global banks on the local economy, including local policies, should be
carried out. As regional banks such as CIMB, MayBank, OCBC and UOB (as
shown in Table 5) continue to expand their activities in the region, it will be
interesting to ascertain how they perform relative to the traditional global banks
such as Citibank, Standard Chartered Bank or HSBC. Are these regional banks
providing more stability in the region? At the end of the day, the influence of
the globalised banking system will likely continue to spread and deepen in the
SEACEN economies. Understanding their network of dealings and anticipating
their bearings in these economies will undoubtedly improve our capacity to manage
them and mitigate, if not, eliminate potential shocks coming from the financial
sector in the near future.19
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Chapter 2
INTERNATIONAL AND CROSS-BORDER BANK
LENDING AND IMPLICATIONS IN SEACEN ECONOMIES:
BALANCE SHEET PERSPECTIVE
THE CASE OF CAMBODIA
By
Souk Mann and Chea Vuthy1
1. Introduction
Banks and their principal financial-service competitors are expanding their
service beyond local boundaries to become international banking institutions. The
majority of commercial and financial transactions now flow across international
borders. The continuing search for higher revenues, lower operating costs, and
reduction in risk exposure through geographic diversification is the driving force
towards these cross border operations. Along with British, Japanese, German
and Canadian banks, U.S. commercial banking institutions have led in the
development of international banking facilities to meet the financial needs of
foreign institutions and multinational corporations. International financial services
today continue to be important sources of earnings for banks and nonbank
institutions around the world. A number of facilities being established across
border include representative offices, agency offices, branch offices, subsidiaries,
joint ventures, international banking facilities etc. (Peter S. R. & Sylvia C. H.,
2005).
The advent of economic globalisation and financial liberalisation has allowed
participation of foreign banks, either through expanded cross-border lending
activities and/or via direct entry into local bank markets. This  has generated
significant local benefits in terms of enhanced efficiency, provision of liquidity,
risk-sharing, and overall potential growth opportunities. At the same time, the34
globalisation of banking can also have profound effects on the transmission of
shocks across markets and on the effectiveness of policy tools applied at home
and abroad. The transmission of the recent crisis into the emerging-market
economies has also been through the existence of the global banks via both
sides of the balance sheet. The adverse liquidity shocks brought about by the
crisis have reduced lending in local markets through contractions in cross-border
lending and parent banks’ support of their foreign affiliates. Since the central
bank is the supervisory authority of the banking system, understanding the size
and nature of the global bank’s presence in their respective economies would
be critical in conducting effective policies for dealing with any potential financial
shocks to the local economy.
This paper, therefore, aims at examining the global banks’ balance sheets
and how shocks could be transmitted from the home economy to Cambodia, the
host economy. In particular, because of data limitation, we would examine only
the effects of the global financial crisis 2007-2009 through the foreign banks’
balance sheets. The findings would be utilised to suggest policy options, including
the areas of regulation and supervision, in addressing risks associated with the
cross-border banking system. Section 2 presents the general review of literature
on the internationalisation and globalisation of banks with the balance of evidence
supporting the view that foreign bank entry would be a stabilising force for host
markets and result in a more efficient allocation of productive resources in a
globalised economy as observed by Goldberg (2009).A brief stylised fact on
Cambodia’s economy and financial system is also covered in this Section. Section
3 presents the main features of the data used for the analysis of foreign banks’
involvement pre- and during the recent global financial crisis in Cambodia. The
foreign bank data is grouped by economies, and selected according to the recent
data on larger shares of assets to total assets of all foreign banks and the larger
shares of foreign bank lending of those particular economies to total foreign
bank lending. Five economies have been chosen for the analysis namely, Malaysia,
Thailand, Chinese Taipei, Netherlands, Australia, and Korea. The focus is to
examine the key data on foreign bank participation rate, the foreign bank lending
(including the cross-border bank claims) and deposits relative to GDP and share
of foreign assets. The research methodology and empirical results using the
quarterly data from 1999Q1-2010Q2would be presented in Section 4. Policy
implications on prudential, supervisory, and regulatory aspects of monetary policy
would then be drawn up and discussed in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the
paper.35
2. Literature Review and Stylised Fact about Cambodia’s Economy
In principle, there are two basic channels through which internationally active
banks can provide credit to other economies - directly, i.e., via cross-border
(international) lending, or indirectly, via entering the domestic market of a host
economy in the form of a subsidiary or a branch and providing credit locally.
The later form is seen to be on the rise. Banking business through international
banks’ branches and subsidiaries in emerging markets has more than quadrupled
in recent years (Gallego, Herrero, and Luna, 2004).The transformation of the
banking sector towards a more globalised one has become apparent in the recent
financial crisis (Karolina 2010).
The Global Development Finance of the World Bank has reported that at
the end of 2007, there were 910 foreign banks present in developing economies,
which controlled combined assets in excess of US$1.2 trillion and accounted for
more than 39% of total domestic banking assets. Foreign-owned lenders
accounted for a particularly high proportion of local banking assets in three regions
- 70% in several Eastern European economies, and approximately 40% in some
Latin American and Sub-Saharan economies. In some economies, such as Peru
and Mozambique, their share was almost 100%, while in others, such Albania
and Croatia, one or two foreign banks control the largest share of the local
banking system (World Bank 2009). In Cambodia, the three largest banks are
foreign-owned and account for 55% of total assets, while the “big five” banks,
also foreign-owned, hold 71% of total assets.
Some literatures attempt to endorse the potential benefits of the existence
of foreign banks in the host economy. The entry of new players into local markets
may lead to a more competitive environment, generating efficiency gains that
can be passed on to consumers in the form of a greater variety of financial
services and lower prices. Other potential benefits of cross-border banking are
transfers and spillovers of knowledge and know-how. In particular, host economies
with weak local banks and a lack of experience with bank supervision might
benefit from the transmission of knowledge from foreign banks and supervisory
authorities to local counterparts.
Moreover, cross-border banking has the potential to improve financial stability
though controversial. However, the empirical evidence on this issue is that cross-
border banking on balance seems to improve rather than weaken financial
stability. They have the potential to contribute to the overall soundness of local
banking systems. Foreign banks are typically less open to government pressure36
to lend to “preferred borrowers”, which may contribute to an improvement in
the overall quality of the loan portfolios. And they are less likely to be affected
by stress in the local market since they usually hold a more geographically
diversified credit portfolio. Moreover, affiliates of foreign-owned banks that
generally have better access to international funding may serve as a countervailing
force to the local business cycle. More importantly, foreign bank entry can have
a positive impact on the host economy authorities, which in turn may induce
stricter regulation and improved financial supervision.
The transmission of shock from the financial crisis via international bank
lending also becomes a topic of interest among others. Cross-border lending
seems to be a two-way street for contagion. Crises can be transmitted from
advanced countries to emerging markets, not just the other way around. In addition,
cross-border lending can transmit advanced country credit booms. Policymakers
might want to reduce the resulting vulnerabilities. On the other hand, cross-
border lending is normally a channel for efficient international capital allocation.
Emerging markets might wish to continue to benefit from this access to
international lending. Given the heterogeneity of emerging markets, the policy
responses might differ substantially across countries.
Some recent literature concentrates on the role of the banking system and
international banks in transmitting financial shocks across borders (Sbracia,
Zaghini, 2003). Some literature in this strand uses the same data source as this
paper, namely the BIS statistics on the international banking business (van
Rijckeghem, Weder, 2001), whereas other literature uses, for example, the data
from the Coordinated Portfolio Investment Survey compiled by the IMF (de
Alessi Gracio et al., 2005).
To the authors’ knowledge, there is no study on the home-host effect of
foreign bank lending in Cambodia per se. Some studies consolidate data of Asia
as a group of developing Asian economies with no detailed discussion on
Cambodia or omit it altogether.  Also, due to the limitation of the data available
in the BIS data set and elsewhere, we attempt to use the data from the Cambodia
supervisory authority plus author’s own estimates, the reliability of which may
be called into question. However, it is the best option available to get some
grasp of the impact of foreign banks’ presence in the economy through their
balance sheets, in particular their lending performance.37
2.1 Overview of the Cambodia Economy
Since the mid-1980s, realising the vast potential provided by the world
community and FDI, Cambodia embraced a market-based economic system.
Cambodia has gradually moved away from a planned economy to a market-
based economy supported by a wide range of economic reforms.
Economic growth has averaged 10% in the last decade. This spectacular
growth was made possible by sharp increases in trade and investments. Economic
growth accelerated to 13.5% in 2005 despite negative external developments
such as higher oil prices, terrorism, and the spread of epidemic diseases. In
2007, the growth was 9.5%  as compared to 6.7% in 2008. Political stability,
accompanied by greater investor confidence, has provided the basis for the robust
growth performance, which has been driven mainly by agriculture, tourism,
garment exports, and increased construction activities. A sharp decrease in the
growth rate to 0.1% in 2009 has occurred due to the slowdown in global economy
as a result of the recent financial crisis (Figure 1).38
The growing integration of Cambodia into regional and global communities
is reflected through the increase in trade and investments albeit fraught with
opportunities and challenges. Cambodia has actively participated on an equal
footing and with equal rights in ASEAN, the WTO, as well as in other sub-
regional, regional, and global cooperation groupings. These linkages have created
a favourable environment for the development of agriculture, tourism, garment
industries, as well as financial industry.
Dollarisation in Cambodia also contributes to greater economic and financial
integration with the rest of the world through reduced transaction costs and the
reduction in exchange rate risk. The wide use of US dollars in the economy has
attracted foreign direct investments and the banking sector per se has also
benefited from this special dollarised environment. Although this limits the ability
of the Central Bank to conduct monetary policy, the banking sector has
nonetheless, been quite stable even with the presence of many foreign banks
in Cambodia.
2.2 Financial System in Cambodia
In the early 1990s, the first foreign bank that invested in Cambodia was the
Cambodian Commercial Bank. The Cambodian Public Bank followed in 1992,
with other commercial banks ensuing. The promulgation of the Law on Foreign
Direct Investment has attracted an influx of foreign capital into Cambodia, adding
to the existing small local capital. In Cambodia, the number of banks has been
increasing rapidly since the first general election. Foreign bank branches and
the locally incorporated banks with share of foreign ownership are also on the
rise.
Over the last decade, following a restructuring of the banking system in
1999, developments in the banking sector have been significant. As of June
2010, Cambodia’s financial system consists of the National Bank of Cambodia
(NBC) as the Central Bank, 27 commercial banks, 6 specialised banks, and 21
microfinance institutions (MFIs). The NBC is in charge of licensing, de-licensing
and supervision of commercial banks, specialised banks (providing rural credit
and loans to small and medium-sized enterprises, and they are not allowed to
take deposits), and MFIs (serving rural poor), based on capital requirements,
capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity, and sensitivity to
market risk rating systems.
The number of banks, referring to the total number of banks including foreign
and local banks doing business in the kingdom of Cambodia, decreased from 3239
in early 1999 to 17 during the period of 2002-2005 but started increasing to
more than 30 from mid 2009. Because of market-oriented reforms, the financial
system has been transformed. Financial liberalisation has been introduced and
foreign funded commercial banks are permitted to operate in Cambodia. Since
then, the number of banks has increased significantly to 26 in 2000, and 33 in
June 2010 (Figure 2). Most of the banks operating in Cambodia are foreign
owned banks, in the form of locally-incorporated foreign banks or branches. In
this paper however, three types of foreign owned banks have been defined:
branches (100% foreign ownership share), local affiliates (less than 50% foreign
ownership share), and foreign affiliates (more than 50% ownership share). On
the other hand, the foreign bank is generally defined based on foreign ownership
of more than 50% that is similar to the foreign affiliates defined above. The
number of foreign affiliates or foreign banks went down from 24 in early 1999
to10 during the period of late 2002 and mid 2005 and then started increasing
from that period to 23 from late 2009. The factors that caused those banks to
decline included the impact of the relicensing programme that required all banks
to increase their minimum capital requirements to US$13 million. Those that
could not fulfill this requirement were forced to liquidate. Based on this definition,
in June 2010, there were 23 foreign banks operating in Cambodia. This number
is expected to get higher since many foreign investors are becoming increasingly
interested in doing business in Cambodia due to the good investment environments.40
Total banking assets amounted to more than 50% of GDP, with the
commercial banks accounting for almost 99% of those assets in June 2010. The
commercial banking industry is highly concentrated – the three largest banks,
foreign banks in this context, accounted for 55% of total assets. The “big five”
banks, classified as foreign banks for the analytical purpose of this paper, hold
71% of total assets, and account for 77% of net credits from the banking sector.
The Cambodian banking sector provides credit to rather concentrated sectors
of the economy. As of June 2010, credit concentration by economic sector
analysis saw the largest concentration in retail trade activities (18.4% of the
total portfolio), followed by wholesale trade (14.5%) and the hotel and restaurant
industry (12%). The retail and wholesale trade, which is mainly composed of
small-medium enterprises, is the backbone of private businesses in Cambodia.
Credit concentration in other sectors was recorded at manageable levels.
Figure 3
Banks – Credit Classified by Sectors, June 2010
2.3 Cambodia’s Banking Sector and the Global Financial Crisis
Cambodia’s financial sector remains vibrant and competitive. The rapid
increase in deposits in the commercial banks attests to growing public confidence
inspired by transparent government policies and a level playing field for investors
(Figure 6).
The global financial crisis had a minimal impact on Cambodia’s banking
sector. During 2008 and early 2009, there was no direct impact on the economy’s
financial system due to the developing nature of the Cambodian financial system
and the insignificant participation in the global financial markets. Banks continue
to perform traditional banking activities, relying on local deposits rather than41
external borrowing for their business. They also have no exposure to the securitised
instruments that were at the root of the crisis. Despite no direct impact on the
Cambodian banking system, this crisis has, nonetheless, caused some indirect
impact as shown by the decline of the year-on-year credit growth and deposit
growth from more 50% before the crisis to less than 20% after the crisis.
In response to the global financial crisis, measures have been taken to
recapitalise banks and financial institutions, improve audits, strengthen supervision,
and ensure sufficient liquidity in the banking system.
3. Analysis of Foreign Banks’ Involvement Pre-and During the Global
Financial Crisis in Cambodia
The economic growth of Cambodia was around 10% during the10 year
period before the crisis. These growths were supported by the banking and
financial system. This can be explained by the increase of bank assets.
Significantly, bank assets rose by 1058% from almost KHR 3 trillion in December
1999 to nearly KHR 25 trillion in June 2010, of which the foreign bank assets
went up by 1286% from KHR 1.7 trillion to over 13 KHR trillion during the
same period. In terms of GDP, the ratio of total bank assets and foreign bank
assets to GDP rose from 19% and 11% at the end of 1999 to 53% and 37%
respectively at the end of June 2010.Moreover, the sharp increase of bank assets
was also attributable to public confidence in banking system (Figure 4).42
Regarding bank investments, foreign banks lending increased almost 2000%
in June 2010 from KHR420 billion at the end of 1999. The ratio of foreign bank
lending to GDP also rose noticeably from 3% at the end of 1999 to nearly 20%
in June 2010 (Figure 5).
In order to support the increases in assets of the Cambodian banking system,
domestic as well as foreign banks tried to look for sources of funds via many
ways. Among these sources, deposits have played an important role in
accelerating the growth of bank assets and values. It should be noted that total
bank deposits increased by more than 1500% in June 2010 from KHR 949.8
billion at the end of 1999 while foreign bank deposits rose by 2300% from KHR
423.5 billion during the same period. In addition, the total bank deposits compared
with GDP increased from 7% at the end of 1999 to 44% in June 2010 while
the foreign bank deposits to GDP rose from 3% in December 1999 to 30% in
June 2010. Moreover, foreign bank deposits compared with total bank deposits
grew from 45% in December 1999 to 67% in June 2010 (Figure 6).43
Cambodia, a small and open economy, depends on external demands, foreign
visitors and foreign direct investments. Even though the Cambodian banking
financial system is not complex like other developed economies, it is affected
indirectly by problems in these economies since its economic growth and
investments depend on foreign investors. This is depicted by some indicators,
for instance, the year-on-year total bank assets and foreign bank asset growth
which grew from 16% and 14% at the end of 1999 to 72% and 102% at the
end of 2007 (prior to the global financial crisis), which then declined to 11% and
12% respectively at the end of June 2010 (after the global financial crisis) (Figure
3).
Moreover, before the global financial crisis, total lending in the banking
system rose sharply at the annual rate of 32% at the end of 2005 to 103% in
June 2008 but declined dramatically to 2.9% in November 2009 (Figure 7).44
In the meantime, foreign bank claims in Cambodia increased yearly from
41% at the end of 2005 to 97% at the end of 2007 and then decreased to 11%
in June 2010 (Figure 8).
The sources of funds in banking system have been affected indirectly as
indicated by Figure 6 which shows that the annual deposit growth rate in the
whole banking system increased from 17% at the end of 2005 to 75% at the
end of December 2007 but then declined to 3% in late 2008, while the annual
deposits growth rate of foreign banks rose from 32% in December 2005 to
108% at the end of 2007 but decreased to1% at the end of 2008.
The sharp increase in credit to the private sector during the period of 2002-
June 2008 is due to the economic expansion resulting from the increase of
garment exports to the United States and the European Union and real estate
boom, driving banks keenness to provide loans to support these sectors.  The
global financial crisis affected almost every economy in the world, especially
developed economies including the United States and the European Union which
import goods from Cambodia. The unexpected decline of consumption in these
economies caused the drop in demand for Cambodian goods, which in turn led
to production cut downs and stagnated credit lending in the system. Foreign
bank lending from parent companies were declining due also to the liquidity
problems faced in their home economies.
In spite of the indirect impact on the Cambodian banking system and foreign
banks in the Kingdom of Cambodia, the total number of banks including foreign45
banks was on the upward trend.  Figure 2 shows that the total number of banks
and foreign banks increased from 20 and 11 at the end of December 2006 to
33 and 23 in June 2010 respectively.
We can see that from groupings by economies using the shares of foreign
bank assets over total assets of all foreign banks that economies dominating the
Cambodian banking sector have been changing. Interestingly, Malaysia which
accounted for only 30% of the total foreign banks’ assets in the first quarter of
1999 has become the market leader in the banking sector in terms of asset
shares, around 40%, even bigger than the share of other economies, which
dropped from 30% in January 1999 to 26% by June 2010. (Other economies
that have smaller shares or decreasing share or disappeared at the later stages
of the banking system development include China, France, Indonesia, Singapore,
Hong Kong, Kazakhstan, US, Japan, British, Germany, Vietnam and India). The
share of Thai banks in Cambodia was around 30% in the period of early 1999-
late 2000 and mid 2003-late 2005, but it declined to about 20% by late 2002.
It should be noted that shares of Thai banks in Cambodia remained only around
7% in June 2010. Thailand’s involvement in the system has been on a decreasing
trend due to the new entry from bigger banks of other economies such as
Australia, Korea and Vietnam (Figure 9).
From Figure 10, it can be seen that Malaysia has kept its lead on foreign
bank lending at about 40% at the end of June 2010. The increase in share
during 2007 up until early 2009 is due to the new entrants from Malaysian banks.
Groupings of other economies remain at around 30%, dropping from over 40%
in 1999. Other economies’ participation rate in the Cambodia banking system is
getting competitive in the last few years, even during the crisis period of 2007
to 2009.46
Since there is no data available on total foreign bank claims for a particular
economy to all other economies, the BIS quarterly data on the BIS banks’
external positions have been used to obtain the outflows of the economies in the
study as a proxy of the total claims extended by foreign economies  as seen
in Figure 11. The data on foreign claims on Cambodia is calculated by the author
using the Central Bank data. The exposure of the foreign bank claims on
Cambodia over the total claims extended by selected foreign economies is used.
Since Malaysian bank lending in Cambodia comprise the largest share at
41% in terms of foreign bank claims on Cambodia in June 2010, this Section
is focused mostly on the annual change of foreign claims from Malaysia on
Cambodia and on the rest of the world. Figure 11 shows that   the annual
growth rates of foreign bank claims from Malaysia to the rest of the world
increased from 49% in at the end of 2006 to 93% in the third quarter of 2007
then declined dramatically from 64% at the end of 2007 to -44% during the
period of September 2008-June 2009. Specifically, Malaysian bank claims on
Cambodia showed  significant annual growth during the pre financial crisis period,
that is, the annual growth rates of Malaysian bank claims on Cambodia increased
from 82% at the end of 2006 to 150% in March 2008 then decreased dramatically
to -3% during the period of third quarter of 2009-fourth quarter of 2010.
This Section analyses the exposures faced by each foreign bank providing
financing to domestic investors in Cambodia. The exposure value is calculated
by dividing each foreign bank lending in Cambodia by total foreign bank claims47
to any foreign economies including Cambodia and the number varies in the range
of 0 and 1. If the exposure value is close to 1, it means that foreign bank
financing in Cambodia does not face any liquidity risk or capital outflow issue
since the numerator representing foreign bank claims in Cambodia by a particular
foreign bank is increasing compared to the denominator representing total foreign
bank claims to the rest of the world.
In particular, the exposures of Malaysian banks increased from 0.17% in
the early 1999 to 3.66% in the late 2009 but got lower from 3.43% at the end
of 2009 to 2.5% in June 2010. This can be explained by the fact that from early
1999, financing from Malaysia to Cambodia was very stable and safe but from
the late 2009 to June 2010, there was some indirect impact of the global financial
crisis for Malaysian banks in Cambodia. This can also be explained by the decline
of quarterly growth of Malaysian bank lending in Cambodia from 3% in the
second quarter of 2009 to -12% in the same quarter of 2010 while the total
claims of Malaysian banks to the rest of the world was on the upward trend
from -16% in the second quarter of 2009 to 17% in the first quarter of 2010.
On the contrary way, other foreign bank claims to Cambodia such as Thailand,
Chinese Taipei, Australia, Netherlands, and Korea did not demonstrate significant
threats to the Cambodian banking system during the pre- and post crisis period
as can be seen in Figure 12 which shows that the exposures have remained
relatively unchanged within the range of 0.04%-0.40% for Thai bank lending in
Cambodia to its domestic borrowers from the early 1999 to the second quarter
of 2010.48
Based on the data of OEDC, IFS and author’s estimate, the quarterly GDP
growth seems to move in the same direction. Most of foreign economies providing
credit to Cambodia had negative economic growth from the fourth quarter of
2008 to the third quarter 2009 as a result of the global financial crisis during that
period.
4. Research Methodology and Empirical Results
This Section discusses the analytical results of the impact of foreign bank
claims on Cambodia pre and post global financial crisis. This paper analyses the
results of time series and penal data of main foreign banks doing business in
Cambodia. The reasons that the two models have been used are to compare
the results of those models to gauge the main and various impacts of foreign
bank claims on Cambodia. However, since the times series data are very limited
with only 45 observations, they may not yield good results. Thus, the panel data
would be a complementary analysis. When the panel data has been used by
combining the time series and cross-sectional data, the number of observations
has been increased to almost 270. The following model was used for both the
times series and panel data. The estimates of the effect on foreign bank claims
is followed by the model set up by Martinez-Peria et al (2005) as follows:49
The  data definitions are  follows:
Δlog (Foreign_Bank_Claims)jt refers to the first difference of the logarithm
of foreign bank claims by foreign banks in Cambodia. Foreign bank claims are
referred to as the total foreign bank claims of foreign economies that were
taken from the liabilities of the Bank of International for Settlements. Foreign
Country Lender Factors are referred to as the quarterly GDP growth of the key
foreign economies that have predominant foreign banks in Cambodia. This data
was taken from OEDC, IFS and author’s estimate. GFC Dummy variable was
used to indicate the global financial crisis. When the dummy variable equals 1,
this indicates the presence of the global financial crisis during the period 2007,
2008, and 2009 while a dummy equaling to 0 specifies the absence of global
financial crisis. Exposure is the ratio of foreign bank claims on Cambodia over
the total claims extended to the rest of the world by foreign banks.
In order to analyse the above equations, all the parameters, dependent and
independent variables would be estimated based on the regression analysis of
time series and panel data since the objective of regression analysis is used to
estimate the mean or average value of the dependent variable, as well as the
coefficients of β0,β1,β2,β3, and β4 for the independent variables. The sample
observations have been used to estimate the population parameters by utilising
the regression analysis.
This Section divides the analysis into two parts (i) regression analysis of
main foreign bank claims based on times series and (ii) regression analysis of
panel data.
4.1 Regression Analysis of Times Series Data
The regression analysis of times series would be presented first. For this
part, two main foreign banks from ASEAN member economies and developed
economies have been selected. Only the main foreign bank claims would be
analysed. The first one is to analyse the times series data of the Malaysian case
because it represents the biggest foreign bank lending in Cambodia.50
4.1.1 Case of Malaysian Bank Claims on Cambodia
After having run the regression, the result of time series analysis was
obtained as shown in the Table 1. Based on the Table 1, the regression equation
is as follows:
Ulog(Malaysian Bank Claims) = – 0.02682 – 0.00017 GDP Malaysia
+ 0.00568 GDP Cambodia + 0.06106 GFC Dummy – 0.00794GFC Dummy
* Exposure Malaysia.
This equation could be interpreted as the coefficient of the quarterly GDP
growth of Malaysia being negative and statistically insignificant, based on the
5% level of significance with two tailed test. In addition, the null hypothesis
signifies that the quarterly GDP growth of Malaysia does not affect the Malaysian
bank claims on Cambodia was rejected. There is a negative relationship between
the quarterly GDP growth of Malaysia and the first difference of logarithm of
Malaysian bank claims on Cambodia. Specifically, the partial regression coefficient
of the quarterly GDP growth of Malaysia of -0.00017 means that holding other
explanatory variables constant, when the quarterly GDP growth of Malaysia
decreased by 1%, the Malaysian bank claims on Cambodia increases by
0.00017%.
Similarly, at 5% level of significance with two tailed test, the null hypothesis
which stated that the quarterly GDP growth of Cambodia does not have any
impacts on Malaysian bank claims was not accepted since the partial regression
coefficient of the quarterly GDP growth of Cambodia is positive and statistically
significant. As a result, there is a positive relationship between the quarterly
GDP growth of Cambodia and Malaysian bank claims on Cambodia. While holding
other explanatory variables unchanged, this partial regression coefficient of the
quarterly GDP growth of Cambodia of 0.00568 signifies that Malaysian bank
lending to the private sector in Cambodia would increase by 0.0057% for every
increase of 1% of quarterly GDP growth of Cambodia.
Moreover, based on the 5% level of significance with the two tailed test,
the null hypothesis stating that global financial crisis dummy variable does not
have any impact on the Malaysian bank claims on Cambodia was rejected
because the partial regression coefficient of the quarterly GDP growth of
Cambodia is positive and statistically significant. In reality, the partial regression
coefficient of global financial crisis dummy variable equasl to 0.061 meaning
that Malaysian bank claims on Cambodia increases by 0.061% for every increase51
of 1% for the global financial crisis while holding other explanatory variables
constant.
On the other hand, with regard to the 5% level of significance with two
tailed test, the null hypothesis which signifies that the exposure of Malaysia
does not affect Malaysian bank claims on Cambodia was not accepted since the
partial regression coefficient of the global financial crisis and exposure Malaysia
is negative and statistically insignificant. This would mean that there is a negative
relationship between the global financial crisis and exposure of Malaysia and
the Malaysian bank claims on Cambodia. While holding other explanatory variables
unchanged, this partial regression coefficient of Malaysia exposure of -0.008
means that Malaysian bank lending to the private sector in Cambodia would
decrease by 0.008% for every increase of 1% of global financial crisis and
exposure of Malaysia.
In general, this equation concludes that there are positive relationships
between the first difference of logarithm of Malaysian bank claims on Cambodia
and the quarterly GDP growth of Cambodia, and global financial crisis dummy
variables and negative relationship between the first difference of logarithm of
Malaysian bank claims on Cambodia and the quarterly GDP growth of Malaysia,
and global financial crisis and exposure of Malaysia. This could mean that when
quarterly GDP growth of Malaysia declines, many Malaysian banks would come
to invest and lend more money to the private sector in Cambodia because there
are more opportunities to make profits in Cambodia than in Malaysia.
Table 1: Summary Output of Malaysian Bank Claims on Cambodia52
4.1.2 Case of Thailand Bank Claims on Cambodia
Table 2 allows the regression equation to be written as follow:
Ulog(Thailand Bank Claims) = – 0.03239 + 0.0062 GDP Thailand +
0.00009 GDP Cambodia - 0.076 GFC Dummy + 0.45GFC Dummy *
Exposure Thailand.
This equation could be interpreted as the coefficients of the quarterly GDP
growth of Thailand, the quarterly GDP growth of Cambodia, and global financial
crisis and exposure Thailand are positive and statistically insignificant, while global
financial crisis dummy is negative and statistically insignificant, based on the 5%
level of significance with two tailed test. The null hypothesis signifies that the
quarterly GDP growth of Thailand, the quarterly GDP growth of Cambodia,
global financial crisis, and global financial crisis and exposure Thailand do not
affect the Thailand bank claims on Cambodia was rejected. There is a positive
relationship between the quarterly GDP growth of Thailand and the first difference
of logarithm of Thailand bank claims on Cambodia. Particularly, the partial
regression coefficient of the quarterly GDP growth of Thailand of 0.0062 means
that holding other explanatory variables constant, when the quarterly GDP growth
of Thailand rises by 1%, the Thailand bank claims on Cambodia increases by
0.0062%. In addition, while holding other explanatory variables unchanged, the
partial regression coefficient of the quarterly GDP growth of Cambodia of 0.00009
signifies that Thailand bank lending to private sector in Cambodia would increase
by 0.00009% for every increase of 1% of the quarterly GDP growth of Cambodia.
In a similar way, the partial regression coefficient of global financial crisis dummy
variable equaling to -0.076 means that the Thai bank claims on Cambodia would
decrease by 0.076% for every increase of 1% for global financial crisis while
holding other explanatory variables constant. Moreover, while holding other
explanatory variables unchanged, the partial regression coefficient of the global
financial crisis dummy and exposure of Thailand of 0.45 means that Thai bank
lending to the private sector in Cambodia would increase by 0.45% for every
increase of 1% of global financial crisis and exposure Thailand.
This regression equation could mean that when quarterly GDP growth of
Thailand and Cambodia increase, Thai banks would invest and provide more
credits to the private sector in Cambodia because there are opportunities to
make profits. Moreover, Cambodia and Thailand can export goods and services
to each other since both economies  are neighbours with linkages of business
activities such as tourist arrivals to Cambodia through Thailand’s international
airport but staying in Cambodian hotels.53
The following two tables emphasise on the analysis of foreign banks from
developed economies to see whether there are any different impacts on their
lending in Cambodia. In particular, Table 3 allows the regression equation to be
written as follows:
Ulog(Australian Bank Claims) = – 6.73 + 1.48GDP Australia + 0.21
GDP Cambodia – 7.26 GFC Dummy + 101.14 GFC Dummy * Exposure
Australia
This equation indicates that the coefficients of the quarterly GDP growth
of Australia, the quarterly GDP growth of Cambodia, and global financial crisis
and exposure of Australia are positive and statistically insignificant, while global
financial crisis dummy is negative and statistically insignificant, according to the
5% level of significance with two tailed test. Moreover, the null hypothesis stating
that the quarterly GDP growth of Australia, the quarterly GDP growth of
Cambodia, global financial crisis, and global financial crisis and exposure of
Australia do not have any impacts on the Australian bank claims on Cambodia
was rejected. The partial regression coefficient of the quarterly GDP growth of
Australia of 1.48 shows that holding other explanatory variables constant, if the
quarterly GDP growth of Australia increase by 1%, the Australian bank claims
on Cambodia would rise by 1.48%. In the same way, while holding other
Table 2: Summary Output Of Thailand Bank Claims on Cambodia54
explanatory variables constant, the partial regression coefficient of the quarterly
GDP growth of Cambodia of 0.21 indicates that Australian bank claims on
Cambodia would increase by 0.21% for every increase of 1% of quarterly GDP
growth of Cambodia. On the other hand, the partial regression coefficient of
global financial crisis dummy variable equaling to -7.26 means that the Australian
bank claims on Cambodia would decline by 7.26% for every increase of 1% for
global financial crisis while holding other explanatory variables constant. Lastly,
while holding other explanatory variables unchanged, the partial regression
coefficient of the global financial crisis dummy and exposure Australia of 101.14
signifies that Australian bank lending to private sector in Cambodia would increase
by 101.14% for every increase of 1% of global financial crisis and exposure
Australia.
This regression analysis would mean that when quarterly GDP growth of
Australia and Cambodia increase, Australian banks would come to invest and
provide more loans to the private sector in Cambodia because there are the
opportunities to make profits and expand their business there.
Table 3: Summary Output of Australian Bank Claims on Cambodia
According to the Table 4, the regression equation could be written as follow:
Ulog(Netherland Bank Claims) =  2.23 + 0.324GDP Netherlands -
0.22 GDP Cambodia – 1.22 GFC Dummy + 8.37 GFC Dummy * Exposure
Netherlands.55
The above equation means that the coefficients of the quarterly GDP growth
of Netherlands and global financial crisis and exposure of Netherlands are positive
and statistically insignificant, while the global financial crisis dummy and the
quarterly GDP growth of Netherlands are negative and statistically insignificant,
according to the 5% level of significance with two tailed test. Moreover, the null
hypothesis stating that the quarterly GDP growth of Netherlands, the quarterly
GDP growth of Cambodia, global financial crisis, and global financial crisis and
exposure of Netherlands do not have any impacts on the Netherlands bank
claims on Cambodia was rejected. The partial regression coefficient of the
quarterly GDP growth of Netherlands of 0.324 means that the Netherlands bank
claims on Cambodia would increase by 0.324% for every 1% increase of the
quarterly GDP growth of Netherland, while holding other explanatory variables
constant. On the other hand, while holding other explanatory variables fixed, the
partial regression coefficient of the quarterly GDP growth of Cambodia of -0.22
indicates that Netherlands bank claims on Cambodia would decrease by 0.22%
for every increase of 1% of quarterly GDP growth of Cambodia. Moreover, the
partial regression coefficient of global financial crisis dummy variable equaling
to -1.22 signifies that the Netherlands bank claims on Cambodia would decline
by 1.22% for every increase of 1% of the global financial crisis while holding
other explanatory variables constant. Finally, while holding other explanatory
variables unchanged, the partial regression coefficient of the global financial
crisis dummy and exposure of Netherlands of 8.37 means that Netherlands bank
lending to the private sector in Cambodia would rise by 8.37% for every increase
of 1% of global financial crisis and exposure of the Netherlands.
This regression analysis shows that when the quarterly GDP growth of
Netherlands ncreases, Netherland banks provide more loans to the private sector
in Cambodia because  they can have more sources of funds from their economy
to expand their business in Cambodia. In the meantime, when quarterly GDP
growth of Cambodia decreases, Netherland bank claims on Cambodia are more
likely to increase since during negative economic growth, he central bank of the
host economy may conduct expansionary monetary policy to increase money
supply. Most Netherland banks are joint ventures with local banks and has the
largest market share in Cambodia.56
Table 4: Summary Output of Netherlands Bank Claims on Cambodia
A. Regression Analysis of Panel Data
Since the time series data is limited, this research paper had to use panel
data along with cross-sectional data. The ordinary least square produced the
result as illustrated in the Table 5 which shows the regression equation as follows:
U log(Foreign Bank Claims) = -0.00126 - 0.00057GDP Foreign
Countries + 0.00071 GDP Cambodia + 0.00745 GFC Dummy - 0.0034
GFC Dummy * Exposure Foreign Countries
The above equation explains that the coefficients of the quarterly GDP
growth of foreign economies and global financial crisis and exposure foreign of
economies are negative and statistically insignificant, while the coefficients of
the global financial crisis dummy and the quarterly GDP growth of Cambodia
are positive and statistically significant, according to the 5% level of significance
with two tailed test. In addition, the null hypothesis stating that the quarterly
GDP growth of foreign economies, the quarterly GDP growth of Cambodia,
global financial crisis, and global financial crisis and exposure of foreign economies
do not have any impact on the foreign bank claims on Cambodia was rejected.
The partial regression coefficient of the quarterly GDP growth of foreign
economies of -0.00057 means that foreign bank claims on Cambodia would
decrease by 0.00057% for every 1% increase of the quarterly GDP growth of57
foreign economies, holding other explanatory variables constant. On the other
hand, while holding other explanatory variables constant, the partial regression
coefficient of the quarterly GDP growth of Cambodia of 0.00071 means that
foreign bank claims on Cambodia would increase by 0.00071% for every increase
of 1% of quarterly GDP growth of Cambodia. In the same way, the partial
regression coefficient of global financial crisis dummy variable equaling to 0.00745
explains that the foreign bank claims on Cambodia would increase by 0.00745%
for every increase of 1% for global financial crisis while holding other explanatory
variables constant. Finally, while holding other explanatory variables unchanged,
the partial regression coefficient of the global financial crisis dummy and exposure
of foreign economies of -0.0034 means that foreign bank lending to the private
sector in Cambodia would decline by 0.0034% for every increase of 1% of
global financial crisis and exposure of foreign economies.
This regression analysis of panel data illustrates that when the quarterly
GDP growth of foreign economies decreases and the quarterly GDP growth of
Cambodia increases, foreign banks tend to provide more loans to the private
sector in Cambodia because they could have more opportunities to invest and
expand their business in Cambodia.
Table 5: Summary Output of Foreign Bank Claims on Cambodia58
In conclusion, both regression analysis of time series and panel data could
explain that panel data could provide better results than the time series as most
of coefficients are statistically significant and have the right signs. However, the
regression analysis equations of both times series and panel data did not yield
very good fits due to the low R square value. This low value of R square was
a result of limited data.
5. Policy Implications
The empirical results of the time series and panel data show that most of
the economies including Malaysia, Thailand, Australia, and Chinese Taipei are
willing to provide more loans to the domestic private sectors in Cambodia when
there are the increases in the quarterly GDP growths in Cambodia since these
are the golden opportunities for them to generate more income from their
investments and their customers are also able to generate cash flows in order
to pay off their debts. This would be good to spur economic growth for the host
economy but the Central Bank of Cambodia has to examine and monitor foreign
bank activities with closely specifically for the sectors they are providing loans
to since some sectors such as real estate may not be able to generate income
easily. Other external sectors could be affected by surges in oil prices and political
unrest which could affect the loan repayments by borrowers even though they
are qualified and creditworthy.
On the contrary, the regression results also show that some economies such
as Netherlands and Korea are likely to provide more credits to their customers
in Cambodia when the quarterly GDP growth of Cambodia declines since these
are chances to attract more customers due to the  government’s implementation
of expansionary monetary policy at lower policy rate or lower required reserve
ratio in order to spur economic growth and investments. The central bank of the
host economy should therefore monitor the intentions of some foreign banks in
providing loans to their customers only during economic downturns in Cambodia.
If this regression results become true, this may lead to credit risks because
during adverse economic conditions, borrowers may not be able to generate
sufficient cash flows to repay banks. This could also lead to liquidity risks since
the foreign banks would not be able to pay depositors when they come to withdraw
their funds which could lead to a banking crisis.
In addition, some foreign economies such as Malaysia and Korea are likely
to extend more credits to the private sector in Cambodia when their quarterly
GDP growths decline because there are opportunities to expand their business
activities in Cambodia. This should also be monitored carefully since  the home59
economies may conduct expansionary monetary policy by lowering their policy
rates to spur investments, economic growth and more job creations. Thus, foreign
banks operating in Cambodia may switch their lending from Cambodia to their
home economies which may lead to liquidity risks and country risks. This requires
the Central Bank of Cambodia to cooperate with foreign banks to share
information on foreign bank performances to avoid these risks. The switch  of
lending from Cambodia to their home economies also depends on the return on
investments. If the returns on investments in Cambodia are higher than those
in the hosting economies, the foreign bank claims on Cambodia would still be
high.
Moreover, the results show that in some economies such as Malaysia, Korea
and Chinese Taipei, with the global financial crisis, foreign bank claims from
those economies on Cambodia are likely to start going up, while other economies
like Thailand, Australia, and the Netherlands, whose foreign bank claims on
Cambodia would likely increase when the global financial crisis subsides. If these
regression results can be verified, the National Bank of Cambodia should monitor
and keep a close eye on their banks and bank customers especially during the
global financial crisis when most economies perform below par. The sources of
economic growth should be also further analysed. If growth emanates from
domestic consumption and agricultural sectors rather than the external demand,
it would be very good for Cambodia since banks would be willing to provide
more loans during the global financial crisis.
On the other hand, in terms of bank numbers, deposits, and assets, foreign
banks take a 60% of the market share in Cambodia from the end of 2007. Thus,
during the global financial crisis, the Cambodian banking system still faced some
financial issues, even though the banking system did not have complex financial
instruments like other emerging and advanced economies. This can be seen
from the credit movements and fluctuations in line with external factors. The
driving forces of Cambodian economic growth emanates from external demand
including the demand of garments from US and EU. The credit growth of the
Cambodian banking system also relies on economic growth. Therefore, the
Central Bank should pay more attention on the sources and uses of funds of
foreign banks since these foreign banks may use funds collected domestically
to facilitate parent banks in terms of overseas investments. Moreover, the Central
Bank of Cambodia should cooperate with foreign banks to share information on
bank performance to avoid liquidity risks since  foreign banks may transfer funds
from Cambodia when there are liquidity problems in the headquarters or vice
versa.60
In addition, when there are more foreign banks entering Cambodia operating
their business in Cambodia, there will be increased competition between local
and foreign banks. Some may loosen the criteria on their loan policies to attract
more customers who are the main driving forces for the bank business growth.
Rapid credit growth in the private sector could cause credit risk, liquidity risk
and finally, solvency risk. In order to respond to the rapid increase in the number
of banks and assets, the National Bank of Cambodia should continue to
strengthening bank supervision even as it had implemented very rigorous policy
actions during the recent global financial crisis.
Since Cambodia is a highly dollarised economy, the National Bank of
Cambodia cannot play an important role as the lender of last resort. If the foreign
and local banks make loans in foreign currency and the borrowers cannot repay
their debts to banks, they may face liquidity risk. Thus, in order to resolve that
issue, the central bank of the host economy should establish swap arrangements
between the Cambodian Riel and American Dollars with other foreign economies
that have many banks in Cambodia.
6. Conclusion
While economic globalisation and financial liberalisation have allowed foreign
bank participation, it has also made the transmission of shocks across economies
easier. The transmission of the current crisis had affected the balance sheets
of local and foreign banks in Cambodia.
As of June 2010, Cambodia’s financial system consisted of the National
Bank of Cambodia (NBC) as the Central Bank, 27 commercial banks, 6
specialised banks, and 21 microfinance institutions (MFIs). Most of the banks
operating in Cambodia are foreign owned, in a form of locally-incorporated foreign
banks or branches. Based on the definition of a foreign bank being foreign owned
by more than 50%, there are 23 foreign banks operating in Cambodia as of June
2010. This number is expected to get higher since many foreign investors are
becoming increasingly interested in doing business in Cambodia due to the good
investment environment. In terms of number, deposits and assets, foreign banks
holds over 60% of market share in Cambodia from end-2007, thus dominating
the Cambodian banking system. Thus, a banking or economic crisis in their
economies may affect the Cambodian banking system. The National Bank of
Cambodia has to, therefore, examine and monitor these foreign banks very
carefully in order to avoid credit risks, liquidity risks, country risks and solvency
risks. The implementation of monetary policies in home economies may also61
affect foreign bank lending in Cambodia. This requires the National Bank of
Cambodia to cooperate closely with the central banks of the said economies
with foreign banks in Cambodia, especially in terms of sharing information on
foreign bank performances overcome the various risks.62
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Chapter 3
INTERNATIONAL AND CROSS-BORDER BANK LENDING IN
KOREA AND IMPLICATIONS: BALANCE
SHEET PERSPECTIVES
By
Bokyong, Jung  and  Dongwoo, Kim1
1. Introduction
1.1 General Objective
Excessive capital inflows during boom periods and sudden outflows in times
of bust create severe financial crises. Even with its strong economic
fundamentals, Korea witnessed sudden capital outflows due to the global financial
crisis in late 2008. Like many other emerging and developing economies, Korea
with small and open economy was highly vulnerable to the fluctuations in the
global economy and consequent capital flows.
The capital and financial account of Korea had shown a net annual inflow
since 2002, but shifted to a net outflow of US$ 50.1 billion in 2008, mainly due
to the global liquidity crisis. During 2009, the capital and financial account shifted
to a net inflow of US$ 26.4 billion, as foreigners’ portfolio investment returned
to a large scale net inflow on expectations of a rapid Korean economic recovery.64
Table 1
Capital Flows1) to and from Korea
(in billions of US$)
Note: 1) Based on net-in(out) flows; (+) : net inflows, (-) : net outflows
2) Including other capital transfers
Among the various categories of capital flows, those associated with increases
in banks’ borrowing merit special attention. From 2006, the volatility in banks’
external borrowing began to grow prior to onset of the crisis, and the level of
volatility was higher than that related to portfolio investment.
As of the end of September 2008, domestic banks’ external debt stood at
US$ 122 billion. Due to the Lehman Brothers collapse, it decreased by US$ 25
billion to US$ 97 billion at the end of December 2008. The case was the same
at foreign bank branches. It decreased from US$ 97 billion to US$ 72 billion,
also by US$ 25 billion.
This was a sudden stop in the banking sector, especially for foreign currency
funding. One interesting factor which can be gleaned from international banks’
external claims on Korea as compiled by BIS, is the global deleveraging occuring
from the second quarter of 2008.65
1.2 Outline
Section 2 will introduce the evolution of foreign banks in Korea, including
the number of foreign banks, and examine the extent of effect of the 2007-2009
financial crisis on foreign bank lending activities. Section 3 will review the related
literature, with a particular focus on Korea. section 4 will present the research
methodology and empirical results, after which Section 5 will conclude and discuss
the policy responses in Korea.
2. Analysis of Foreign Banks’ Involvement in Korea Before and During
the Global Financial Crisis
2.1 Key Emphasis Regarding Foreign Bank Involvement in Korea
2.1.1 Categories of Foreign Banks in Korea
In general, a foreign bank is defined as a bank whose headquarters is located
in a foreign country. In Korea, the foreign bank affiliates are classified largely
into three categories — local subsidiaries, branch offices and liaison offices —
in accordance with the purpose of establishment, range of business activities,
equity, etc.
Chart 1
BIS Reporting Banks External Claims on Korean Banks,
Korea’s External Debt In Banking Sector66
A local subsidiary, first of all, comes under the domestic bank classification,
because it is regarded as a foreign invested corporation. In this case, foreigners
(foreign banks) may invest or establish subsidiaries in Korea by means of
acquisition of new stocks or other assets in accordance with requirements under
the Foreign Investment Promotion Act. On the other hand, it can establish and
administer branch offices and liaison offices in order to carry on banking business
activities or non-business functions in the domestic area.
As indicated above, foreign bank branches and liaison offices differ from
each other in some aspects, such as scope of business activities, establishment
standards, etc. A foreign bank branch can conduct banking business activities
generating profits in the domestic area; however, a liaison office cannot. A liaison
office can only do non-business functions such as the mere purchasing of domestic
assets, office business, advertising and public relations, collecting and providing
of information, conducting market survey, R&D, and other such things to support
the foreign bank’s business activities carried out for profits. In addition to this,
a foreign bank branch must observe stricter requirements, related to such matter
as standards or conditions for establishment, than a liaison office.
2.1.2 Development of Foreign Bank Branches in Korea
Foreign bank branches’ advancement into Korea has continued to increase
since Chase Manhattan Bank founded the first foreign branch in Seoul in July
1967.
There was a drastic increase in the number of foreign branches in Korea
particularly in the mid-1990 due mainly to the removal of restrictions on
establishment of foreign bank branches or subsidiaries as a part of foreign
openness policy.
International interest rate differentials and the attractions of arbitrage
transactions following disequilibrium in the swap market also accelerated foreign
banks’ advancement into Korea. At the end of 2009, there were 38 local branches
of foreign banks in Korea, down from the maximum of 39 before the global
financial turmoil. This number was 28 at the end of 2006, three years  before.
During the same period, the external debt of banks in Korea increased from
US$ 136.5 billion to US$ 180.9 billion. It then decreased sharply from US$
219.5 billion at the end of Q3 2008 to US$ 161.8 billion at the end of Q1 2009,
affected by the global deleveraging amid the financial crisis.67
2.1.3 Foreign Bank Lending to Korea in Respect of both Cross-border
    and Its Affiliates
The amount of cross-border loans as well as the lending by foreign affiliates
continued to increase until Q1 2008 before the global financial turmoil.
According to BIS consolidated banking statistics, foreign banks’ foreign
claims on domestic banks in Korea accounted for US$ 229.0 billion (local
currency liabilities excluded) at the end of Q4 2009. It had stood at just US$
80.2 billion at the end of Q1 2005, and then expanded continuously to US$ 252.5
billion in Q1 2008 due to the increase in FX derivatives trading, corporate demand
trade finance, and so on. It declined ,however, severely during the global financial
crisis to total for US$ 194.0 billion at the end of 4Q 2008.
The ratio of foreign banks’ foreign claims to GDP has increased in the
same way, from 9.7% at the end of Q1 2005 to 27.2% at the end of Q1 2008.
It experienced a sharp drop during the global financial crisis to 21.3% at the end
of 4Q 2008. After that, it recovered considerably to reach 26.6% at the end of
4Q 2009.
Chart 2
Number of Foreign Bank Branches in Korea68
Chart 3
Foreign Banks’ Foreign Claims1)
Chart 4
Foreign Banks Foreign Claims1) as Percentage of GDP69
Foreign banks’ foreign claims (local currency liabilities excluded) are
composed of the cross-border claims of foreign banks and the local claims of
foreign affiliates. Foreign banks’ cross-border claims amounted to US$ 142.2
billion at the end of Q4 2009, while at the same time, the local claims of foreign
affiliates stood at US$ 86.8 billion.
In terms of type of foreign bank business, foreign banks’ cross-border claims
had increased continuously to account for US$ 157.1 billion at the end of Q2
2008, after standing at just US$ 56.4 billion at the end of Q1 2005. They had
declined sharply during the financial crisis to US$ 120.8 billion at the end of Q4
2008 though, and after that steadily recovered to reach US$ 142.2 billion at the
end of Q4 2009. On the other hand, the ratio of foreign banks’ cross-border
claims to GDP was 16.5% at the end of Q4 2009, close to the historic high of
16.6% at the end of Q2 2008 prior to onset of the financial crisis.
The local claims of foreign affiliates stood at US$ 23.8 billion at the end
of Q1 2005, but at end of Q4 2009, this totaled US$ 86.8 billion. In between,
they had decreased severely from US$ 103.5 billion at the end of Q1 2008 to
US$ 73.2 billion at the end of 4Q 2008. Meanwhile, the ratio of local claims of
foreign affiliates to GDP was 10.1% at the end of Q4 2009.
Chart 5
Foreign Banks’ Cross-Border Claims70
Chart 6
Foreign Banks’ Cross-Border Claims as- Percentage of GDP
Chart 7
Local Claims of Foreign Affiliates1)71
2.2 Main Factors Behind Surge in Short-term External Debt
The main factors behind the surge in external debt (mainly short-term debt)
in 2006~2007 can be summarised as two factors.
First, FX derivatives trading (including FX forwards, FX swaps, cross currency
interest rate swap (CRS), non-deliverable forward (NDF), etc.) between banks
and shipbuilders or asset management companies increased as a result of massive
forward exchange sales by Korean shipbuilders, overseas portfolio investors.
The attraction of arbitrage transactions was also magnified due to international
interest rate differentials.
The second factor was the increase in the demand of corporate ratings for
foreign currency bank loans including trade finance due to Korea’s heavy
dependence on foreign trade.
Chart 8
Local Claims of Foreign Affiliates1) as Percentage of GDP72
3. Review of Related Literature in Korea
Although the number of foreign bank branches in Korea has increased since
2005, the research on their influence has been relatively lacking. The past
literature on foreign capital inflows focused usually on bond and stock investments.
Recently, however, foreign banks and affiliates have been regarded as more
important channels of capital inflows. Therefore, some recent work dealing with
how the domestic financial system is influenced by the entry of foreign banks
has been published.
Many researchers thought before 2008, when the global financial crisis
happened, that an increase in the entry of foreign banks into the domestic financial
markets could stabilise them. According to Kang and Kim (2005), domestic banks
generally encounter a more competitive environment when foreign banks enter
the domestic markets, and therefore would have to make themselves more
efficient in terms of costs, revenues, and risk management. In addition, domestic
banks can gain knowledge of leading edge financial technology from foreign
Figure 1
Arbitrage Transactions of Foreign Branches73
banks. Researchers expected that these efforts would significantly increase the
efficiency and soundness of the domestic banking sector.
They also believed that foreign banks’ affiliates could be safe havens when
global or domestic economic conditions deteriorated rapidly. Domestic depositors
tend toward a “flight-to-quality” during a recession, and foreign banks are regarded
as safer than domestic banks because they commonly have abundant liquidity
and more reliable reputations. Based upon this proposition, the notion was that
the entry of foreign banks could make the domestic financial system more stable.
Moreover, foreign banks and their branches can also supply continuous
liquidity to the domestic economy when financial distress caused by recession
deepens. When the domestic economy slows, domestic banks collect and reduce
the amounts of their loans, whereas foreign banks can lend money procured
from abroad to domestic businesses and financial institutions. If the domestic
market consists of domestic banks only, lending will be managed procyclically.
For that reason, the entry of foreign banks can relieve the procyclical lending
problem, thereby making the financial system more stable.
However, they also pointed out several risk factors — such as market
concentration, global banks’ cherry picking attitudes, and spill-over effects. First,
the entry of foreign banks could force small and medium-sized banks to merge,
shrink or die, by creating a more competitive market environment. If the domestic
market share was more concentrated, the ‘too big to fail’ problem would be
more serious, thus increasing the systemic risk of the financial markets.
Second, global banks usually prefer to lend to big firms and prime customers
as they do not have sufficient information on domestic business and economic
conditions. When this practice is generalised, domestic institutions need to extend
loans to small and medium-sized businesses and customers with lower credit
ratings, worsening the soundness of  domestic institutions.
Finally, global banks can also be a channel of spill-over effects. If the economy
that a global bank’s main office is located in suffers from a slowdown or financial
distress, the effects from this could spread quickly to domestic financial markets,
increasing their external vulnerability.
The literature since the global financial crisis has focused on the risk side
more than before. Song and Kim (2008) analysed that foreign banks’ branches
had played a major part in foreign borrowings. Since 2003, the Korean covered74
interest rate differential has increased significantly due to the decline in the
swap rate. Massive selling of forward contracts of shipbuilders, which expected
KRW appreciation, caused the swap rate to drop. Foreign affiliates, which can
procure foreign currency loans at lower prices, therefore obtained large amounts
of foreign currency borrowed from their main offices to buy forward contracts.
They could then realise gains by arbitrage transactions by way of buying forward
contracts along with government bonds, MBSs and CDs. This incentive led to
excessive foreign borrowings by foreign affiliates, and increased the external
vulnerability of the domestic markets as well. Most foreign borrowings were
procured by very short-term contracts, but then invested in long-term assets
such as government bonds. If global economic conditions deteriorated, the foreign
borrowings could flow out rapidly.
Suh and Kim (2009) also pointed to similar problems, albeit focusing especially
on currency and maturity mismatches. They argued that the foreign liquidity
shortage that Korea experienced during the global financial crisis was due to
the currency mismatch problem of the domestic banking sector. From 2000,
currency mismatch problems were easily observable in both domestic and foreign
banks. Foreign affiliates’ currency mismatch problems in particular grew rapidly
from 2006.
Foreign affiliates could obtain arbitrage incentives from the Korean forward
market because of Korean export enterprises’ excessive selling. At that time,
Korea’s economic fundamentals were strong while exports and the current
account surplus were on a continuous increase. In line with this situation, Korean
export firms, and especially shipbuilders, expected that the KRW would appreciate
constantly and therefore sold their cash flows from shipbuilding contracts in the
form of forward contracts. This immoderate forward selling caused a decline
of the swap rate, enabling foreign affiliates to procure foreign currency loans
from their home offices at much lower costs, realising arbitrage profits by buying
forward contracts. Foreign affiliates’ loans in foreign currency increased towards
this end and the rapid expansion of foreign claims without the appropriate increase
of foreign assets brought about a currency mismatch problem -  a factor
threatening domestic financial stability.
Yang and Kim (2008) analysed the influence of the incentives for undertaking
arbitrage transactions on foreign investment in Korea. They explained that the
incentive for arbitrage transactions has been one of the major determinants of
foreign investment. From the third quarter of 2007 especially, non-residents’
domestic bond investment increased greatly, almost simultaneously with the rise75
in incentive for arbitrage transactions influenced by the U.S. subprime mortgage
crisis. These bond investments grew rapidly in the process of massive buying
of forward contracts. In these deals, foreigners had to buy spot KRW for their
position management, meaning that until they finally pay the KRW to their
counterparties, they had to manage that money safely and profitably through
risk-free financial instruments like bonds.
Meanwhile, looking at the pattern of domestic bond investment by foreign
capital, which had grown sharply since 2006, we see that it was led by foreign
bank branches in Korea until the first quarter of 2007. However, from the third
quarter of 2007 it was driven directly by foreign investors such as foreign banks
and institutions. In spite of the yield on arbitrage transactions increasing sharply,
foreign affiliates could not expand their investment since both foreign currency
loans and domestic bond investments by foreign banks’ branches had reached
the country limits for Korea set by their head offices. Instead, it was the foreign
investors (non-residents) that invested in the domestic bond markets for arbitrage
gains.
The authors pointed out that massive foreign capital inflows can raise the
probability of sudden stops. A future outflow of foreigners’ bond investment
funds owing to sudden changes in domestic or overseas financial conditions
would likely widen the scale of fluctuations in the domestic financial and foreign
exchange markets.
Many of the former literature have focused on the determinants of foreign
investment in- and outflows. Some researches have analysed the effects of
foreign banks’ entry into Korea, but there yet has to be any research using
subtle econometric methods.  Above all, the research on the issue of the influences
of foreign banks and branches on financial stability is still wanting.
4. Research Methodology and Empirical Results
In this Section, we will verify whether global banks contributed to the
financial distress in Korea during the recent systemic, global crisis, by adversely
scaling back their Korea market lending especially when global interbank liquidity
deteriorated dramatically. Our purpose is to examine the links between bank
exposures in the recent financial crisis and international bank lending to Korea,
as well as to examine the links of the latter with the funding conditions in advanced
economies and pull factors in Korea.76
In order to analyse these relationships, we employ a standard econometric
method that can take into account the stationary time-series properties and cross-
sectional heterogeneity of the home country data such as exposure and funding
condition variables. To simplify the model, we select only two kinds of explanatory
variables – for the funding conditions of foreign economies and for the Korea’s
own pull factors.
The growth rates of foreign countries are expected to measure the funding
conditions in foreign banks’ home countries. In general, a high growth rate means
the home country’s economy is in the boom part of the business cycle. Therefore,
banks in the home countries having higher growth rates can afford to invest
more in Korea. Next, interest rates can be another measure of funding conditions.
A lower interest rate means lower funding costs. Foreign affiliates whose home
offices are in the countries maintaining lower interest rates can procure funds
at a lower price. We can thus expect that the foreign banks from home countries
with have higher growth rates and lower interest rates can make greater
investments in Korea.
This logic can also apply to the factors making Korea attractive to foreign
investors. Korea’s high growth rate can mean that it is more attractive for foreign
banks while higher Korean interest rate may mean that foreign investors can
obtain higher profits from the Korean domestic financial markets. We expect
foreign banks to increase investments in Korea when it is experiencing higher
growth and higher interest rates.
Based on the above argument, we establish the following panel model which
is a modification of Martinez-Peria et al. (2005), taking into account the recent
global financial crisis:
Where:
 ΔForeign bank claim = the first difference of the logarithm of foreign country
j bank claims (sum of cross-border claims and local claims of foreign affiliates)
on Korea77
Foreign country growth rate = real GDP growth rate of foreign country j
Foreign country interest rate = government bond (long-term) rate of  foreign
country j
Korean growth rate = real GDP growth rate of Korea
Korean interest rate = government bond (long-term) rate in Korea
Asian crisis dummy = dummy variable taking the value of one in 1997 and
1998
GFC dummy = dummy variable taking the value of one from the third quarter
of 2008 to the first quarter of 2009
Exposure = the share of foreign country j claims on Korea in total foreign
country j claims on all countries
All time series data for this analysis are obtained from the BIS consolidated
banking statistics, the IMF International Financial Statistics, and the Economic
Statistics System of the Bank of Korea. The time period of analysis is from the
1Q 1995 to the 2Q 2010. To estimate the model, we use the panel regression
method. Based on the Hausmann test, we employ a random effect model.
The foreign countries used in the model are selected by their relative sizes
of claims on Korea. We choose the 10 countries having the biggest claims on
Korea. Chart 9 below shows the 10 countries with the highest proportions in
their total international exposures of exposures to Korea. These exposures are
calculated by averaging the values of 2000~2010. The U.S. has the highest ratio
of exposure to Korea, followed by the U.K. and Japan.  European countries
have relatively smaller ratios.
Chart 9
Foreign Country Ratios of Exposure to Korea
Source: BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics78
Prior to estimating the model, we plot the time series data of foreign country
claims on Korea and interest rate trends in Charts 10 and 11. Chart 10 shows
us that countries with higher Korean exposure ratios such as the U.S., U.K.
and Japan reduced their claims on Korea by relatively small margins. The U.S
and Japan have even increased their claims since the GFC. On the other hand,
European countries having relatively lower exposure ratios, sharply withdrew
their claims on Korea. We thus can expect that higher exposures can translate
into more stable financing, other factors remaining unchanged.
Chart 11 shows the interest rates (on short-term government bonds) of
major foreign economies. After the sub-prime mortgage crisis broke out, the
long-term interest rates in major economies increased sharply and maintained
relatively higher levels than before the crisis. During the GFC especially, interest
rates increased sharply. However, ever since the advanced economies’ quantitative
easing policies, interest rates have gone down slightly. This means that interest
rates can indicate global liquidity conditions. We, therefore, expect that the higher
interest rates of major economies can cause a rapid reduction in their claims on
Korea, by exacerbating global liquidity conditions and undermining relatively the
attraction of the Korean markets.
Chart 10
Major Foreign Country Bank Claims on Korea
Source: BIS Consolidated Banking Statistics79
Based on the former discussion, our model specification is likely to be feasible.
We estimate the coefficients of the explanatory variables by the panel GLS
method. The most important part is β8, the interaction term between the GFC
dummy and the exposure ratio. If that coefficient is positive and significant, we
can tell that the higher exposure ratio of foreign banks can make the domestic
financial markets more stable.  Table 2 shows the results of panel regression:
Chart 11
Major Foreign Country Long-Term Interest Rates
Source: Bloomberg
Table 2
Results of Panel Regression Analysis
Note: 1) The grey columns indicate the coefficients of the explanatory variables to be significant
within the 90% confidence level.80
The results are consistent with our expectations. The values of  β2, β3, β5,
and β8  are significant. First, the high growth rate of Korea increases foreign
banks claims considerably. This means that foreign investors are of the view
that Korea is a more attractive market for investments when the economy is
in the boom period of the business cycle. The Korean interest rate also increases
foreign banks’ investments. However, the coefficient is not really significant.
Second, lower long-term interest rates in foreign countries can increase foreign
claims on Korea. Usually, low long-term interest rates in major economies mean
that global liquidity is flooding the markets. In addition, it means that the
expectations of return on investments to Korea are relatively higher than those
for investments in other major economies. Contrary to our prior expectation,
however, high growth rates in banks’ home economies do not have an effect
on investments into Korea.
The coefficients of the dummy variables are significant and negative,
consistent with our expectations. Obviously, the Asian crisis and the GFC had
great effects on foreign claims on Korea. The most important coefficient, β8,
is significant and positive. This is the most interesting finding of this analysis as
it means that the economies having higher ratios of exposure to Korea tend to
withdraw smaller amounts of their claims from Korea than other economies
having lower exposure ratios.
It is feasible that economies having bigger claims on Korea compared to
their total claims are able to access more information on the Korean economy,
enabling them to better judge whether the Korean economic fundamentals are
sound. Furthermore, these economies sustain greater capital losses when they
withdraw their claims from Korea, because their risk distributions are relatively
concentrated on Korea. In other words, the claims of countries’ higher exposure
ratios are more stable in a crisis.
In contrast, the coefficient β7  is not significant. This is the coefficient of
combination term of the Asian crisis dummy and the exposure ratio. During the
GFC, a higher exposure ratio meant a smaller withdrawal. In AFC period,
however, even economies with higher exposure ratios withdrew their claims
rapidly. The difference between the two crises was caused by several factors.
First, during the AFC, the major foreign borrowing agents were not banks, but
corporations. These major enterprises invested excessively and expanded their
business operations even beyond their capacities through by foreign borrowings.
Thanks to the government guarantees, they were able to procure foreign loans
at relatively low prices. Consequently, this excessive business expansion caused
a domino default of major firms, causing a deterioration in Korea’s credibility.81
Many foreign investors judged that the Korean economy was not sound during
the AFC.  During the GFC, in contrast, the financial conditions of Korean major
and medium- sized enterprises were very sound.
Second, during the AFC, Korea’s trade credit account recorded a large
deficit. In the 1990’s, Korean banks’ foreign borrowings were relatively small
compared with the GFC period, and therefore withdrawal of foreign claims on
the banking sector was not really significant. At the same time, however, trade
credit outflows were bigger than outflows of foreign banks’ loans.  Due to the
decline of Korean firms’ credibility, they could not procure foreign credit, and
were therefore provided with credit by the Korean banking sector. Meanwhile,
the Bank of Korea, also supplied capital denominated in US dollars to the banking
sector. The Bank also concurrently intervened in the foreign exchange market
to maintain the foreign exchange rate at a certain level. This policy mix, therefore,
drained Korean foreign reserves. During the GFC period, however, the real
business sector was very sound and the trade credit account was in relatively
good condition. The Bank of Korea’s  foreign reserves were substantial as well.
Third, foreign investors could not gather sufficient information on the Korean
economy. At the onset of the AFC, the Korean capital markets were relatively
closed. In addition, the composition of foreign investments in the Korean stock
and bond markets was very small.  In 1999, foreign investors registered only
18.5% of stock market capitalisation and 0.3% of Korean bonds. After the IMF
loan and the restructuring policy, however, the Korean capital markets opened
in stages and foreign investors’ market composition has increased greatly since
then. In 2009, foreign investors held 30.5% of stocks and 5.7% of bonds.
Moreover, they can now have more access to information on Korean economic
fundamentals than during the AFC period. In both scenarios the Korean economic
conditions were reasonably sound, but during the AFC period particularly, foreign
investors were not convinced of the robustness of the fundamentals  and withdrew
their investments due to  insufficient information.82
5. Conclusion and Policy Responses in Korea
5.1 Conclusion
In general capital inflows, especially bank lending, do not only have positive
effects but also negative effects on emerging and developing economies which
are small and open.
The amount of cross-border loans as well as the lending by foreign affiliates
in Korea continued to increase until Q1 2008 before the onset of the global
financial turmoil. The two main factors behind the surge in external mainly short-
term debt in 2006~2007 are firstly, FX derivatives trading between banks and
shipbuilders or asset management companies increased as a result of massive
forward exchange sales by shipbuilders, and overseas portfolio investors. In
addition the attractions of arbitrage transactions were magnified due to
international interest rate differentials. The second factor was the increase in
demand of corporations for foreign currency bank loans including trade finance,
due to Korea’s heavy dependence on foreign trade.
In Korea, capital inflows have made some contributions to the growth and
development of the financial markets by supplying foreign exchange and providing
various hedge trading opportunities for market participants. However, since the
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business motives are mainly profitability, the sudden withdrawals during periods
of global financial turmoil, have made the foreign exchange and money markets
unstable.
This paper has explored the determinants of the relationship between
international bank lending and funding conditions in Korea. Its main findings are
as follows. First, the high levels of growth and interest rates in Korea significantly
increased foreign banks’ claims. Second, lower interest rates in foreign countries
can increase foreign claims on Korea. Contrary to prior expectations, high growth
rates in foreign economies do not have an effect on investments.
Obviously, the Asian crisis and GFC had definite impacts on foreign claims
on Korea, especially, the interaction term between the GFC dummy and the
exposure ratio (β8) which shows a significant and positive value. This means
that an economy with a higher Korean exposure ratio tends to withdraw a smaller
amount of its claims from Korea than an economy having a lower exposure
ratio. In other words, the claims of economies with higher exposure ratios were
more stable during the GFC.
5.2  Specific Policy Responses in Korea
The Korean government has recently adopted macro-prudential measures
to curb excessive volatility of capital flows within the current framework of the
open and liberalised economy. It also plans to establish a minimum pre-captive
“safety net”, in accordance with internationally agreed standards, so as to avoid
potential risks and increase its resilience to a financial crisis.
There are three parts to the government’s policy efforts. The first is
introducing new ceilings on banks’ FX derivatives positions. The second is aimed
at reinforcing the regulations on use of foreign currency bank loans. The last
part includes improving the FX soundness of financial institutions.
5.2.1 New Ceilings on Net FX Derivatives Positions
New limits for the net FX derivatives positions of domestic banks and
branches of foreign banks have been set up. The ceiling on domestic banks’ net
FX derivatives contracts is no more than 50% of their capital in the previous
month. In the case of foreign bank branches, the ceiling has been set at 250%
of their capital in the previous month, given that the level prior to the regulation
was around 300%.84
The ceilings are to be adjusted on a quarterly basis depending upon future
economic conditions, the market situation, their impact on business activities,
etc. The principle of “grandfathering” will also be considered: for example, in
a case where the existing net FX derivatives position is more than the positions
of the new ceilings, a bank can maintain its existing net FX derivatives positions
for a maximum of two years.
5.2.2 Reinforcing Regulations on Use of Foreign Currency Bank
    Loans
The regulations on use of bank loans in foreign currency will be tightened.
Recently, banks’ foreign currency funding, which declined sharply in the wake
of the recent financial crisis, has been judged likely to increase significantly on
the back of the economic recovery and arbitrage transactions. It is, therefore,
necessary to prevent a return to excessive foreign currency bank loans causing
systemic risks.
Under the old rules, foreign currency bank loans had to be for overseas use
only, but corporate purchases of domestic facilities were an exception. These
fundamental rules will be maintained: foreign currency financing should be
targeted for overseas use only. However, the exception is applied now only to
small and medium-sized manufacturers, who are allowed to operate foreign
currency loans for the purpose of purchasing domestic facilities — to the extent
that total foreign currency bank loans of all small and medium-sized manufacturers
as a group stay at the current level. The reinforced regulations are also applied
only to new bank loans, to alleviate their impact on business activities
5.2.3 Improving FX Soundness of Financial Institutions
The authorities have tightened the existing regulations on domestic banks’
foreign currency liquidity. The “Regulations on Foreign Currency Liquidity Ratio”
and “Regulations on the Ratio of Mid- to Long-term Financing” applied to
domestic banks have been reinforced. In the same context, branches of foreign
banks are recommended to set up their own liquidity risk management
mechanisms, a recommendation already applied to domestic banks in Korea, in
order to enhance their ability of liquidity risk management capacities.85
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2. The Indonesian government initiated banking liberalisation in 1983 through a deregulation
package known as Pakjun 1983. It removed interest rate controls and credit ceilings for all
banks. Consequently, the banking sector, which up to then was channeling oil revenues to
priority sectors, began to face competition. The Indonesian Government reduced liquidity
credit and replaced effective credit ceilings with monetary tools and Bank Indonesia
Certificates (SBI). This resulted in significant increases in the deposit rate and lending
activities, particularlyin private banks. The dominance of state banks began to erode.
However, priority credits still enjoyed subsidised interest rates and funding from the Central
Bank (Husnan, 2001).
3. Foreign claims including cross-border bank lending of globalised banks vis-à-vis Indonesia’s
rapid expansion,especially after financial liberalisation in 1988. Since then, it has provided
much-needed private capital flows to finance economic development in Indonesia. During
the 1990s, Indonesia’s economy expanded with impressive speed.
Chapter 4
FOREIGN CLAIMS BY GLOBAL BANKS:




The banking liberalisation process in Indonesia2 has globalised the Indonesian
banking system. Indonesian banks not only have linkages with local banks but
also with global banks. On the one hand, such conditions can act as a stabilising
force for the Indonesian banking system as they provide Indonesian banks with
increased access to liquidity3 while also precipitating institutional and regulatory/
supervisory improvements in the banking system . On the other hand, they can
pose risks to the domestic banking system because globalised banks act as a
contagion channel for financial shocks. The global financial crisis in 2008-2009
has demonstrated that the globalised banking system plays a crucial role in the
transmission of shocks from one particular economy to other economies. For
that reason, the banking crisis triggered by the subprime mortgage debacle in
USA was immediately transmitted to the entire global economy.
Considering these pro & cons, Bank Indonesia as the banking authority in
Indonesia must fully comprehend the magnitude and nature of global banks’88
involvement in the Indonesian economy. Such an understanding - including the
role of global banks and the financial shock transmission mechanism - will assist
Bank Indonesia in strengthening financial regulation and supervision.
Against this backdrop, this paper focuses on examining the development
and role of global banks, as well as determining their implications on Indonesia’s
economy. Our aim is to identify the most appropriate policies to be instituted
with regard to the recent rapid and significant penetration of global banks in the
domestic banking industry. In particular, we strive to address the following key
issues:
• Has the global bank enhanced the Indonesian economy by providing liquidity
needed to finance economic growth?
• Does the global bank have a prominent role in the spread of financial crisis
in Indonesia?
• Which is more stable, cross border lending or local lending,  global bank
lending or domestic bank lending?
This paper is organised into the following sections. Section 2 explains the
prevailing stance of existing literature and views on the role of global banks,
which is followed by a description of the development and role of global banks
in the Indonesian economy in Section 3. A corresponding empirical analysis is
presented in Section 4 and the conclusion in Section 5.
2. Literature Review
Over the previous generation, there has been a drastic reduction in global
barriers to competition in financial services, including the banking industry.
Deregulation around the world and improvements in information technology have
facilitated consolidation across distant and different types of banks in numerous
countries around the world. In addition, growth in the cross-border activities of
non-financial companies has catalysed a stronger demand for banking services.
As a result, banking has become more globalised and growth in a bank’s foreign
claims has outpaced that of economic activity.
As banking in most countries has become more globalised, the need to
understand the role of bank globalisation has increased. In general, it is claimed
that banking globalisation not only provides more access to liquidity and boosts
lending activity but also encourages efficiency improvements in domestic banks.
Structure conduct performance hypothesis supports this positive role of global
banking, arguing that global banking stimulates competition, which in turn enhances
efficiency.89
On the other hand, the global financial crisis in 2008 bore witness to a more
sinister side of banking globalisation, namely the international transmission of
shocks and cycles. This more nefarious role of banking globalisation is supported
by Mishkin (2009), Goldberg (2009), Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008, 2009), Garcia-
Herrero and Martinez Peria (2007).
Mishkin (2009) argues that if financial globalisation is not managed properly
it will lead to financial crises that trigger wide spread economic hardship. Mishkin
(2009) added that ensuring financial globalisation works well is not a simple
task; it requires policies that promote property rights and good-quality financial
information, encourage effective prudential supervision, and promote a stable
macroeconomic environment. According to Mishkin (2009), policies concerning
financial globalisation should be homegrown. Nevertheless, international financial
institutions such as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank can
create incentives to promote these policies in emerging market economies. Citizens
in advanced countries can also help by supporting the opening up of their markets
to goods and services from poorer economies, thereby encouraging expansion
of their export sectors, which creates increased support for financial development
and less vulnerability to financial crises.
In line with Mishkin, Goldberg (2009) argues that global banks play a
significant role in the transmission of shocks through their activities, contributing
to a more integrated global business cycle. According to Goldberg (2009), the
most recent global financial crisis is clear evidence of the role played by global
banks in the international transmission of shocks.
Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008) support the argument regarding the potential
role global banks play in the international transmission of shocks with their finding
that capital flows to emerging market regions declined dramatically during the
global financial crisis, and concomitantly there was a significant decline in internal
lending from the parent and other overseas affiliates to foreign-owned banks in
emerging markets. In further analyses, Cetorelli and Goldberg (2009) indicate
that lending supply in emerging markets was affected through separate channels:
a contraction in direct, cross-border lending by foreign banks, a contraction in
local lending by foreign banks’ affiliates in emerging markets, and a contraction
in lending supply by domestic banks, as a result of the funding shock to their
balance sheets induced by the decline in interbank or cross-border lending.
Garcia-Herrero and Martinez Peria (2007), focusing on stability, lend support
to the argument concerning the role of global banks in the transmission of shocks
during a crisis. Based on their analysis of Latin American cases, Garcia-Herrero90
and Martinez Peria (2007) found that cross-border lending by global banks is
less stable compared to local lending by global bank branches and subsidiaries.
Cross-border lending diminishes during economic slowdowns, whereas local
lending by foreign banks appeared to be much more stable. This finding is
congruous with research conducted by Peek and Rosengren (2000). According
to Peek and Rosengren (2000), reductions in cross-border lending were generally
met by increases in lending by foreign bank subsidiaries, either because new
subsidiaries were established or because the lending of the existing affiliates
increased.
A large number of studies report similar findings that cross-border bank
lending tends to be less stable compared to local bank lending (Goldberg, Dages
and Kinney (2000), Detragiache and Gupta (2006), de Haas and van Lelyveld
(2006)).
Regarding the case of Indonesia, it is generally agreed that the domestic
banking industry has become more globalised. Abdullah (2010), using foreign
claims data from BIS, found that the Indonesian banking industry has become
more open and integrated with global banks since banking liberalisation in the
late 1980s. According to Abdullah (2010), in the case of Indonesia, tighter
integration with global banks has not led to greater competitiveness and efficiency.
In fact, compared to other ASEAN economies, the banking industry in Indonesia
is the least competitive.
Parallel to Abdullah’s findings, Hui (2009) reported that between 1991 and
1996 some US$41 billion in net investments flowed into Indonesia compared to
US$15 billion in the preceding six years. This deluge was in the form of bank
loans that bloated the banking sector. The ratio of total bank assets to GDP rose
from 35% in 1985 to 114% in 1997. This huge surge in liquidity created
opportunities to expand economic activities and as a result the Indonesian economy
grew rapidly at an average of 7-8% per annum.  The torrent of bank loans,
however, intoxicated lenders and borrowers alike, and resulted in poor credit
discipline on the part of the lenders and financial mismanagement on the part
of the borrowers. Lenders lent more than what the borrowers required.
Borrowers, for their part, inflated their project costs and siphoned off excess
money into their own pockets. This resulted in a frail Indonesian banking system
that  ultimately collapsed when the financial crisis befell Indonesia.
Abdullah (2010) and Hui’s findings (2009) confirm that global banks in
Indonesia have played a positive role in providing liquidity to expedite economic
growth. In addition, the findings also prove that the efficiency hypothesis does91
not hold true in the case of Indonesia. However, the role played by global banks
in international shock transmission is not discussed.
3. The Role of Global Banks in the Indonesian Economy: Trend Analysis
3.1 A Closer Look at the Indonesian Banking Industry
Foreign banks have had a long and checkered history in Indonesia, playing
a prominent role in the domestic economy since the days of Dutch colonialism
despite stagnation during the revolution after Indonesia proclaimed its
independence in 1945. Foreign banks regained a foothold after Indonesia liberalisd
its financial and banking sector in 1988, opening the domestic banking industry
to new entrants, reducing restrictions on foreign exchange transactions and
increasing the access of domestic banks to international financial markets.4  Along
with the liberalisation process, the number of foreign and joint venture banks
skyrocketed as presented in Table 1.
Table 1
The Development of Foreign and JointVenture Banks in Indonesia
________________
4. The deregulation package known as Pakto 1988 represented another cornerstone of banking
liberalisation in Indonesia. Pakto 1988 reduced the requirements for bank establishment,
including foreign and joint venture banks in Indonesia. The minimum capital requirement
for foreign and joint venture banks was reduced to US$ 28 million, and the limit on foreign
ownership was increased to 85%. Pakto 88 also allowed foreign banks to open sub-branches
in six cities (prior to 1988, foreign banks were only permitted to have two branches in
Jakarta). The financial liberalisation process, especially in the banking sector, continued.
In March 1989, government control of offshore lending was removed. Then in 1992, the
Indonesian Government allowed foreigners to purchase banking sector stock on the capital
market (creating the opportunity for foreigners to own bank shares). After the banking
crisis in 1998/1999 the Indonesian government raised foreign ownership limits to 99%,
which far exceeds the level set by the World Trade Organization (WTO) at 85%.
Source: Bank Indonesia92
As shown in Table 1, the number of foreign and joint venture banks in
Indonesia increased sharply from 11 in 1988 to 44 in 1998. Notwithstanding,
after the financial and banking crisis in 1998-1999, the number of foreign and
joint venture banks declined to 28.
The burgeoning role of foreign banks in Indonesia was not only reflected
by the total number of foreign and joint venture banks but also by the ownership
structure of national private banks5. Subsequently, based on ownership, several
national private banks, for example Bank CIMB Niaga, Bank Danamon, and
Bank UOB Buana, became foreign banks. The ownership structure of several
private national banks is presented in Table 2.
Table 2
Foreign Ownership of Several Private National Banks in Indonesia
Source: Bankscope
________________
5. Banks in Indonesia are categorised into four groups based on license, namely: state-owned
banks, national private banks, foreign and joint venture banks, and regional development
banks.
6. The principal data sources for the remaining of the paper include the Bank for International
Settlement (BIS) International Banking Statitstics and Bank Indonesia (BI) Statistics. BIS
data is consolidated across banks in all countries reporting to the BIS.
3.2 Global Banks’Cross-Border and Local Lending: Impact of the Crisis
As displayed in Table 1, the number of foreign banks in Indonesia increased
sharply following banking liberalisation in 1983 and 1988. This development was
followed by the expansion of global banks in Indonesia. Figure 1 illustrates that
during the period of 1983-1997 the total assets of global banks vis-á-vis Indonesian
banks increased almost seven times while liabilities rose two folds6. As a result,
the net external position increased drastically. The expansion of global banks
was interrupted in 1997-1998 by the Asian financial crisis, which triggered a
long and deep contraction in global banks’ assets. The role of global banks began93
Figure 1
Indonesia’s Net External Position (1977-2010)
Millions of US $
Source: BIS Banking Statistics
to recover in 2004. However, in 2008-2009, the global financial crisis undermined
the global economy which impacted on Indonesia, causing a break in the recovery
of global banks.
Figure 2 tells the same story in terms of cross-border deposits and loans,
confirming that Indonesia, since 1983 (banking liberalisation), has experienced
net inflows from global banks. After peaking in 1997, as an impact of the Asian
financial crisis, cross-border loans from global banks compared with domestic
banks dropped dramatically, while deposits increased slightly.  In 2008, when the
country was beset by the global financial crisis, a similar occurrence transpired;
cross-border loans declined drastically, while deposits increased slightly.94
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the differences between the impact of the two
crises, namely the Asian and the global financial crisis, with regard to the role
of global banks in Indonesia’s economy. The Asian financial crisis precipitated
a long and deep contraction while the global financial crisis merely sparked a
short and mild contraction. The Asian and global financial crises also revealed
similar characteristics, specifically that during the crises the assets or loans
dropped significantly while the liabilities or deposits increased to some extent.
This phenomenon indicates that during the crises, foreign banks were more
trustworthy compared to domestic banks.
On a bilateral basis, before the Asian financial crisis, Japanese banks
accounted for the bulk of outstanding stock of cross-border loans to Indonesia,
followed by European, US and UK banks. Nevertheless, the order changed
subsequent to the crisis. Cross-border loans from Japanese global banks waned
while those from European, US and UK banks were almost unaffected by the
crisis. As a result, European banks became the most significant global banks in
Indonesia followed by Japanese, US and UK banks.
Figure 3 shows the different pattern of effects attributed to the Asian and
global financial crises. During the Asian financial crisis Japanese banks’ foreign
Figure 2
External Loans and Deposits vis-á-vis Domestic, 1977-2010
Millions of US $
Source: BIS Banking Statistics95
claims declined sharply for a protracted amount of time. Conversely, European
banks’ foreign claims were only slightly affected. During the global financial
crisis, however, the pattern reversed with Japanese banks’ foreign claims
increasing slightly while those of European banks were disrupted by occasional
sharp reductions. US and UK global banks were almost unaffected by the two
crises.
Based on the previous description, it is clear how the global banks’ role in
Indonesia has changed and how the two crises had differing impacts. An
alternative method to examine the development and uniqueness of global banks
in Indonesia is through a comparison with several peer economies, namely
ASEAN economies. Figure 4 demonstrates that prior to the Asian financial crisis
in 1997, total foreign claims from global banks in Indonesia and other ASEAN
economies especially Thailand, Malaysia and the Philippines7 increased
significantly.
Figure 3
Foreign Claims in Indonesia by Origin of Global Bank, 1977-2010
Millions of US $
Source: BIS Banking Statistics
________________
7. Malaysia and Thailand began liberalising their banking industry in the early 1980s, while
the Philippines commenced liberalisation in 1994 through the Republic Act No.7721. As
a result, the banking industry in those economies became more globalised and foreign claims
increased abruptly.96
Total foreign claims in Indonesia and Thailand from1983-1988, increased by
8.59% and 8.45% respectively on average per annum. During the same period
in Malaysia, foreign claims increased by just 0.84%, while the Philippines posted
a -2.98% decrease. From1989-1997, after the second stage of liberalisation
(PAKTO 1988), foreign claims in Indonesia increased by 15.18% on average
annually. Similarly, foreign claims on other ASEAN economies increased by more
than 10% on average per year.
In the subsequent period, from 1998-2000, foreign claims by global banks
plummeted  due to the Asian financial crisis that undermined foreign confidence
in the ASEAN economy. The impacts of the crisis, however, were not
symmetrical across all ASEAN countries. Foreign claims in Indonesia and
Thailand declined respectively by -4.88% and -1147% on average per annum.
Conversely, the impact of the crisis in Malaysia and the Philippines was limited
and temporary. In addition, Malaysia was the only country in the region to achieve
a hasty recovery from the crisis. During the period from 1998-2000, foreign
claims by global banks in Malaysia increased by 23% per year; far exceeding
previous growth rates.
Figure 4
Total Foreign Claims in Indonesia and Other ASEAN Countries
(1983-2009)
Millions of US $
Source: BIS Banking Statistics97
Subsequent to the Asian financial crisis, beginning in 2001, foreign claims
in Indonesia recovered gradually increasing by 7.02% on average annually.
Growth was interrupted momentarily by the global financial crisis in 2008. In
contrast to the previous crisis, the impact of the global financial crisis in Indonesia
and other ASEAN economies was limited and temporary. Accordingly, foreign
claims in Indonesia dipped by just 0.85% in 2008 and subsequently rebounded
to 14.01% in the following year (see Table 3).
The impact of the crisis on total foreign claims of global banks in Indonesia
to some extent confirms their role as a contagion channel for international
financial shocks. Global banks are able to readily penetrate the Indonesian market
directly (through cross-border lending) and indirectly (through local claims by
branches and subsidiary offices), which beckons the question of which channel
is more stable. This question is indeed important in order to comprehend the role
of global banks and their implications on policy making.
Figure 5 shows a comparison between cross-border lending and local lending
of global bank branches and subsidiary offices in Indonesia. It can be seen from
Figure 5 that cross-border lending is more volatile compared to local lending.
During the global financial crisis in 2008, cross-border lending in Indonesia
declined significantly, while local lending by global bank branches and subsidiaries
in Indonesia remained unaffected. This is indisputable evidence that global banks
in Indonesia can play a negative role as a contagion channel for international
financial shocks through direct financing but not through branches or subsidiaries.
Table 3
Average Annual Growth Rates of Foreign Claims in Indonesia
and Selected ASEAN Economies, 1983-2009
Source: BIS Banking Statistics98
Figure 5
Cross-border versus Local Lending in Indonesia, 2005-2010
Millions of US $
Source: BIS Banking Statistics
Figure 6 depicts domestic bank lending by type of bank in Indonesia. It can
be seen from the graph that during the Asian financial crisis, bank lending by
state-owned and private banks in Indonesia diminished while that of foreign and
joint venture banks experienced merely a small decline.  Indeed, from 2008-
2009 when Indonesia was at the mercy of the global financial crisis, local lending
by foreign and joint venture banks declined significantly but only for a short
period of time. This confirms the stability of local claims by the affiliates of
global banks in Indonesia, thereby supporting the argument that the negative
role of global banks in Indonesia stems from direct financing (cross-border
lending).  Meanwhile, the positive aspects of global banks belong to foreign and
joint venture banks.99
Figure 7 illustrates a decomposition of foreign claims by sector in Indonesia.
According to the graph, flows to the public sector exacerbate the volatility of
foreign claims by global banks in Indonesia. Meanwhile, flows to the banking
sector and non-bank private sector remained stable.
Figure 6




Consolidated Foreign Claims of Reporting Banks in Indonesia by
Sector from 1983-2009
Millions of US $
Source: BIS Banking Statistics100
4. The Role and Implications of Foreign Claims by Global Banks: Panel
Data Analysis
4.1 Methodology
In order to verify the role played by global banks in channeling shocks from
their respective home countries to Indonesia, especially during the financial crisis,
a modified econometric model by Martinez-Peria et al (2005) is utilised in this
paper. The modified model explains changes in foreign bank claims taking into
account the Asian financial crisis in 1997-1999 and the recent global financial
crisis (2007-2009). The model is as follows:
(1)
Where j = 1 to 4 identifies the four BIS home countries that have strong
banking relationships with Indonesia, namely Japan, United States, Germany and
United Kingdom. t refers to the time period considered, specifically 1994 to
2009. The dependent variable, Foreignclaims_growthj,t, is semi-annual change
in real consolidated foreign claims from banks in their home country j to Indonesia,
the host country, between 1994 and 2009. Homefactors are control variables
that capture the macro economic conditions in the country of the foreign bank
(j), for example real interest and GDP growth rates. Hostfactors are control
variables that capture the macro economic conditions in Indonesia such as real
interest rates, GDP growth and exchange rate vis-á-vis the home country’s
currency. AFCDummy is a dummy variable with a value of 1 for  the period
1997 to 1999. GFC_Dummy is a dummy variable with a value of 1 from2007
to 2009, while exposure is the ratio of foreign country/bank (j) claims on Indonesia
over total claims extended by the foreign country/bank (j).
The test of the effect of the Asian and global financial crisis is based on
the sign and significance of the β5 and β6 coefficients. Indeed, controlling for
other factors, if higher exposure is translated into more stable financing,
interaction between the GFC dummy and exposure is expected to be positive
and significant.
From the model above, we take into account the role of both home (or
push) and host (or pull) factors. Home/push factors are considered to be
exogenous to the host country and refer to structural or cyclical features of the
home country, which affects the banks’ desire to invest abroad. Following101
Martinez-Peria et al (2005), the model uses real interest rates and real GDP
growth rates in the home country as a proxy of push factors. On the other hand,
to account for pull factors, real interest rates, real GDP growth and the rupiah
exchange rate are used. Aside from the impact of push and pull factors on
foreign bank claims in Indonesia, the exposure of each home country to Indonesia
is also considered.
In order to differentiate between cross-border and local lending, model 1 is
modified as follows:
(2)
The dependent variable is replaced with localclaim_growthj,t, the semi-
annual change of local claims from global bank branches or subsidiaries in
Indonesia between 2002 and 2009. Hence, j = 1 to 4 identifies the four BIS
home countries that have branches or subsidiaries in Indonesia, namely Japan,
United States, Germany and United Kingdom.
Models 1 and 2 were estimated using two general methods to analyse panel
data, specifically the fixed effects model (FEM) and random effects model
(REM). The two models are based on the assumption of correlation between
individual specific effects and the independent variables. If the individual specific
effects are uncorrelated with the independent variables, then the random effects
model is more efficient than the fixed effects model. However, if this assumption
is incorrect, then the random effects model is not consistent, thus the fixed
effects model is better. In this paper, the appropriateness of the fixed and random
effects models are tested using the Hausman test.
Models 1 and 2 are applied using a data set taken primarily from BIS, Bank
Indonesia and IFS. Table 4 summarises the definition and sources of all variables
included in the model.102
4.2 Empirical Results
4.2.1 Panel Unit Root Tests
Pooled time series data, much like uni-variate time series data, tends to
exhibit a time trend and is, therefore, non-stationary.  Engle and Granger (1987)
argue that the direct application of OLS or GLS to non-stationary data produces
spurious regressions. These regressions tend to produce inflated performance
statistics, such as high R2 and t-statistics, which often lead to a high frequency
of type I errors (Granger and Newbold, 1974).
Table 4
Data Definition and Sources103
Levin, Lin and Chu (2002), Breitung (2000), Hadri (1999), and Im, Pesaran,
and Shin (2003) developed panel based unit root tests that are similar to tests
carried out on a single series. They proved that panel unit root tests are more
powerful compared to unit root tests applied to individual series because the
information in the time series is enhanced by that which is contained in the
cross-section data.  In contrast to individual unit root tests, which have complicated
and limiting distributions, panel unit root tests lead to statistics with a normal
distribution in the limit (Baltagi, 2001).
Table 1 below reports (summary) panel unit root tests for the relevant
variables given in equations (1) and (2) above. Most of the tests reject the unit
root null hypothesis for all of the variables at all levels. These results suggest
that the variables in question do evolve as stationary processes and the application
of OLS or GLS to equations (1) and (2) will result in non-biased and consistent
estimates.
Table 5
Panel Unit Root Tests
Note: LLC=Levin, Lin, Chu (2002), IPS=Im, Pesaran, Shin (2003), MW = Maddaladan Wu.
Sign (*) indicates reject H0.104
4.2.1 Estimation Results
The test results for Model (1) are presented in Table 6.  The Hausman test
confirms that the random effects model should be used when estimating Model
(1). Focusing on the subset of home country j variables, we find that the coefficient
of GDP growth is significant and positive. This implies that banks from Japan,
Germany, United Kingdom and United States increased their claims in response
to greater profit opportunities at home (in response to stronger growth at home).
On the other hand, we also find that the coefficients of all host factors are not
significant. These findings contradict the hypothesis that foreign claims made by
global banks are determined by opportunities to gain profit at home and in the
host country (push and full factors).
Table 6
Determinants of Change in Foreign Claims by Global Banks in
Indonesia
Note: (*) and (**) indicate statistically significant at the 5 and 10 percent level respectively.105
Table 6 also demonstrates that the dummy coefficients of the Asian and
global financial crises are negative and significant. This is evidence that foreign
banks did, indeed, propagate the financial crisis through their foreign claims in
Indonesia. The dummy coefficient of the global financial crisis multiplied by
exposure, on the other hand, confirms that greater global bank exposure to the
Indonesian economy improves the banks’ role. Accordingly, greater exposure
translates into more stable financing.
Regression results for Model (2) are presented in Table 7. Regarding the
growth of local claims, the coefficients of host GDP growth and exchange rate
change are positive and significant, denoting that local claims of global banks’
affiliates are principally determined by pull factors. These findings reveal a
contrast between cross-border lending and local lending, for which cross-border
lending is more dependent on conditions in the home country, while local lending
depends more on the host country environment.
Table 7
Determinants of Change in the Local Claims of Global Banks’
Affiliates in Indonesia
Note: (*) and (**) indicate statistically significant at the 5 and 10 percent level respectively.106
Table 7 also indicates the differing roles played by cross-border and local
lending in terms of aggravating the financial crisis in Indonesia. As can be seen,
the dummy coefficients of the Asian and global financial crises are not significant,
which suggests no substantial fallout from the crises on the growth of local
claims made by global banks’ affiliates. Furthermore, the local claims of such
banks depend more on host factors.
5. Closing Remarks
In this paper, a comprehensive data set was employed to explore the
behaviour of foreign bank claims in Indonesia, a nation that has witnessed a
significant increase in foreign bank financing since banking liberalisation in the
1980s. The data set, primarily taken from BIS, is rich in two dimensions. From
a cross-sectional perspective, the behaviour of banks was captured from four
home countries that differ both in their degree of exposure and in their importance
as a source of finance to Indonesia. From a time-series perspective, the data
set covered all the salient periods from serenity, to low foreign bank penetration,
to high and very high foreign bank penetration, as well as two major crisis periods
(Asian financial crisis and global financial crisis).
The data used in this paper was valuable but still had limitations. First, the
data is aggregated at the country level, therefore, lacking individual bank level
data. Second, the time period observed was relatively short. Due to these
limitations, the paper cannot fully answer all questions relating to the behaviour
of foreign banks. Nevertheless, this paper does contribute by highlighting the
role of global banks in Indonesia in terms of providing liquidity required to finance
economic growth and channel shocks from the respective home countries to
Indonesia, especially during crisis periods.
Concerning the role played by global banks in providing liquidity, this paper
confirms that such banks in Indonesia became more significant during the 1980s
and1990s (after banking liberalisation). The net external position of global banks
escalated sharply, whereby assets increased six-fold and liabilities two-fold. Net
external loans of global banks indicate that these banks have played and continue
to play a significant role in providing access to liquidity for the Indonesian
economy.
With reference to the role global banks play in channeling shocks, experience
from the two crises has revealed particular phenomena.  Firstly, the impact of
the crises on loans exceeded that on deposits. During the two crises, global
bank loans declined rapidly, while deposits skyrocketed. These findings to some107
extent, confirm that global banks are considered more trustworthy than domestic
banks, especially during a crisis. We also discovered that the impact of the
crises primarily affected cross-border claims, particularly on the public sector
(claims on the government).
Secondly, the repercussions of the Asian and global financial crises were
quite dissimilar. During the Asian financial crisis, Japanese banks attributed for
the steepest decline in foreign claims followed by European, US and UK banks.
The global financial crisis, however, bucked this trend. As a result, European
banks experienced the largest drop in foreign claims, while US, UK and Japanese
banks were almost unaffected by the crisis. Furthermore, the impacts of the
two crises were not symmetrical across Indonesia and other ASEAN economies.
Thirdly, the two crises showed that cross-border lending is more volatile
compared to local lending, which confirms that global banks in Indonesia do act
as a contagion channel for international financial shocks through direct financing,
although not through local branches or subsidiaries. These findings are congruent
to the results of empirical models, which revealed that global banks’ cross-border
claims depend more on push (home) factors, while local claims are more
contingent upon pull (host) factors. In addition, cross-border claims are
significantly affected by crises, compared to local claims that are more stable
even during a crisis. Greater foreign bank exposure appears to be a stabilising
force - foreign banks’ responsiveness to crisis conditions, therefore, becomes
more counter-cyclical as exposure increases.
The empirical results suggest a number of policy implications. First, it would
make for sensible policy to limit the shocks that may result from relying on
foreign bank financing. This can be achieved by maintaining economic conditions.
Second, regarding the issue of counter-cyclicality, empirical results suggest that
Indonesia might benefit more from dealing with foreign banks with high exposure
than from foreign banks with low exposure and no commitment to the country.108
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Chapter 5
FOREIGN BANKS, CROSS BORDER BANK LENDING AND
IMPLICATIONS ON MALAYSIA: BALANCE SHEET
PERSPECTIVES
By
Allison Loke Yen San*
1. Introduction
The decade prior to the global financial crisis witnessed a strong revival of
cross-border capital flows from advanced economies to emerging markets.
Notably, cross-border bank flows from advanced economies to emerging markets
and developing economies grew from a level around zero in 2000 to over USD130
billion in the second quarter of 20071. The trend in cross-border flows ended
abruptly in the aftermath of the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September
2008. Cross-border bank lending fell dramatically during the global financial crisis,
but the impact varied significantly across regions and countries.
International banks have been the major source of finance for the catching-
up process of the emerging market economies in recent years. It is, therefore,
not surprising that financial linkages and in particular, bank lending has been
identified as one of the main channels of transmission of the latest crisis from
advanced economies to the emerging markets (IMF, 2009). Indeed, the dramatic
changes in capital flows to emerging markets are cited as evidence of such
concerns. Strong growth was recorded for this type of capital flows through
2007 which was then followed by pronounced contraction across Emerging Asia,
Latin America and Emerging Europe. As shown in Cetorelli and Goldberg (2009),
during the 2007-2008 crisis, while all components of private capital flows declined,
the largest among these reductions were in cross-border bank loans. However,
given the stable deposit-based funding structure of banking institutions in Malaysia,112
coupled with continued ample liquidity environment in the system, the reliance
of Malaysian banking institutions on cross-border wholesale funding has continued
to remain minimal.
The recent crisis has drawn attention to the far-reaching impacts that
internationally active financial institutions have on the stability of individual
economies and financial systems that host their presence. Given their widespread
businesses and the complexity of the operations and governance processes,
concerns arose on the role these institutions play in the transmission of external
shocks into host markets. Since there are a number of globally renowned financial
institutions operating in the Malaysian financial system, it has become increasingly
important for the Central Bank to better understand the balance sheet of these
global banks. The important role these global banks played as a contagion channel
of the recent financial crisis has also further underscored the urgency to strengthen
financial regulation and supervision, and the greater emphasis given to cross-
border supervision.
This paper aims to firstly understand the transmission of shocks from the
global market to the Malaysian economy via the balance sheet of foreign banks,
focusing in particular on the lending behaviour of foreign bank affiliates during
the global financial crisis. Secondly, the paper attempts to examine systematically,
using econometric techniques, the effect of the global financial crisis on the
internal capital market of cross-border banks and thirdly, it examines whether
foreign affiliates have a stabilising effect on the financial system after a shock
induced by the crisis. This assessment provides an important contribution to
greater understanding of the drivers of cross-border bank lending to emerging
markets, facilitating conducive analysis of sources of financial vulnerabilities.
For the purpose of this study, this paper follows Cetorelli and Goldberg
(2010) and defines the pre-crisis period as 2006 Q2 to 2007 Q2 and the post-
crisis period from 2008 Q3 to 2009 Q2. This paper is organised as follows.
Section 1 of the paper provides an overview of the banking system structure
and regulatory philosophy that shaped the presence of foreign banks in Malaysia.
Section 2 provides a brief discussion on the evolution of foreign banks in Malaysia
and examines the extent of the effect of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis
on foreign bank lending activities. Section 3 contains a review of related literature,
which is followed by the exposition of the estimation methodology and empirical
results. Policy recommendations and concluding remarks are presented in the
final Section of the paper.113
1.1 Background
1.1.1. Overview of the Banking System in Malaysia
Malaysia has a comprehensive financial system that continues to evolve in
response to the changing domestic and international landscape. Malaysia has a
dual banking system (conventional and Islamic banking) consisting mainly of
commercial banks (both domestic and foreign), investment banks and Islamic
banks (Table 1). The Islamic banking landscape comprises 17 full-fledged Islamic
banks. Of these, six Islamic subsidiaries of foreign-owned conventional banking
institutions are involved in the international currency business. Domestic
commercial banks have the largest share of the market.
Table 1
Structure of the Malaysian Banking System as at end of June 2010
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia
1.1.2 The Forces that Shaped the Presence of Foreign Banks in
    Malaysia
Following the enactment of the Banking and Financial Institutions Act
(BAFIA) in 1989, the regulatory and supervisory responsibility of Bank Negara
Malaysia (the Bank) which is also the central bank of Malaysia, expanded to
include a larger spectrum of financial institutions, with direct responsibility to
regulate and supervise all licensed financial institutions. The licensed financial
institutions are banking institutions, insurance companies and Takaful operators.114
Foreign-owned banks, which were previously operating branches of global entities,
were required to be locally incorporated. The local incorporation was to ensure
that the foreign-owned banking institutions would be supported by permanent
capital and would be subject to the same prudential requirements prevailing on
domestic banking institutions. The local incorporation also created a legal
separation between the domestic entity and its foreign parent company, whereby
assets and capital of the domestic entity would be ‘ring-fenced´ to ensure that
obligations in Malaysia, especially to the banks’ domestic depositors, would be
given first priority. Coupled with the existing comprehensive financial safety net
in place, the operations of foreign banking institutions in Malaysia and the interest
of their customers are well safeguarded. For the rest of the paper, foreign banks
will referred to as locally incorporated foreign-owned commercial as well as
Islamic banking institutions.
One of the key catalytic drivers in shaping the Malaysian financial system
was the Financial Sector Master Plan (FSMP), a 10 year plan launched in 2001.
FSMP’s vision was to improve efficiency, innovation, flexibility, resilience and
dynamism of the financial system. The Master Plan spanned three phases focusing
primarily on building the capabilities of domestic banking institutions and enhancing
their performance. Today, more than 90% of the recommendations in the Plan
have been implemented. The significantly transformed Malaysian financial system
is now more diversified with well developed financial markets and broadened
product offerings. As the Bank moved into the final phase of the FSMP, more
liberalisation measures for the financial sector were announced in 2009,
encompassing three broad strategies namely, the issuance of new licences, the
increase in foreign equity limits and the offering of greater operational flexibilities
to incumbent foreign players. The Bank has received strong interest in new
licences from Asia, the Middle East, Europe and the United Kingdom which
bring with them, strong value propositions that will add significantly to the depth
and breadth of the financial sector in Malaysia.
Capitalising on the competitive advantage that Malaysia has in the area of
Islamic finance, namely a strong and comprehensive Islamic financial system
with a robust regulatory regime and well established legal framework, the Malaysia
International Finance Centre (MIFC) was launched with the aim of promoting
Malaysia as an international Islamic financial centre in August 2006. The objective
of the MIFC is to establish Malaysia as a centre for the origination, distribution
and trading of Islamic capital market instruments, Islamic funds and wealth
management. Products and services under the MIFC may be structured in any
currency and may be offered to both residents and non-residents. In line with
the aspirations of the MIFC, the Bank has issued several new offshore Islamic115
banking and takaful licenses, including the International Islamic Bank (IIB)
licences under the Islamic Banking Act 1983 which provides for the licensed
entity to undertake international banking business in international currencies2. In
addition, the existing Islamic banks and takaful operators are allowed to set up
International Currency Business Units that may provide the full range of Islamic
banking or takaful services with residents and non-residents in international
currencies. The first IIB licence was granted in 2007. There are now 4 IIBs
established in Malaysia. Given that most of the IIBs are set up as branches and
are only required to submit interim and audited financial statements to the Bank,
these IIBs are not included in this study.
2. Involvement of Foreign Banks Prior to and During the Global
Financial Crisis in Malaysia
2.1 Stylised Facts
The financial system of Malaysia hosts a diverse group of foreign financial
institutions, with many of them possessing an entrenched presence, having been
pioneers during the formative years of the financial system in the 19th century.
After the Asian financial crisis, there were 13 foreign-owned commercial banks
in Malaysia. At present, 20 foreign-owned banks have set up 266 branches in
the country, each with distinct business strengths and niches, focusing mainly on
retail and corporate banking.
Foreign commercial banks held over 90% of the share of the banking system
in 1957, when Malaysia achieved independence. By 1997, the share has declined,
accounting for only 14.2% of the total assets of the banking system. The market
share of foreign banks was relatively stable in the early 2000s, but recorded
higher growth after 2005 with the increased contribution from Islamic bank assets.
Total assets of foreign banks registered an average annual growth of 12%
between 2000 and 2005, amounting to RM221 billion by end-2006 or accounting
for 20.2% of the total banking system assets. As the financial turmoil began to
unfold, the total assets of foreign banks as a share of total banking system
assets remained stable at 21.1% to record RM310 billion by mid-2010 ( Figure
1).
________________
2. International currencies refer to all foreign currencies excluding the currency of Israel.116
2.1.1 Funding and Lending Activities of Foreign and Domestic Banks
The funding structure of foreign banks has been predominantly deposit-
based, with customer deposits accounting for 70% of total funding. In terms of
composition, more than half of the funds raised are intermediated into customer
loans, followed by inter-bank loans and lending to overseas affiliates and
investments in domestic and foreign securities.
Between the early part of 2006 and mid-2007, the deposits placed with
foreign banks grew an average of 14% while loans extended remained relatively
stable, recording between 5%-9% growth during the period. This resulted in the
deposit-to-loan ratio of foreign banks reaching 142.9% by mid-2007. At the same
time, the deposits placed with domestic banks recorded similar trends as that of
the foreign banks, growing at an average of 10.7% while loans extended recorded
an average growth rate of 10% during the period, resulting in a deposit-to-loan
ratio of 126.8% for domestic banks by mid-2007.
The amount of deposits placed with foreign banks grew at a moderated
rate of 20.4% by mid-2007 to register 11.7% by September 2008. Meanwhile,
the amount of loans extended outpaced that of deposits placed during the period,
leading to a decline in the deposit-to-loan ratio of foreign banks to 131.6% at
end September 2008. Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September
2008, the increase in deposit placement with foreign banks throughout September
2008 to September 2009 moderated further. During this period, anecdotal evidence
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia117
pointed to incidents of deposit withdrawals from the branches of foreign banks
located outside of the Klang Valley area. Anecdotal evidence also indicated that
these funds were then deposited into domestic banks. However, we found no
evidence of causal relationship3 between deposits placed with foreign banks and
deposits placed with domestic banks at the 5% significance level suggesting that
the shifts in deposits from foreign banks to domestic banks had been isolated
cases and not prevalent throughout the system.
As labour market conditions weakened towards the early part of 2009 and
capital expansion activities slowed, businesses deferred or cancelled investment
decisions following the sharp global economic downturn. Therefore, the amount
of loan extended by foreign banks moderated from RM152.7 billion in September
2008 to RM150.9 billion towards the early part of 2009. With deposits placed
and loan extended exhibiting moderation, the deposit-to-loan ratio of foreign banks
remained above 130% against the backdrop of domestic economic contraction
in 1Q 2009. In tandem with the economic recovery in the second half of 2009,
loans extended by foreign banks turned around to record an expansion of 2.7%
during the period and 11.5% in the first half of 2010. Given the expansion and
coupled with moderation in deposits placed with foreign banks, the deposit-to-
loan ratio of foreign banks declined further to register 129.6% by mid-2010
(Figure 4).
In contrast, the loans extended by the domestic banks expanded at a higher
pace during the period relative to deposits received. This led to the deposit-to-
loan ratio of domestic banks remaining within the range of 127-130% during the
same period. However, after the crisis, loan extended and deposits placed with
domestic banks exhibited a similar trend as that of the foreign banks (Figure 5).
________________
3. Granger causality test was performed in search of a direction of causation between deposits
placed with foreign banks and deposits placed domestic banks utilising monthly data from
June 2007 to September 2008. At 5% critical value, we cannot reject the hypothesis that
deposits placed with foreign banks does not Granger cause deposits placed with foreign
banks.118
Table 2
Deposits Received and Loans Extended by Banks in Malaysia
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia119
The Malaysian banking system remained on a strong foundation when the
global financial crisis erupted. The strong capitalisation of and ample liquidity in
the banking system had ensured that the intermediation function remained
uninterrupted, as reflected in the continued expansion of loans outstanding
throughout the crisis. The total lending provided by domestic and foreign banks
in Malaysia remained stable despite the liquidity squeeze experienced by the
developed economies from late 2007.
However, the full impact of the global financial crisis, which spilled over to
the real economy was only felt by the Malaysian economy in the first quarter
of 2009. Arising from the significant deterioration in external demand and the
decline in domestic demand, the Malaysian economy declined by 6.2% in the
first quarter of 2009. Demand for financing declined significantly in the first half
of 2009 amidst weaker domestic economic conditions as households and
businesses remained cautious and reprioritised expenditure plans in anticipation
of a more challenging employment outlook and economic environment.  The
loans extended by the foreign banks moderated gradually after end-2008,
registering a growth of 3.4% in 1Q 2009 to -0.8% in 3Q 2009. Coupled with
the contraction in the domestic economy for the first three quarters in 2009,
lending by the foreign banks as a share of GDP moderated from 24.1% in 1Q
2009  to 21.9% in 3Q 2009 (Figure 2). With the Malaysian economy recording
a contraction of 1.7% in 2009, lending by the foreign banks as a share of GDP
stabilised to 21.3% by end-2009 as the demand for financing rebounded strongly
in tandem with the improved prospects for growth.
In contrast to the foreign banks, loan extended by domestic banks remained
firm throughout 2009, registering between 8% in the first quarter of 2009 to
7.4% by the end of the year. Moderation in the loans extended by the domestic
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia120
banks, resulted in lending by the domestic banks as a share of GDP record an
average of 89.8% in the first three quarters of 2009 and subsequently to decline
to 83.6% by end-2009. Notably, the domestic banks played an even more
significant role in extending credit in Malaysia during and post-crisis period.
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia
2.2 Cross-border Lending and Foreign Claims4   vis-a-vis Malaysia
Following Herrmann and Mihaljek (2010), the data series in this Section are
taken from the Bank of International Settlement (BIS) locational and consolidated
banking statistics. The database comprises data on the gross international financial
claims and liabilities of banks, which are residents of a given country, on the
bank and the non-bank sectors in other countries (hence the term “cross-border”).
In the alternative set of the international banking data compiled by the BIS - the
consolidated banking statistics – creditor data are reported on the nationality
(home country) rather than residence (host country) basis.
The main purpose of both data sets is to provide information on the role of
the internationally active banks in intermediating cross-border capital flows. The
locational data are more relevant for economies receiving external loans, because
________________
4. Total foreign claims equals total international claims (cross-border claims in all currencies
and foreign currency claims extended locally by foreign offices) plus locally extended claims
in local currency. Foreign claims comprise loans, deposits placed, holdings of debt securities,
equities and other on-balance sheet items. Note that foreign claims do not include other
exposures, such as derivative contracts, guarantee and credit commitments.121
the way the lending flows are measured is consistent with the balance of
payments statistics. In particular, the “external loans” correspond to the “other
investment” category of capital flows in the balance of payments statistics. This
allows for better matching of cross-border bank flows and various
macroeconomic and financial system characteristics in emerging markets. The
consolidated data are more relevant for creditor countries, because the data
provide indication of the size of international banks’ country and liquidity
exposures.
The expansion in cross-border financing was most pronounced in 2005 to
2007, growing by 40.5% by end-2007. The external positions and cross-border
loans outstanding post the global financial crisis were higher than the positions
during the Asian financial crisis. Cross-border loans accounted, on average, for
about 80% of external positions of the BIS reporting banks vis-à-vis Malaysia.
Source: BIS Locational Statistics- Table 7A122
Source: BIS Consolidated Statistics
Using the BIS consolidated banking statistics, McGuire and von Peter (2009)
documented that the internationally active banks’ foreign positions have surged
since 2000. The outstanding BIS reporting banks’ foreign claims grew from
USD11 trillion at end-2000 to USD31 trillion by mid-2007 with a year-on-year
growth in foreign claims approaching 30% by mid-2007, rising from around 10%
in 2001. This acceleration coincided with significant growth in the hedge fund
industry, the emergence of the structured finance industry and the spread of
‘universal banking’, which combines commercial and investment banking and
proprietary trading activities. Total foreign claims of international banks on
Malaysia began to surge with a year-on-year growth of 5.8% by mid-2003 to
16.6% by mid-2007, or USD103 billion, driven largely by the growth in local
claims in local currency (Figure 7).
Local claims in local currency (measured in USD) grew by 8.7% on a
compounded annual basis to USD67 billion at end-2009 (end-2000: USD29 billion)
while total international claims rose by 6.6% on a compounded annual basis to
more than USD18 billion during the same period (end-2000: USD20.8 billion).
Both local and international claims were observed to have grown on a similar
trend since March 2004. However, scrutiny of the data over shorter horizon
especially during the crisis period, indicated a contrasting trend. Total international
claims surged sharply since September 2007, growing on an average of 30.3%
over the next three quarters to reach USD56 billion in mid-2008. The marked
increase in the total international claims after September 2007 may have been
driven by the US dollar shortage in the global market reflected in the increase123
in the spread of the inter-bank market rate due to the higher risk aversion among
the internationally active banks. In contrast, the growth in local claims in local
currency moderated from 22.7% as at end September 2007 to 14.2% as at mid-
2008.
McGuire and von Peter (2009) found that European banks, in particular,
accumulated foreign claims at a pace that outpaced domestic credit growth. At
the same time, European banks also took on more foreign liabilities, reflecting
a growing dependence on cross-border funding. Among the internationally active
banks, European banks increasingly accounted for the bulk of the outstanding
foreign claims on Malaysia followed by the UK and the US banks since the
early part of 2000 (Figure 8 and Figure 9). Foreign claims by European banks
on Malaysia increased at an average rate of 17% from 2006 through mid-2008.
The growth became more pronounced amid the on-set of the crisis, reaching
almost 30% between end-2007 and March 2008. However, foreign claims fell
sharply towards the end of 2008 and declined further during the first half of
2009.
Source: BIS Consolidated Statistics124
3. Literature Review
Foreign banks or multinational banks have a role to play in facilitating financial
intermediation in the domestic financial system. However, formal studies on the
specific roles of foreign banks in the development of Malaysian banking system
have been scant. Detragiache and Gupta (2004) compare the performance of
domestic banks and a group of long-established foreign banks during the 1997/
98 crisis in Malaysia. They found that the foreign banks which are not
specialised5 in Asia performed better than the domestic and some foreign banks
during the crisis, maintaining higher profitability due to their higher interest margins
and lower non-performing loans. In addition, foreign banks (especially the non-
Asia-oriented group) did not flee the Malaysian market in the immediate aftermath
of the crisis. On the contrary, their lending and deposits contracted less than
those of the domestic banks.
There is an intense ongoing debate as far as the consequences of increased
internationalisation or globalisation of banking is concerned. There is evidence
to support the view that a foreign bank’s entry into the domestic banking system
is a stabilising force for the host economy and will result in a more efficient
allocation of scarce resources. Much of the analysis, however, has been in the
context of shocks originating in the emerging markets (Cetorelli and Goldberg,
2009; Goldberg, 2009). The recent global financial crisis has highlighted several
vulnerabilities of which foreign banks did play a role in the transmission of shock
Figure 9: Annual Growth of Foreign Claims by Nationality
Source: BIS Consolidated Statistics
________________
5. Detragiache and Gupta (2004) distinguish specialised foreign banks as those foreign banks
with Asia as the main region of the bank’s operation.125
to emerging economies. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2009) argue that global banks
played a significant role in the transmission of the impacts from the recent crisis
to emerging market economies through the flows of internal funds within the
banking and cross-border lending channels. Using data from the banking system
of developed economies, Cetorelli and Goldberg (2010) examine the liquidity
shocks on emerging markets across Europe, Asia and Latin America by isolating
lending supply from lending demand. They found that lending supply in emerging
markets was affected via three distinct channels: a contraction in direct, cross-
border lending by foreign banks; a contraction in local lending by foreign banks’
affiliates in emerging markets; and a contraction in lending supply by domestic
banks.
In contrast, De Haas and Lelyveld (2009) present evidence of the existence
of internal capital markets that facilitate multinational banks’ management of the
lending activities by their subsidiaries. Their dataset includes 45 multinational
banks from 18 home economies with 194 subsidiaries across 46 economies.
Subsidiaries of multinational banks with financially strong parents are able to
expand their lending at a faster pace. As a result of parental support, foreign
bank subsidiaries also do not need to rein in their credit supply during a financial
crisis, while domestic banks need to do so. Hence, the presence of such globalised
banks in domestic economies acted as a stabilising force during times of financial
distress.
The third strand of the literature analyses the effect of the presence
of multinational banks on the aggregate bank lending of host economies.
McGuire and Tarashev (2008) establish a link between cross-border loans and
measures of bank health in host economies. They find evidence that the
deterioration in a bank’s health is associated with a decline in the growth of
credit to 19 emerging markets in the 1990s. Takáts (2010) using the Bank of
International Settlement (BIS) locational statistics, finds that the impact of supply
factors (the volatility of the S&P 500 financial index) is stronger than that of
demand factors (seasonally adjusted nominal GDP of each economy in USD)
in causing the sharp decline in bank lending to 21 emerging market economies
during the financial crisis.
4. Research Methodology and Empirical Results
The following Section presents the determinants of foreign bank lending
using a standard panel estimation similar to Navaretti et al. (2010). Navaretti
et al. (2010) examines whether multinational banks have a stabilising or a
destabilising role during times of financial distress. With a focus on Europe, it126
looks at how these foreign affiliates of the multinational banks have fared during
the recent financial crisis. The paper finds that retail and corporate lending of
these foreign affiliates have been stable and even increasing between 2007 and
2009. This pattern is related to the functioning of the internal capital market
through which these banks funnel funds across their units.
In order to verify whether the internal capital market or the funding conditions
of the global banks provided support functions in extending credits during the
recent global financial crisis, we also examined whether the change in a bank’s
loan-to-deposit ratio during the recent crisis has been significantly different for
foreign affiliates.
4.1 Model Specification and Data
Similar to Navaretti et al. (2010), we estimate the following specification on
the data during the period of the recent global financial crisis.
where the dependent variable,             is the ratio of customer loans and depo-
sits of foreign bank i in Malaysia at time t. Dummy_Crisis is a dummy variable
taking the value of one in the period of 2007, 2008 and 2009.
Dummy_Foreign_Bank is a dummy variable taking the value of one if bank i
in Malaysia of country j at time t is a foreign bank subsidiary of a holding
company located in country j (or region) in parentheses. With most of the home
countries of the foreign banks in Malaysia being located in North America, Europe
and Asia,  when bank i is located from those regions, the region dummy takes
the value of one. Bank_Specific_Char are characteristics of bank i of country
j in Malaysia, at time t-1. The model not only tests the effect of foreign bank
subsidiaries’ financial characteristics on their loan-to-deposit ratio, but it also
tests whether the access to the internal capital market will affect their loan-to-
deposit ratio.
In order to simplify the country factors, a region dummy is used in another
equation to replace the country dummy as follows:127
The model uses dummies to capture systemic differences among panel
observation results in what is known as a fixed-effect model using pooled data.
The data set runs from January 2000 to December 2009, amounting to 1440
monthly observations comprising 12 foreign banks in Malaysia.
The test of the effect of the global financial crisis on the internal capital
market of cross-border banks is based on the sign and significance of each of
β2 coefficients with k = 1 and 2. A positive and significant value would imply
that foreign banks with access to the internal capital market would reduce their
loan-to-deposit ratio less than the control group of banks6, and therefore would
have a stabilising effect on a potential shock caused by the financial crisis.
As for the factors of bank characteristics, we have considered the ratio of
return on assets (ROA) as a measure of profitability. If β2 is positive and
significant, it may imply that banks with more profit would extend more credits.
On the contrary, if β2 is negative and significant, it means that unprofitable banks
may assume more credit risks to gain greater profits. Therefore, the expected
sign of the variable is indeterminate. We also considered leverage (total equity
over total assets, LEVERAGE) as a measure of the bank’s risk aversion. A low
leverage ratio could mean relatively risk-adverseness and the bank may extend
credit more conservatively during crisis period, implying a negative relationship
between bank’s leverage and loan growth. In contrast, a low leverage ratio
could also represent liabilities constraints being less severe so that banks have
the capability to expand lending. Therefore, the sign of leverage ratio is
indeterminate. Finally, we examine the implication of the bank’s asset size
(ASSETS) and growth (DLOG(ASSETS)) for loans. Table 3 summarises the
definition and sources of all the variables included in the model.
________________
6. Navaretti et al. (2010) retain a control group of stand-alone banks that represent their
benchmark for banks that have no access to the internal capital markets.128
Table 3
Data Definition and Sources
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia
4.2 Empirical Results
Table 4 shows the estimation results of the models using the country and
region dummy. None of the interaction coefficients between the crisis dummy
and country dummy (or region dummy) is significant. The results suggest that
the effect of the global financial crisis on the internal capital market of cross-129
border banks may not exist in all of the foreign banks’ parent home countries
and the region of North America, Europe and Asia. These findings are
inconclusive in determining whether all foreign bank subsidiaries with access to
the internal capital market provided stabilising effects on Malaysia in response
to the shock caused by the global financial crisis. The findings could also suggest
that the foreign banks in Malaysia may not be reliant on the support of internal
capital of their parents.
The coefficient of D(ROA_LAG) is negative and statistically significant in
both models. Given with the negative signs, less profitable banks may assume
more credit risks to garner bigger profits. In addition, the positive and statistically
significance of the coefficient of DLOG(ASSETS_LAG) implies that foreign
banks with bigger assets would extend more credits. However, we found that
D(LEVERAGE_LAG) has a negative but negligible effect.
The adjusted-R squared of both models was 1.5% and 1.8% of variance
loan-to-deposit ratio of foreign banks respectively. A low adjusted-R squared
could be a result of the small  sample size. Nonetheless, we have identified
which determinant does affect the loan-to-deposit ratio of the foreign banks
during the crisis period. The value of Durbin-Watson statistics of close to 2 in
both models suggests that autocorrelation correction is not needed.130
Table 4: Panel Least Square Test - Fixed Effects
(Dependent variable is the difference of the logarithm of loans over
deposits of bank)
Note: In the panel, t-statistics are reported in parenthesis. The symbol *** indicates a significance
level of 1% or less, ** indicates 5% and * indicates 10%.131
5. Policy Recommendations and Conclusion
As the move towards greater international financial integration persists, the
potential for risk transmission and contagion across borders will also be heightened.
Against this background, this paper aims to understand the transmission of shocks
from the global market to the Malaysian economy via the balance sheet of
foreign banks, focusing in particular on the lending of foreign bank affiliates
during the global financial crisis.
Malaysia’s banking system has a sizeable presence of foreign players which
accounts for approximately a fifth of the market share of the banking system
assets. In terms of lending activities, foreign banks recorded approximately
double-digit annual loan growth between 2006 and 2008 before showing signs
of moderation in 2009.
Cross-border loans accounted on average for about 80% of external positions
of the BIS reporting banks vis-à-vis Malaysia. Total foreign claims of international
banks on Malaysia began to surge from mid-2003 to mid-2007, driven largely
by the growth in local claims in local currency. The bulk of the outstanding
foreign claims on Malaysia is dominated by European banks which became more
pronounced amid the on-set of the crisis.
This paper attempted to answer the questions of whether the internal capital
market or funding conditions of global banks provided support to the subsidiaries
in extending credits during the recent global financial crisis, by using a standard
panel estimation on monthly data of 12 foreign banks in Malaysia for the period
of January 2000 to December 2009. The results indicate that firstly, there is no
robust evidence supporting the existence of the internal capital market effect on
the subsidiaries of global banks with home countries and in the regions of North
America, Europe and Asia. These findings are inconclusive in determining
whether all foreign bank subsidiaries with access to internal capital from parent
companies provided stabilising effects on Malaysia from shocks caused by the
global financial crisis. The inconclusive result could possibly be due to the fact
that all foreign banks in Malaysia are locally incorporated and the lending and
deposits taking activities are mainly directed towards the domestic economic
activities. Secondly, unprofitable banks may assume greater credit risks to gain
bigger profits while foreign banks with bigger assets size would extend more
credits. This supports the well accepted notion that profitability and assets size
are important factors in driving foreign bank lending activities.132
While cross-border lending and internal capital markets could be the channels
for international shock transmission, our empirical study suggests the importance
of national authorities in reducing the concentration of foreign banks from specific
countries or regions. The findings of this paper also bring to the fore, the
importance of prudential regulations. Global recommendations on cross-border
bank supervision and resolution are much discussed and debated currently. Among
the suggestions are for the national authorities to promote better coordination in
cross-border resolutions; strengthen risk mitigation mechanisms that reduce
contagion and systemic risks during a crisis; and for home and host authorities
to agree on arrangements that would ensure the timely production and sharing
of needed information both for purposes of contingency planning during normal
times and for cross-border crisis management and resolution during times of
distress. Inevitably, these recommendations need to be further strengthened and
adapted to suit the local context. This would require much by way of the
harmonisation and coordination of national laws. In tandem with the more
extensive cross-border operations of the major domestic financial conglomerates,
greater collaboration between the Bank and host regulators within the region
has also become a key priority to support the effective supervision of financial
groups. The Bank is also actively participating in supervisory collaboration to
facilitate the timely sharing of information and improved cross-border collaboration
with other home and host supervisors.133
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Myanmar is the largest country in South East Asia with a total land area
of 261,228 square miles (677,000 square kilometers). The population of Myanmar
in the year 2008-2009 (provisional data) is estimated at 58.4 million. After 1985-
1986, the value of export sdecreased whereas the price of imports became
higher and hence, imports of raw materials and spare parts declined leading to
a contraction in domestic production. Consequently, the Gross Domestic Product
(GDP) declined by 15.8% during the period from1986-1987 to 1988-1989 while
that of per capita GDP also declined by 20% during that period.
In order to induce investments with accompanying technology and capital
to exploit the rich natural resources endowment and to speed up the development
process, the Foreign Investment Law was enacted in 1988. This main aim of
the Law is to provide incentives and rights to foreign investors. Following this
Law, the Myanmar Citizens Investment Law was enacted,  enabling Myanmar’s
private entrepreneurs to enjoy privileges on tariffs and taxes.
1.2 Objective of Study
Almost SEACEN economies were affected by the global financial crisis to
varying degrees and Myanmar was not immune from its effects. However, as
Myanmar is not yet fully integrated into the global economy, the financial crisis
has not directly affected its economy. Myanmar may have to face indirect adverse
effects of the crisis such as declines in trade, foreign investments and tourism.136
In these aspects, it is expected that the effects will not be as bad for our economy
as others.
Within the context of this study, the development of domestic and foreign
bank lending, the strategies for attracting foreign direct investments (FDI) will
be reviewed. This paper will  also analyse the major determinants of both claims
and loans of foreign banks following crisis in Myanmar.
The Central Bank of Myanmar’s major responsibilities includes inspecting,
supervising and regulating the financial system. Another important goal is to
ensure the soundness and development of the financial system. Currently, the
banking system is quite rudimentary with mainly commercial banks. Attention is
thus given to supervision and regulation of the commercial banks.
1.3 Macroeconomic Performance in Myanmar
After shifting the economic system into a market-oriented one, various reform
measures have been taken with a view to stimulating and accelerating the
economy’s development.  Due to the consistent and coherent manner in which
the reform measures were taken and also due to the fundamental  strength of
the economy, the downward trend of the economy had been halted and recovery
achieved as indicated by GDP growth rates achieved in 1989-90 and 1990-91
despite problems and difficulties that usually accompany reforms.
The First Short-term Four Year Plan (1992-1993 to 1995-1996) has been
implemented with a very satisfying average annual growth rate of 7.5%. During
the Second Short-term Five Year Plan (1996-1997 to 2000-2001), real GDP
growth in 1997-1998 and 1998-1999, slowed down to an average annual rate of
6.23 %. This was partly a result of the contagion effects of the regional financial
crisis. In FY 1999-2000, it increased to more than 10%, with the agriculture
sector leading the expansion. In addition, the manufacturing and processing,
energy and mining sectors have also grown rapidly.
In the Third Five Year Short Term Plan spanning from 2001-2002 to 2005-
2006, significant growth have been achieved with the high average annual growth
rate of 13.09 %. The agriculture sector remains the driving force of the
economy’s growth.
Myanmar is now implementing the fifth year of Fourth Five-Year Short
Term Plan spanning from 2006-2007 to 2010-1011. Due to concerted efforts,
remarkable growth rates were recorded at 13.1 % in 2006-2007, 12.1 % in137
2007-2008. However, growth declined to 10.1% in 2008-2009 due to the slight
decrease in the Agriculture Sector which was hit by Cyclone Nargis on 2 May
2008. It slightly increased to 10.4% in 2009 due to the growth of major economic
sectors such as the 5.4% growth in agriculture sector, 17.6 % in industrial sector
and 11.9 % in services sector, respectively. The agriculture sector took a 31.9%
share in the 2009-2010 GDP. Myanmar has huge potential for higher growth
with many other sources of growth, including oil and gas, fishery, forestry, gems
and services sector improvements. Therefore, the Fourth Five-Year Short Term





Source: Ministry of Planning and Economic Development
The share of the service sector in Gross Domestic Product (GDP) decreased
slightly from 39.6 % in 1991-92 to 34.7 % in 2005-06 in the presence of the
market oriented reforms. However, the agriculture sector is still the most important
sector, accounting for about 50% of GDP at current price and employing about
60% of labour force.138
Source; Central Statistical Organization, Statistical Year Book, Ministry of Planning and Economic
Development, Myanmar
Table 1
Share of Service Sector in GDP and Growth Rates in Myanmar
(Percentage)
The inflation rate has been decreasing significantly since 1999-2000 from
16.09% to (-) 1.6% in 2000-2001, the first year of the Third Short-Term Five
Year Plan. The second year, it rose again and stood at 58% in 2002-2003 which
gradually declined to 24.9% in March 2004 and dropped to 3.8% in 2004-2005.
Soaring global oil prices during that period did not have much effect on domestic
prices as the government sold energy at a subsidised rate. However, due to the
increase in government salaries as well as the abolishment of subsidised energy
prices, it rose again in 2007- 2008 to 28.8 %. Although inflation has returned
to the low single digits of 9.2 % in 2008-2009, due to the reversal in the trend
of ing rnational food and fuel price, declining domestic demand as credit to the
private sector and public sector moderated caused a sharp drop in food and
market fuel prices.
The Foreign Investment Law which was enacted in November 1988 has
permitted foreign investments since 1989-90. The inflow of foreign investments
started to contract since 1997-98, mainly due to the indirect impact of the Asian
financial crisis and reductions in investment of some developed economies. Under
the Foreign Investment Law, 423 enterprises from 29 economies were permitted
to invest in Myanmar with a total amount of US$ 15,726 million up to the end
of March 2009.139
   
Figure 3: Composition of Foreign Investment Countries and
Sectoral Investment
Source: Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development
Domestic investments by enterprises in accordance with the Myanmar
Citizen’s Investment Law which was enacted in 1994 has been increasing. There
are 700 enterprises permitted to invest with the amount of Kyat 167.79 billion
under the Myanmar Citizen Investment Law up to December 2008.
Source: Ministry of National Planning and Economic Development140
The trade sector’s growth  performed impressively under the market oriented
economy. Trade value increased from US$ 400 million in 1988-1999 to US$
11.77 billion in 2009-2010. Myanmar experienced deficits in the external sector
before 2002-2003 and achieved surplus starting from 2004-2005 due to the
government’s implementation of export promotion measures and systematic
management of the foreign trade system. The demand for Myanmar’s forestry,
marine and agricultural products in foreign markets was stronger than before.
Both exports and imports decreased by 22.3 % and 14.5% in 2007-2008 and
increased again by 5.85% and 32.92% in 2008-2009 and the annual average
growth of exports and imports in 2009-2010 continued to increase by 17.7% and
21.1% respectively.
Myanmar’s major trading partner economies are Thailand, India, China and
Singapore and so foreign trade is mainly with Asian economies (exports 70%
and imports 90%). The share of foreign trade with ASEAN constitutes an average
share of about 54% in total exports and 46.2% in total imports. Among Asian
economies, trade with China is highest followed by India and Japan. Gross
international reserves are adequate to finance 11.7 months of imports cover due
to increases in export earnings and other capital flows.
Source: Central Bank of Myanmar
Myanmar has a fixed exchange rate system. The Myanmar currency, Kyat
is officially pegged to the SDR at Kyat 8.50847 per SDR 1. Myanmar applies
margins of 2% to spot transactions, based on the fixed Kyat-SDR rate. Although
Myanmar has kept foreign exchange control, it  has the vision to make its currency
convertible in the long run.141
2. Analysis of Foreign Banks’ Involvement Pre and During the Global
Financial Crisis in Myanmar
2.1 Myanmar Banking Structure
The financial system in Myanmar has been restructured since 1989-90 at
the inception of the market oriented economic system. In order to establish a
sound and efficient financial system, which would facilitate the conduct of market
economic system, new laws were promulgated in banking sector. The banking
sector consists of the Central Bank, four state-owned banks, eight semi-
government banks, eleven private-owned banks and thirteen representative offices
of foreign banks.
Central Bank of Myanmar implements a banking sector development strategy
with three phases as follows;-
Phase 1 :- promoting institutional development;
 - promoting skills and efficiency among the domestic banks within
a medium term, while foreign banks are allowed to establish
their representatives offices. Initially foreign banks are allowed
to open representative offices which may work only as liaison
offices of their head quarters;
Phase 2 :- permitting selected domestic banks to establish joint venture
banks with foreign banks;
Phase 3 :- permitting foreign banks to open bank branches and operate
banking activities in Myanmar.
2.1.1 State Owned Banks
The Myanma Economic Bank which has the largest commercial banking
network in Myanmar maintains a deposit base (over Kyat 70 billion) consisting
of and heavily weighted towards mobilising domestic savings. The bank’s loan
portfolio consists of 70% to the private sector. It has a total number of 314
branches throughout the economy while its  paid up capital amounts to Kyat 220
million.
The Myanma Foreign Trade Bank concentrates on international banking
business, rendering banking services for exports, imports, guarantee issuance,
remittances, credit card services, sales and purchases of foreign currencies and142
traveler’s cheques, collection of foreign currency cheques and drafts. The
Myanma Foreign Trade Bank maintains correspondent relations with 148 foreign
banks from 52 economies.
The Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank, as mentioned above,
specialises in corporate and investment banking for local customers and foreign
companies. The Bank accepts deposits in both kyat and foreign exchange. It
has established correspondent relations with 250 foreign banks from all parts of
the world, of which 35 are Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank’s
depository institutions.
The Myanma Agricultural and Rural Development Bank, the successor of
the State Agriculture Bank of 1953, continues to emphasise on loan provision
and rendering services to the agricultural sector, amid a broader scope of
activities. The Myanma Agricultural and Rural Development Bank has a
countrywide network of 14 regional offices, 165 branches and 47 agency offices
providing short and long-term credit to over 2 million farmers. The title of the
Bank was changed to the Myanma Agricultural Development Bank.
2.1.2 Private Banks
With the promulgation of the Central Bank of Myanmar Law and Financial
Institutions of Myanmar Law, the government allowed the establishment of private
banks, as part of the banking sector reform process. Private banks have played
an increasingly substantial role in financial sector development as well as the
nation’s economic development. This has been reflected in a growing share of
deposits held by the local private banks, and substantial increase of bank deposits
at an average rate of 50% per annum. Private banks hold about 60% of total
deposits and total loans in recent years. To date, there are 19 domestic private
banks operating in Myanmar. By the end of October 2010, there were 257
branches of domestic private banks.143
Table 2
List of Private Banks as of end-October 2010
*Semi-government Bank
 Source: Central Bank of Myanmar
2.1.3 Representative Offices
There are currently 13 foreign banks, which have opened representative
offices in Myanmar. These offices cannot conduct any commercial banking
business yet. Some of these representative offices often monitor Myanmar based
projects for which their parent banks have extended financing while some assist
in the smooth operations of commercial transactions between Myanmar banks
and their parent banks.
Table 3
List of Representative Office of Foreign Bank as
of end-October 2010
Source: Central Bank of Myanmar144
2.2 Recent Banking Sector Development
During the socialist period from 1962 to 1988, Myanmar had practiced a
centrally planned economic system with no foreign investments. Since 1988,
Myanmar has transformed its economic system from a centrally planned  one
to a market oriented system, with special emphasis made on stepping up
investments. One of the most important new measures undertaken was the
promulgation of the Foreign Investment Law in November 1988 which was
immediately followed by an endorsement of its procedure in December. The
main aim of this Law was to provide incentives for the inflow of foreign capital
and technology, which is essential to expedite the development of the national
economy.
In Myanmar, liberalisation in the financial sector has allowed for  sector
participation in financial businesses, in accordance with the new banking laws
enacted in 1990. The new banking laws contain all necessary provisions to govern
and nurture the banking system and are also consonant with internally accepted
banking principles. Enhancing the efficiency of financial services is an important
contributory factor for economic development. Consequently, fiscal and monetary
policies that facilitate the development of the economy were laid down and
implemented. In 1988-1989, there were four state-owned banks. However, in
line with the market economic system, private entrepreneurs were allowed to
participate in banking services and hence, up to end of March 2010 there were
four state-owned banks, 15 private banks with 233 branch offices in operation.
Moreover, 13 representative offices of foreign banks were also operating as
representative offices for information and marketing purposes.
The financial system in Myanmar is strongly dominated by banks, while the
insurance sector and the securities market are nascent. As of March 2010, the
total assets of the banking system stood at Kyat 2,929.87 billion. The banking
sector consists of 32 institutions, of which 4 are State Banks, 15 local banks and
13 representative offices of foreign banks.145
The State Banks serve the specialised needs of the economy as indicated
by their names -  Myanma Economic Bank, Myanma Foreign Trade Bank,
Myanma Investment and Commercial Bank, and Myanma Agricultural
Development Bank. They are complex financial institutions, which combine
banking with directed lending and other quasi-fiscal operations and, in some
cases, certain central banking and treasury operations.
Compared to the size of Myanmar and its economy, the current formal
financial sector in the economy is exceptionally small. Between 2008-2009 and
2009-2010, total assets of the banking system as a percentage of GDP fell from
9.2% to 8.7%. This is low for an economy that officially grew at a real rate
of 11.9 %. In many other economies, the total assets of the banking system
exceed GDP, and normally the growth of the banking sector exceeds the GDP
growth.
In FY2009-2010, the total assets of the banking sector increased Kyat
3,851,174.76 million from Kyat 2,684,104.13 million in FY 2008-2009. In  FY
2008-2009, the banks held most of their funds in liquid assets, followed closely
Table 4
Myanmar Banking System, as of end-March 2010
Source: Central Bank of Myanmar146
by loans and advances. Cash and bank balances due from banks, which increased
by 29.42 % from Kyat 1,130,375.52 million in FY 2008-2009 to Kyat 1,462,929.23
million in FY 2009-2010.
On the other hand, loans and advances accounted for 29.30% of total assets
in FY 2009-2010. At the same time, banks sourced 82.12% and 4.81% of their
funds from deposits.
The Central Bank of Myanmar, in ensuring stability and soundness of the
banking system, is continuously strengthening the supervisory and regulatory
controls during 2006-2007, 2007-2008 and 2008-2009. The present Central Bank
rate has been 12% since April 2006.The Central Bank of Myanmar, on behalf
of the government, has issued 3 year and 5 year Government Treasury Bonds
since 1993 as indirect instruments of monetary control and also for the promotions
of savings. Starting in 1992, private domestic banks were again allowed to operate147
in Myanmar. After a period of strong economic growth, private banks dominated
the banking sector before the 2003-2004 banking crisis.
During 2007-2008, 2008-2009 and 2009-2010 the  financial  sector  in
Myanmar, particularly  the  banking  sector, was  relatively  stable  and  charted
good  progress. Consequently, the  amount  of  capital  as  well  as  deposits
and  loans  have  increased. The  sum  of  paid-up  capital  of  private  banks
increased  27.76 %, 30.86 %  and  22.9 %  respectively. The  increase  in  paid-
up  capital  is  mainly  due  to  increased  contributions  to  capital  by  private
banks. Deposits and loans and advances also rose. The steady growth of deposits




Figure 8: Myanmar Banks’ Capital, Deposit and Loan148
2.3 Foreign Banks’ Involvement in Myanmar
A branch of the Presidency Bank of Bengal was established  in Yangon in
1861 with the second branch opening  in Mawlamyaing in 1865, and subsequently
a  third branch in Sittwe in 1866. These banks acted as exchange banks for
export and import businesses. In 1921, the Imperial Bank of India was converted
into the Central Bank of Burma, under the Imperial Bank of India Act 1920.
In 1934, the government of India passed the Reserve Bank of India Act and
created the Reserve Bank of India as the new central bank, placing its branch
in Rangoon (Yangon) in 1935. Commercial banking, mainly conducted by some
European and Indian banks prevailed during that time with banking business
centered only in Yangon.
Before World War II, there were some trading of equity securities in
Myanmar on the Yangon Stock Exchange. A limited number of British and
European stocks were traded by seven European firms in the secondary market
within an informal over-the counter framework. There were no Myanmar
companies listed in that fledgling market. Eventually, the Yangon Stock Exchange
failed to take off following the outbreak of World War II.
The Yangon branch of the Reserve Bank of India was closed on 31 March
1947. On 1 October 1947, the Union Bank of Burma Act was promulgated and
the Union Bank of Burma was established as the Central Bank under this Act.
It commenced operations on 3 February  1948, just after the achievement of
Independence in January 1948.
After independence was secured, Myanmar pursued the course of a market
economic system with government control over some key economic sectors
such as railways, air transport, postal services, electricity supply, etc. Under this
economic environment, the financial sector developed with the presence of a
central bank, one state-owned commercial bank, one state-owned agricultural
bank, one state-owned industrial bank, one state-owned insurance institution,
some private domestic banks, branches of foreign banks and foreign insurance
companies. By the end of 1962, there were ten private banks and thirteen foreign
bank branches in the country.
In 1962, the Revolutionary Council Government assumed state power and
it introduced changes in the political and economic systems, transforming the
nation into a socialist country based on a centrally planned economic system.149
In order to implement the centrally planned economic system, all private banks,
including those owned by foreign nationals, were nationalised on 23 February
1963.
Foreign-owned institutions were by law not allowed to undertake banking
operations in Myanmar. In addition, foreigners were not allowed to own shares
in domestic banks. Accordingly, the only way for foreign banks to have a presence
in the economy was to open a representative office for information and marketing
purposes. In the early years of the reform era, a great many of these were
establish. Since then, however, their numbers have dwindled considerably and
no establishment of joint ventures has been permitted.
The Myanma Foreign Trade Bank specialises in conducting foreign exchange
operations concerning external trade and non-trade Foreign Exchange operation.
These include executing contracts relating to receipts and payments of foreign
Table 5
List of Private Banks and Foreign Banks as of end-December 1962150
exchange and ntaining clearing account under the bi-lateral counter trade
agreement. Effective competition between state banks and private banks appears
weak. The Myanma Foreign Trade Bank is not really a bank at all but rather
a government agency in charge of distributing scarce foreign exchange funds
allocated in the state budget to state-owned economic enterprises and other
state institutions.
During 2007-2008, 2008-2009 and 2009-2010, the Myanma Foreign Trade
Bank was developing stably. Consequently, the amount of deposits and loans as
well as borrowings from global banks has increased. The  total  deposits, loans
and borrowing  has increased  42.58 %, 2.53 %  and  0.15% in 2009-2010
respectively.
2.4 The Role of Representative Offices in Myanmar
The Central Bank of Myanmar Law and the Financial Institution of Myanmar
Law (1990) permitted the opening of representative offices of foreign banks in
Myanmar. The representative office serves as a trade and commerce liaison for
local and foreign clients. Prior to the Asian financial crisis of 1997, there were
46 representative offices of both Asian and European banks in Myanmar. Some
representative offices have closed to due to the restructuring of the parent
companies in the aftermath of the Asian currency crisis. The majority of foreign
bank representative offices have closed due to an insufficient number of banking
operation licenses needed to conduct international business in Myanmar.151
Only 13 representative offices of foreign banks currently remain. Due to
Myanmar banking laws, citizens of Myanmar are prohibited from depositing
money in foreign banks or acquiring loans from them. Representative offices of
foreign banks operate in Myanmar to gather economic data on the economy’s
investment climate. Many of the representative offices are conducting financial
research with just one liaison officer and a small number of local staff running
the office. These offices are not allowed to conduct commercial banking business
as yet. They often monitor Myanmar based projects for which their offshore
parent banks have extended financing. Foreign banks will eventually be allowed
to set up joint-venture banks with local partners.
2.5 Banking Crisis in Myanmar
In spite of the success achieved by the private banks, a sudden shock brought
about damages of enormous proportion to the banking industry in Myanmar in
early 2003. The crisis started with the failure resulting from the illegal financial
operations of general services enterprises. These firms, the  so-called “A-Kyoe
Saung” accepted deposits from the customers with the promise to pay high
interest rates of 4% to 6% per month. As these enterprises are incorporated
under the Companies Act and/ or Co-operative Law, they are not allowed to
carry out financial activities such as receiving deposits and issuing bond-like
instruments. The fact that these firms receive deposits and used them in high
risk businesses such as speculation in gold or US dollar, real estate and so on
runs completely counter to the provisions of the Central Bank of Myanmar Law
and to Financial Institutions of Myanmar Law.
Until the end of January, 2003, the banking operations were functioning
smoothly. The private banks took a larger share of the market, garnering  60%
of the total deposits and total loans. They were sound in terms of capital adequacy,
profitability, asset quality and NPL ratio. Unfortunately, some major private banks
experienced sudden withdrawals of deposits starting from the 7 February 2003.
This sparked the contagion effect of the failures of the private general services
enterprises (outside the purview of the Central Bank supervision) which were
offering attractive interest payments. As the boom in real estate business was
coming to an end and asset prices were dropping sharply, one after another
general services companies fell into difficulties in terms of making interest
payment and principal investment money to household investors. With the collapse
of these companies, the consequent panic spread and caused massive withdrawals
from six major private banks, which inevitably faced a liquidity shortfall.152
To closely oversee the speedy recovery of the banks, the Bank Supervision
Committee was formed by the end of February 2003. Moreover, ten bank
examination teams were formed to scrutinize banks’ operations on daily basis.
Special rescue loans were issued to the banks in crisis, taking adequate securities.
Not only did the problem banks but also the other 14 banks have to furnish their
daily financial positions. The Bank Supervision Committee took necessary actions
to help the banks maintain normal operations and to prevent the occurrence of
widespread banking crisis. The Central Bank intervened by imposing restrictions
on withdrawals of deposits and by providing instructions to banks the recalling
of loans. Credits by the private banks were strictly controlled and the loans
made by the problem banks were collected before their due. The private banks
had to raise their capital rovision. The Central Bank did not only continue its
close monitoring of the private banks’ debt portfolios but also in resolving the
NPL issues among banks. The average NPL ratio of private banks declined to
the lowest level of 2.09% as of end March 2003. Currently, the private banks
are back to operating normally.
The private banks had been able to mobilise deposits and provde loans to
private enterprises to a considerable extent- the total deposits of all private banks
increased from Kyat 437 million in 1992-1993 to Kyat 514,958 million in 2001-
2002 while loans and advances increased from Kyat 337.39 million in 1992-1993
to Kyat 373.30 million in 2002. Such a tremendous increase in deposits and
loans can be construed as an impressive performance on part of the private
banks in view of the negative interest rates, credit restrictions, and the lack of
banking habit among the public. However, in 2003 both deposits and loans declined
as a result  of the liquidity crisis that occurred in early 2003. Consequently, both
deposits and loans increased in the private banks as can be seen in the following.153
As shown in the graph, both deposits and loans declined in the years 2002-
2003 and 2003-2004 as a consequence of the liquidity crisis. The recovery began
in 2004-2005, and about the end of 2006-2007, a full recovery both in terms of
deposits and loans had been achieved. As the banks gradually regained the trust
and confidence of the public, the regulatory authority relaxed the deposit-taking
restriction to some extent. In June 2006, the private banks were allowed to
accept deposits up to 10 times of their paid up capital.
The liquidity problems in banks began with the failure of the general services
enterprises resulting from their illegal financial operations. The negative
externalities of their collapse had spilled over to the banking sector. Modern
commercial banking is fractional-reserve banking and is dependent upon public
trust and confidence because a depositor of a commercial bank always has two
worries, i.e., the solvency and liquidity of his bank. When depositors believe that
the bank is no longer solvent and is unable to honour deposits, or liquid, there
will be a bank run. Fundamentally commercial banking business is dependent on
public trust and confidence. Given the nature of the banking business, not a
single bank in the world can survive should its clients (the depositors) for some
reasons or others withdraw all their bank deposits in a rush.
2.6  Impact of the Global Financial Crisis in Myanmar
The impact of the 1997 financial crisis and recent global financial crisis has
not directly affected Myanmar’s economy, because it is still not completely
accessible to the global financial market. However, as Myanmar’s main trading
partners are its neighbouring economies such as China, India as well as ASEAN+3
countries, which were affected by global economic downturn. Myanmar was
also influenced somewhat.
The domestic financial sector was not directly affected because the banking
system in Myanmar has remained insulated from the region. Although the banking
crisis of 2003 has receded, the financial sector including banking, insurance and
non-banking financial institutions remains weak and is not supporting international
trade and domestic investment activities adequately. There is a need for a
comprehensive reform of the financial and banking system which would bring
about effective financial intermediation; a prerequisite for economic growth.
There is no firm data on the number of Myanmar nationals working abroad
and dependent on employment and income from  international merchant shipping
activities, but observations and newspaper reports indicate that a large number154
of Myanmar nationals have returned home from Singapore, Malaysia, South
Korea and middle-eastern countries. A growing number of Myanmar nationals
who had previously held contractual employment with international merchant
ships have been waiting their next assignments. Foreign exchange earnings
through remittances had therefore declined.
The global recession could hit the fisheries sector to some degree as fish
products are one of the economy’s major exports. The industry was facing
difficulties with payments from foreign buyers. As a result, most small exporters
could no longer trade because of these delays in payment. There are many
worries in the industry due to the financial crisis and every stakeholder is obviously
concerned about overcoming possible difficulties. In the economy’s ornamental
fish production sector, exporters reportedly face a slowdown due to reductions
in orders from buyers abroad.
According to figures from the Myanmar Department of Fisheries, fisheries
exports amounted to US$310 million in 2008 (from the beginning of the fiscal
year to mid-November), about US$17 million lower than the export earnings of
the same period the previous year. Fisheries exports for financial year 2008-
2009 reached only about 56 % of the target. By 2008-2009 ended 31 March,
the economy had exported around 320,000 tons of fisheries products, worth
about US$483 million against a target of US$850 million. The shortfall, according
to officials, was attributed mainly to the after effects of cyclone Nargis and the
global recession. Because of the credit crunch, foreign buyers could not borrow
sufficient funds to pay the prices requested by exporters, while breeders could
not sell their products at prices below their production costs.
The beans and pulses market lost an estimated US$200 million due to price
fluctuations and market distortions during the period. However, international prices
of beans and pulses have now recovered to a certain level after a sharp slump
caused by market fluctuations and aggravated by the global financial crisis.
As regards remittances from Myanmar’s expatriate workers, the impact of
the global recession, coupled with the rise in value of the Myanmar Kyat, has
been tremendous. Singapore is the most attractive ASEAN country for Myanmar
overseas workers where many work as engineers, IT experts, accountants, nurses
and factory workers. The employers are giving priority and preference for hiring
their own citizens in lieu of Myanmar expatriate workers. In Malaysia, Myanmar
workers are facing the same problems. Due to declines in exports in these
economies, many factories have reduced foreign workers, seriously affecting155
Myanmar workers. Consequently, remittances back in Myanmar have declined
sharply.
In spite of the negative impact of the global recession on sectors as the
fisheries, beans and pulses, construction, and foreign remittances, Myanmar’s
foreign investments rose sharply by 93.06% in 2008, reaching US$974.996 million
compared with 2007, based on the latest figures released by the Central Statistical
Organisation. The CSO attributed the sharp increase in foreign investments to
the mining sector, which amounted to US$860.996 million. Of this, nearly US$856
million came from China while the remaining US$5 million came from Singapore.
Of the US$114 million of foreign investments in oil and gas, Russia injected
US$94 million, while Vietnam invested US$20 million. By the end of 2008, there
were 422 projects with committed foreign investments of US$15 billion. Of the
29 countries that have invested in Myanmar, Thailand topped the list with over
US$7 billion, followed by Britain and Singapore with over US$1 billion each2.
Regarding Myanmar foreign trade, the total overseas trade volume exceeded
US$11 billion within the first 11 months of the fiscal year 2008-2009, including
US$1.2 billion in border trade. Exports accounted for more than US$7 billion,
while the remaining US$4.4 billion represented imports. Exports rose by 10.8%
and imports rose by 31.2%, compared to previous year’s figures.
Myanmar had a trade surplus of US$2.7 billion in the fiscal year 2008-2009.
The exports of natural gas amounted to US$2.486 billion out of the total exports
US$6.413 billion. Myanmar’s principal exports are natural gas, agricultural
produce, fisheries, and forest products. The economy imports mainly machinery
and parts, crude oil, edible oil, cement and fertiliser. In view of the good
performance in the trade and foreign investment sectors, it would seem that
Myanmar is in a good position to weather the impact of the deepening global
downturn.
As Myanmar’s capital market is in a fledging stage, the impact of the global
crisis on its financial sector had been minimal. Foreign banking operations in
Myanmar are available only to the state-owned banks. The Central Bank regularly
supervises the State-run and private banks in accordance with laws, rules and
regulations. All the banks are in compliance with the guidelines and instructions
________________
2. Quote from the Union of Myanmar Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry.156
issued by the Central Bank. In short, there is no risk of a liquidity crunch and
Myanmar’s banking system has remained stable.
3. Literature Review
Klingebiet (2003) stated said that from late 1970s up to 2003, there were
117 systemic crises and 51 cases of border line crisis (between systemic and
non-systemic crisis). The international activities of commercial banks have
expanded rapidly over the past few decades although banks in most economies
still hold a small fraction of their portfolios in foreign claims. To understand the
financial turmoil, it is necessary to begin by looking at macroeconomic
developments in the region up to the middle of 1997. The sound macroeconomic
fundamentals of ASEAN defied any suspicion of the dramatic collapse of
exchange rates that began in July 1997. ASEAN has been one of the fastest-
growing regions in the world. The GDP of ASEAN countries grew at an annual
rate of 6.6% between the 1970s and 1995.This is a remarkable achievement
since other developing economies grew by only about 3% during the same period.
The rapid economic expansion in the region has increased the demand for
foreign borrowings. In an environment of stable exchange rates and high interest
rates in ASEAN countries, foreign capital inflows have increased. Data from
the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) show that by the end of June 1997,
cross-border claims in all currencies and local claims in non-local currencies for
eight ASEAN countries (excluding Singapore) reached a total of US$173 billion.
It is interesting to note that about 60% of these claims were from the non-bank
private sector.
The increase in the availability of capital enable the expansion of loans for
private spending particularly in real estate and motor cars, creating a price bubble
for these sectors. In addition, the Japanese economy recovered in early May
1997 and led to a sharp appreciation of the yen and a sudden rise in Japanese
short-term interest rates. Investors started to withdraw their funds from Southeast
Asian markets to take advantage of the higher interest rate in Japan.
The financial crisis has had a significant impact on ASEAN countries, the
effects of which are likely to be felt beyond the immediate and medium terms.
Chronologically, what started out as an exchange rate crisis became a banking
and financial crisis. By late 1997, it had infected the real sectors due to rising
interest rates, higher costs of imports, credit crunches in the banking sector, and
the resultant bankruptcies of firms which had become insolvent.157
The financial crisis has directly affected not only the four ASEAN member
economies such as Thailand, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines but also
other members of ASEAN as most of their foreign direct investments come
from the founding member economies of ASEAN.
During the 1990s, international banks became increasingly active in derivative
and capital markets (McGuire and Wooldridge 2005), McCauley et al (2002)
and Doman ski etal (2003). Moreover, many banks invested in foreign subsidiaries
and branches. In some economies, the passing of new investment laws
contributed to the lifting of restrictions on foreign direct investments and to the
rise in foreign banks activities. Prior the Asian crisis, emerging Asian economies
encouraged FDI in manufacturing, with restricted FDI in the services sector.
In the last quarter of the 20th century, the wave of globalisation led to
increased global interconnectedness - economically, politically, socially, culturally
and ideologically. Consequently, in the so-called Globalization era, the demand
for an economy’s production is no longer confined to its own market. A country’s
knowledge frontier is no longer determined by geographical territories while a
country’s financial resources are no longer confined to what it can save itself
(Stiglitz 2002). In retrospect, prior to the mid-1970s, the emerging market
economies did not experience much cross-country financial flows. Financial
globalization has inflated noticeably and capital from developed to the developing
economies started flowing in the early 1980s.
There are a number of advantages that the world is enjoying today due to
international financial flows. The first two main potential benefits are the more
efficient allocation of capital across country borders, and improved risk sharing
opportunities (Levchenko 2004). Foreign direct investments in the industrial sector
have proved to be an adequate mechanism for supporting economic development.
Foreign participation contributes to increased competition between financial service
providers. This competition benefits the economy, by providing incentives for
adopting improved corporate management standards, reducing overall
intermediation costs, improving the quality of risk management and boosting
advisory and other services offered to enterprise and household clients.
Foreign financial institutions also allow instant access to key competitive
assets such as advanced financial management systems, marketing expertise in
retail banking and presence in global markets (Muller 2000). The presence of
foreign financial services competitors, coming from outside established local
circles, can also assist the local supervisory authorities as they take steps to
limit politically motivated and other connected lending, corruption and other illegal158
financial activities. For many newly industrialised economies,  economic success
started when foreign direct investment was liberalised (Muller 2000).
However, there are several disadvantages as pointed out in some studies.
The possibility that more efficient foreign financial institutions can crowd out
local institutions is real. It has also been argued that foreign financial institutions
do not have the same civic spirit or the sense of social responsibility as local
institutions (Poret 2001). A number of very different observations  such as by
Baxter and Crucini (1995) and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) show that economic
volatility/instability/crises may increase due to financial integration.
Some studies have noted that developing economies would not be able to
reap the full benefits of globalisation since  their institutional structures not  as
well designed  due to the  inadequate sequencing of reform processes (Kim and
Lau 1994). If the economic fundamentals are weak, an economy could be affected
by the financial shocks from another  country.
Overall, most studies show that foreign banks have a limited but positive
impact on financial development. Foreign financial involvement has a variety of
other effects on developing economies. Not least, for instance, is the role of
capital flows in generating output growth and their ability to mobilise foreign
savings for domestic investment as well as their role in technology transfer.
As Myanmar’s capital market is in the inception stage, the impact of the
global crisis on Myanmar’s financial sector can be said to be minimal. Since
foreign banking operations in Myanmar are only allowed to the state-owned
banks and banks are compliant with rules and guidelines set by Central Bank
of Myanmar, the confidence and stability of the banking system have not been
affected the global financial crisis.
The layoff of foreign workers in some regional economies such as Singapore,
Thailand, Malaysia, Korea and Japan has resulted in the decline of Myanmar
nationals working abroad which in turn has affected remittances in the trade
and services account. In this context, the Ministry of foreign Affairs, the Ministry
of Labour and the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation are ready to extend
assistance to workers coming home on account of losing their overseas jobs.
The impact of the global financial crisis has not directly affected Myanmar’s
economy. However as Myanmar’s main trading partners are its neighbouring
economies  such as China, India as well as ASEAN+3 countries, it may face159
the indirect adverse effects of the crisis through  declines in trade, foreign
investments and tourism. However, it is expected that the effects will not be as
severe for Myanmar as other economies.
If and when the time comes for necessary actions, the Ministry of Finance
and Revenue will take appropriate measures via monetary and fiscal policy
instruments. Furthermore, Myanmar is collaborating and cooperating with Regional
Organisations such as  ASEAN and SEACEN as well as other regional
economies to confront the challenges from the global financial crisis.
4. Research Methodology and Results
This study analyses the determinants of foreign banks claims by using the
technique of TOBIT regression. Some determinants that researchers use to
examine international and cross-border bank lending in developing economies
are foreign bank lending, gross domestic output (GDP), deposit-to-loan ratio,
inflation rate, deposit and lending rate, exchange rate and interest rate. The
factors taken into consideration for this paper  also include  foreign country
lender’s factors, home country factors, impact of the Asian Currency Crisis and
Global Financial Crisis and financial stability indicators.
This paper uses the above mentioned variables as explanatory variables in
the econometric model. Annual data for the period 1999 to 2010 are used for
the analysis. Output data (GDP) is collected from the Ministry of National Planning
and Economic Development, Union of Myanmar. For this analysis, data on foreign
banks claim is collated from the Myanma Foreign Trade Bank. The rest of the
data used for explanatory variables are obtained from the China Statistics Bureau.
To  avoid the use of non-stationery variables in the regression model, the
test for stationarity  of all variables were performed. According to Dickey and
Fuller (1997) test, most of the random variables were varying and the sequence
is non-stationary. Non-stationary variables lead to spurious results in the estimation
of a model.  The Augmented Dickey Fuller Unit Root Test was applied for all
variables to find their order of stationary.
This study used an econometric model to examine the determinants of foreign
claims in Myanmar and the identity equation is as follows:-160
Where:Log (  Foreign_Bank_Claim)= the first difference of the logarithm
of Foreign Claims by China.
Foreign Country _Lender_Factors=  control variables that capture the
macroeconomic conditions applied to China’s GDP growth rates with one
year lag.
Home_Country_Factors= control variables that capture the macroeconomic
conditions    applied real GDP growth rate with one year lag, exchange rate
is not included as available exchange rate cannot reflect the real financial
situation.
GFC_Dummy= is a dummy variable taking the value of one in 2007, 2008
and 2009.
Exposure= is the ratio of foreign claims on home country over the total
claims extended by foreign country.
The Augmented-Dickey Fuller was conducted for all the variables to find
their order of stationary. The hypothesis of ADF is whether variables used in
model contains a unit root or otherwise. The results of ADF tests for all variables
at 1st difference are shown below.
Note: significant at the 1% confidence level.161
After taking the difference variables and TOBIT was applied, the estimation
was found to be as follows:
Dependent Variable: CLAIM
Method: ML - Censored Normal (TOBIT) (Quadratic hill climbing)
Date: 11/30/10   Time: 03:40
Sample (adjusted): 2001 2010
Included observations: 10 after adjustments
Left censoring (value) at zero
Convergence achieved after 7 iterations
Covariance matrix computed using second derivatives162
According to the estimation results, the coefficients of Myanmar GDP growth
(MYGDP), Exposure (EXPO) and Global Financial Crisis (GFC) are negative
for the period, while China GDP growth (CHGR) and Global Financial Crisis
Exposure (GFCEXPO) are positive. The positive coefficient of China GDP
growth and Global Financial Crisis Exposure show that foreign claims are
stimulated by the level of activity in the banking sector. The sign of Myanmar
GDP growth, Exposure and Global Financial Crisis are negative rather than
positive. Myanmar GDP growth is statistically significant at 1% level while the
coefficient is only a marginal 0.13. GFC Exposure is not significant while the
explanatory power for Exposure and Global Financial Crisis is negative indicating
a result of apparently less stable financing.
The negative coefficient of Myanmar GDP growth and Exposure, is
statistically significant for the period considered. The increase in GDP and
Exposure indicates an increase in the investment level. However, the negative
coefficients for Global Financial Crisis did not prove statistically significant which
indicates that this variable did not affect foreign claims significantly. For the full
sample, coefficients of all variables except Myanmar GDP growth, Exposure
and Global Financial Crisis are positive. Therefore, we can conclude that China
GDP growth and Global Financial Crisis Exposure have positive impacts on
foreign claims. Myanmar GDP growth, Exposure and Global Financial Crisis
have negative impact on foreign claims.
According to the results obtained, it can be said that Global Financial Crisis
would be sufficient to explain the positive impact on foreign claims in Myanmar.
Availability of credit financing encourages investing in the Government Sector
and it is also an important factor in foreign bank lending. However, according
to the empirical finding, Global Financial Crisis is not statistically significant  on
foreign claims in the pre and GFC period in Myanmar.
After 1988, Myanmar allowed the private sector to participate in the
economy. Private banks were given authorisation to operate domestic banking
and allowed to open representative offices. The Myanmar Securities Exchange
Center was also established. However, private banks were not authorized to
transact foreign exchange business except for the State-owned banks.
Furthermore, foreign banks have not yet been granted branch status. Foreign
borrowings by the private sector are also not permitted. The private sector firms
therefore face challenges for expansion due to a lack in accessibility to credit.
Finally, in the absence of international assistance for more than two decades,
Myanmar has relied on her own resources to implement infrastructure163
development and reforms which have caused continued increases in government
budget, inflation and low investor confidence.
5. Policy Implications
As measures to initiate market-oriented economic development, the Myanmar
Government implemented banking and financial reforms in June 1990.This is a
big step towards realising a market-oriented economy, albeit only up to a certain
point. Numerous other reforms must be implemented in the future to enhance
the institutional ability of the banking system as well as the capital market. The
reform initiatives undertaken since 1992 in financial sector are an important
element of market-oriented economic reforms. Private banks were given
authorisation to operate domestic banking, foreign banks were allowed to open
representative offices, and the Myanmar Securities Exchange Center was
established. However, private banks have to be permitted to transact foreign
exchange business.  Only the Myanma Foreign Trade Bank and Myanma
Investment and Commercial Bank are authorised to conduct foreign exchange
business. Furthermore, foreign banks have not been granted branch status and
the Myanmar Securities Exchange Center currently has only one listed company.
The financial conditions in Myanmar have certain characteristics. First, bank
loans in general do not play a major role in the corporate finance of private
manufacturing companies. The share of bank loans to total assets is only about
30%. Financial intermediation activities by the banking sector appear to be in
a state of inertia. Second, there is a substantial demand for funds in the market.
Particular companies actively utilise bank loans as means of investments, and
funds borrowed from banks account for a fairly high share of total assets. Third,
the relationship between accessibility of bank loans and the size of the firm is
not linear. Medium-sized firms are more active in bank borrowings than large-
sized firms, which use bank loans for their operations and investments.
The utilisation of bank loans as a source of funds for Myanmar manufacturing
firms is extremely negligible  and there is a great disparity in the usage of bank
loans among the firms. The availability of bank loans is largely determined by
informal and non-economic factors. In other words, the bank loan market exists
in a scattered manner along with the corresponding “scattered” social capital.
This condition can also be expressed as a market suffering from a broad range
of credit rationing.164
Observations on both the banking sector and corporate finance through this
research indicate that the main cause of the inefficient market does not stem
from a lack of demand for bank loans. Investment seems substantially active;
firms raise funds by various means for their investments in equipment. The
most important cause of the market inefficiency is the low capacity in financial
intermediation, the reasons for which are very complicated. First, a negative
real interest rate is the most basic factor. Second, various banking regulations,
such as the “matching deposits”, impede the operational efficiency of banks.
Lastly, the incompleteness of the legal system is a serious obstacle to daily
financial transactions.
Policy reforms for banking sector development should be the first priority
for resolving the problems of corporate financing. The policy implications are as
follow:-
(a) Stabilisation of  the macroeconomy: a precondition for a healthy banking
sector
Macroeconomic stability is a prerequisite for healthy financial intermediary
activities for promoting deposits and investments by the private sector.
(b) Mobilisation of savings
Without mobilising savings in a big way, it is impossible to enhance the
intermediary capacity of banks. To do so, financial restraints should be
avoided. Positive real interest rates by restraining inflation is necessary and
it is also crucial for controlling budgetary deficits.
(c) Deregulation of lending activities
The private banks have extremely restrictive lending policies. Loans are of
a short term basis only and the lending amount is limited by the value of
collaterals. Such conservative attitudes of lenders are a result of a rational
response to given policy environments such the “matching deposits”
regulation for private banks. Deregulation of lending practices in various
dimensions should be carried out for bank loan market development.
(d) Enhancement of intermediary capacity of private banks
Several measures should be considered to enhance the financial intermediary
capacity of private banks. First, private banks should be permitted by an
independent Central Bank of Myanmar to grant long-term loans, deal in
foreign exchange, and clear trade through L/C and extend trade finance to
local firms. Second, financial infrastructure, such as computerisation and
technical expertise of banking personnel, should be developed.165
(e) Capital market development
Certain companies have a huge potential as catalysts for further economic
development. There are also some that want to be public limited companies.
Developing the capital market for Myanmar is an important task and the
first step toward achieving this goal is to promulgate the Securities Law.
A sound banking system contributes to economic growth by the mobilisaion
of financial resources and channeling them to investments and other business
activities. In the absence of a developed capital and bond market in Myanmar,
banks are mainly responsible for playing the role of financial intermediation,
considered to be crucial for the economic development. In addition, the banks
in Myanmar provide payment and transactions services, which increase the
efficiency of economic activities. However, as banks operate on the basis of
fractional reserve, mainly concerned with risk-taking on the asset side and
maintaining the confidence of depositors on the liability side, they are subject to
market failures. It is therefore important that the banking system should be well
regulated. In Myanmar, there is a prudential framework and the supervision and
monitoring policies are in line with international practices.
At present, foreign banks are not permitted to open branches or own shares
in Myanmar. Their activities are limited to those of a representative office.
However, there are plans to create special economic zones (SEZs) with the
possibility of foreign banks being allowed to operate in such zones. Myanmar’s
financial sector remains sound with limited exposure to international markets.
The authorities’ vigilant financial sector supervision has supported confidence
and domestic demand, while minimising risks. All major banks are adequately
capitalised with good profit performance and manageable non-performing loans.
Efforts are being made towards further banking and financial sector
modernisation with the  implementation of  the Electronic Banking Network and
Automated Clearing House system and further strengthening of the banking
system. Developing the domestic banking system will help enhance financial
intermediation to achieve growth objectives over the medium term. As the
government has gradually phased out the administrative requirements to expand
branch networks, 48 new branches of 8 private banks were opened countrywide
during the period of March 2007 to March 2010. With the prospects of increased
financial innovations and further change in industry structure, competition is
envisaged.
Looking forward, the authorities are dedicated to liberalising the financial
sector, such as provision and transfer of financial information, financial data
processing and related software of other financial services and guarantee and166
commitments, envisaged under the financial sector liberalisation in line with the
ASEAN Economic Co-operation (AEC) Blueprint. The Myanmar Special
Economic Zone Law which allows the establishment of  financial services
companies is being prepared and submission of the final draft to the Cabinet is
underway.
Over the medium term, Myanmar will focus on growth and macroeconomic
stability while maintaining fiscal prudence. The growth outlook is favourable in
FY 2009-2010 in line with the Five Year Plan. This recovery would be supported
in part by the recovery in the economies of neighbouring main trading partners
as well as driven largely by improved economic activities via increases in
production of mineral products and oil and gas. Furthermore, the authorities will
offset the increases in civil servants’ wages and salaries in December of 2009
by speeding up the pace of privatisation, such as auctioning government owned
buildings, contributing to a better fiscal position. Although the economy has
performed well, the authorities are cognisant of the challenges and risks going
forward. The overvalued official exchange rate and the government budget deficit
are concerns to the authorities. In addition, the indirect effects of the recent
global financial crisis and some economic sanctions are also down side risks to
FDI. In order to attract FDI and harness private sector investments to assist
in the industrialisation process, plans are underway for the establishment of special
industrial zone.
6. Conclusion
Alan Greenspan, who was at the helm of the US Federal Reserve for 18
years, was a fervent proponent of deregulation. However,  on 23 October 2008,
he told Washington lawmakers that he was wrong to trust the free market to
regulate the financial system without stronger government oversight. Greenspan
had faced mounting criticism during the year for having adamantly resisted efforts
to rein in credit derivatives, an unchecked market, excesses of which partially
led to the current financial crisis. He also admitted that he made a mistake in
presuming that the self-interests of organisations especially banks and others,
were such that they were best able to  protect their own shareholders and their
equity in the firms. He added that he was in “a state of shocked disbelief” about
the breakdown in the ability of banks to regulate themselves.
In fact, deregulation started with the 1999 repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act,
which allowed commercial banks to get into the investment banking business
and thereby take on more risks. Indeed, it was a move in the wrong direction.167
Politicians and government officials should have realised the dangers threatening
the stability of the financial safety nets to supervise these institutions. They
should have also devised proper procedures for oversight by regulatory authorities.
In order to prevent future crisis, the measures concerning the reform of the
financial markets should be undertaken within the framework of common
principles adopted at the G 20 meetings.
Another serious consequence of the recession is that it could throw millions
back into poverty. Already over 60 million people have become unemployed. In
China alone, over 20 million people have lost their jobs. The national governments
would have to give top priority in addressing the social problems and their attendant
hardships brought about by the global financial crisis.
The IMF studies indicate that over 130 member countries have encountered
varying degree of banking sector problems. Their experiences underscore the
importance of a sound banking system for macroeconomic stability. It should be
emphasised that a well-functioning banking system is essential for the
effectiveness of macroeconomic policies, and problems that emerge in the financial
sector, if left unchecked, could endanger the macroeconomic stability of a country.
As far as Myanmar is concerned, one of long-term impact of the 2003 liquidity
crisis is the loss of public trust and confidence in the banks. It would be difficult
to regain such a confidence in a few years time, even under the most favourable
circumstances. Another serious long-term impact of the crisis is the negative
effect on the mobilisation of savings and investments which may eventually lead
to macroeconomic problems such as declines in  GDP growth, unemployment,
and income inequality.
Foreign banking operations in Myanmar are allowed only to the State-owned
banks while the Central Bank regularly supervises the State-run and private
banks in accordance with  stipulated laws, rules and regulations. All banks are
in compliance with the guidelines and regulations issued by the Central Bank.
Therefore, there are no risk of liquidity crunch and the banking system has
remained stable in Myanmar. As Myanmar’s capital market is in the inception
stage, the impact of the global crisis on Myanmar’s financial sector has been
minimal. The regional economies such as Singapore, Thailand, Malaysia, Korea
and Japan where a lot of Myanmar citizens work had laid off foreign workers
resulting in the decline of Myanmar nationals working abroad. This has resulted
in a tremendous decline in remittances back to Myanmar.
However, since Myanmar has yet to be fully integrated into the global
economy, the impact of the crisis has not directly affected the economy. Myanmar168
may face the indirect adverse effects of the crisis through declines in trade,
foreign investments and tourism. However, it is expected that the effects will
not be as bad as other economies.169
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Chapter 7
WAS IT IS CREDIT SUPPLY?
INTERNATIONAL CLAIMS AND CROSS-BORDER LENDING TO
THE PHILIPPINES DURING THE FINANCIAL CRISIS
By
Veronica B. Bayangos 1
1. Introduction
International banking activity expanded massively from the second half of
the 1990s to the latter part of 2006 until the global financial crisis in 2007.  The
significant increase in international banking system was caused by the growing
world trade, the increase of multinational firms, growth in financing of global
payments imbalances and the integration of some transition economies into the
global banking system.  This expansion led to the consolidation of the international
banking industry and consequently in the rise in cross-border mergers and
acquisition over the past decade.
However, the global financial crisis that started in 2007 shook the foundation
of international banking and finance.  International financial markets were heavily
affected while some international banks had to be rescued from bankruptcy.  In
turn, international claims and cross-border bank lending to emerging markets
also dropped sharply, raising a serious policy question: did declines in international
claims and cross-border bank lending in advanced economies transmit financial
shocks to emerging markets?  Or, did they simply reflect the lower need for
financing?
Understanding the economic drivers of cross-border bank lending to emerging
markets is key to critical thinking about financial vulnerabilities. However, one
needs to consider a larger lending picture. There are other channels through172
which international banks provide loans to emerging market economies. The
Committee on the Global Financial System (CGFS, 2009) documents the steady
increase in local currency lending of subsidiaries and branches of international
banks after the Asian financial crisis in 1997; as McCauley et. al. (2010) show,
this local currency lending by international banks held up much better than
international lending during the financial crisis in 2007.
The growing presence of international banks (and foreign-owned financial
institutions) raises a number of important issues. The arguments for and against
foreign bank entry and foreign banks’ impact on the efficiency and stability of
domestic banking systems continue to be a subject of debate. Factors that have
stimulated international banking institutions to expand into overseas markets and
those that have influenced host countries’ decisions to accept foreign financial
institutions are closely related to these arguments.  But the precise role of foreign
banks in the run up and during the global financial crisis in 2007 is yet to be
fully ascertained.
This study examines the drivers of international claims and cross-border
lending to the Philippines and the role of foreign banks during financial crises
by modifying the Siregar and Choi  (2008) gravity model from 1995 to 2009.
This study finds that supply factors drive the decline in international claims to
the Philippines in the run up to the global financial crisis.  The demand for
cross-border bank lending also drops, albeit marginal. These findings are
consistent with the general understanding that the global financial crisis originated
outside the emerging markets, including the Philippines. However, the results
show that the presence of foreign banks in the Philippines has stabilised the
surge of international claims but not cross-border lending. This observation
suggests that the global financial crisis in 2007 has been a different one from
the past financial crisis of the Philippines.
Throughout this paper, international banks refer to foreign banks (branches
and subsidiaries) and offshore banks.   The “cross-border bank flows” in this
paper are sourced from the data set at the BIS international banking website,
in particular, the external positions of BIS reporting banks vis-à-vis individual
emerging market economies. About 80% of the external positions consist of
standard cross-border loans from banks in source countries to banks and the
non-bank sector in recipient countries. The remainder includes some other types
of capital flows, such as holdings by banks from source countries of bonds,
money market instruments and equities issued by banks and the non-bank sector
in recipient countries.173
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: The next Section examines
the growing role of foreign banks in the Philippines.  Section 3 describes the
recent trends in international bank lending and cross-border lending to the
Philippines.  Section 4 looks closely at foreign bank operations before the details
on the model, the methodology and main findings are discussed in Section 5.
Section 6 concludes.
2. The Growing Role of Foreign Banks in the Philippines
Foreign banks’ operations in emerging market banking system increased
dramatically during the second half of the 1990s (Song 2004).  The share of
banking assets under foreign control increased from 25% in 1995 to 30% in
2000 in Eastern Europe.  A similar development was also observed in Latin
America, with almost 40% of total bank assets controlled by foreign banks in
2000, following a series of cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Although
foreign banks have played a smaller role in Asia than in Eastern Europe or Latin
America, foreign bank control in East Asian banking market increased from 5%
in 1995 to 6% in 2000. In fact, Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand have
raised allowable foreign equity levels in local banks to 100%, while the Philippines
have permitted 60% foreign ownership.2
The growing importance of foreign banks is oftentimes seen in the flow of
foreign capital in emerging economies.  Asian emerging market economies have
been major beneficiaries of capital flows from the advanced economies especially
starting in 2000. The literature suggests that the major factors that encouraged
this flow of capital to emerging market economies are the sustained decline in
interest rates in the industrial world and the depth of financial development in
emerging markets (Reinhart 2005). However, the prolonged surge in capital flows
to Asia has renewed concerns among policymakers on issues related to global
liquidity, financial stability and capital reversals.
The liberalisation of foreign direct investment, along with financial and foreign
exchange markets became major parts of the structural adjustment adopted in
1981. On 24 August 1992, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued Circular
No. 1353 liberalising foreign exchange regulations throughout the country.  Indeed
the restructuring and liberalisation measures led to salient changes in the economy.
For one, capital flows surged into the economy, which (as a proportion of GDP)
more than doubled between 1994 and 2001 or an average of 3.5% from an
average of only 1.4% between 1986 and 1993 (Table 1).  The 1980s were
________________
2. Hawkins and Mihaljek (2001), p. 24.174
characterised by large borrowings from abroad by public enterprises.  However,
capital flows (composed of direct and portfolio investments) in the 1990s were
primarily portfolio. Net portfolio investments showed particularly large increases
in 1993 and 1994 before the capital account liberalisation and rose steeply in
1996. In general, the capital account was larger and more volatile in the 1990s
than in the 1980s.
The capital flows which were largely intermediated through foreign banks
have caused credit extended to the private sector to jump significantly.   In
August 1996, year-on-year growth of credit extended by banks to the private
sector reached more than 56%, the highest since the 1980s.  A closer look at
the nature of bank loans outstanding by economic activity reveals a notable
year-on-year growth of 97.2% in end-December 1996 to financial institutions,
real estate and business services sector. Meanwhile, a trend appreciation of the
peso was noted particularly from 1991 to 1996.  Banks start to depend on foreign
market for liquidity support instead of the BSP. This is shown in the significant
upsurge in monetary foreign liabilities starting 1995.
The Philippine foreign exchange regulatory regime is characterised by an
open current account, few restrictions on capital inflows and some controls on
capital outflows. The liberalisation measures introduced in the early 1990s were
directed at enhancing the supply of foreign exchange by reducing transaction
and financing costs, broadening financing options and promoting opportunities
for portfolio diversification. However, there remained a few restrictions on capital
inflows and some controls on capital outflows. Hence, the BSP adopted a
comprehensive yet measured approach for the roadmap toward further
liberalisation of foreign exchange transactions.
Table 1:  Philippines:  Major Trend of Selected Capital Flows,
1986-2010
(% Share of Nominal GDP)
Source of basic data:  BSP Selected Philippine Economic Indicators175
In 1994, Republic Act No. 7721, which called for the establishment of a
maximum of ten new foreign banks, was passed. While not giving unrestricted
branching privileges, the aforementioned law contained additional provisions in
setting up branches by foreign banks. However, to prevent foreign bank
domination of the local banking industry, the law required that domestic majority-
owned Filipino banks should hold 70% of total resources of the entire banking
system.
The response of the foreign banks to the new charter was quite positive.
In 1995, a year after the passage of the legislation, ten foreign banks entered
the Philippine banking industry. The most common form of entry in 1995 was
establishing full branches.  As of December 2009, a total of 22 foreign banks
operate in the Philippines, ten of these foreign banks are branches of foreign
banks with commercial bank functions.
On 22 February 2007, the Monetary Board (MB) approved the first phase
of reforms to the foreign exchange regulatory framework to make the regulatory
environment more responsive to the needs of an expanding, more dynamic
economy that has become increasingly integrated with global markets. Improving
macroeconomic fundamentals, as well as ongoing banking, capital market and
institutional reforms, provided a favourable setting for the comprehensive review
and gradual reform of the existing foreign exchange regulatory framework. The
reforms, which became effective on 2 April 2007, involved changes in rules
governing external current account and capital account transactions as well as
prudential regulations.  Since 2007, the monetary authorities have undertaken
three more major phases of foreign exchange reforms. The reforms brought
greater access to foreign exchange resources for trade, investment and other
foreign transactions. The measures also facilitate the diversification of investment
portfolios and help reduce the economy’s vulnerability to shocks.
Indeed, the role of foreign banks in the economy’s financial depth has been
rising.  Empirical studies focus on the role of foreign banks to banking
development.  However, formal studies on the specific roles of foreign banks
in propagating financial shocks to the Philippines have been scant.  This paper,
therefore, brings a first formal study on a more detailed analysis of the role of
foreign banks in the Philippines especially during the recent global financial crisis.
Catorelli and Gambera (2001) observe that the liberalisation of foreign bank
entry in the Philippines provides a unique opportunity to undertake a
comprehensive study of these issues due to four distinct advantages.  First,176
foreign bank entry is confined to a single year where a significant number of
foreign banks were granted rights to establish operations.  This allows us to
better isolate the effects of foreign bank entry.  Second, confounding effects
such as restrictions on capital accounts are largely absent in the Philippines, as
general economic liberalisation took place prior to the liberalisation of foreign
bank entry.  Third, the study of a single country allows a more direct test of
the effect of foreign competition within a uniform environment.  Finally, unlike
many emerging economies, the Philippine authorities play only a minimal role in
the ownership of banks.
Sicat (1984) traces the development of offshore banking units in the
Philippines from the early 1970s to the early 1980s.  Meanwhile, Manzano and
Neri (2001) analyse the effectiveness of the liberalisation of the foreign bank
entry in the Philippines by highlighting the role of macroeconomic policy stance
on the degree of competition in the banking sector.
In a similar manner, Unite and Sullivan (2001) analyse the effect of foreign
bank entry and ownership structure on the Philippine domestic banking market.
They note that an increase in foreign presence is expected to result in a decline
in interest rate spreads and in profits.  Moreover, they also found out that an
increase in foreign banks is expected to result to an increase in non-lending
activities and a decline in operating expenses.
3. International Claims and Cross-Border Lending to the Philippines
The data series in this Section are taken from the BIS locational and
consolidated banking statistics.  The locational banking statistics comprises data
on gross international financial claims and liabilities of  banks resident in a given
country, on banks and the non-bank sector in other countries (hence the term
“cross-border”).3  In the consolidated banking statistics, creditor data are reported
based on the nationality (that is, home country) rather than residence (that is,
host country) basis.
The main purpose of using the two data sets is to provide information on
the role of internationally-active banks in intermediating cross-border capital flows.
The locational data are more relevant for economies receiving external loans,
because the way they measure lending flows is consistent with the balance of
________________
3. In its initial specification, monthly data on the BSP-registered portfolio investments and
loans are considered.  However, due to limited data series, this paper focuses on the BIS
locational statistics for longer run and more detailed analysis.177
payments statistics.4 The consolidated data are more relevant for creditor
countries, because they help assess the size of international banks’ country and
liquidity risk exposures.
The external positions of BIS reporting banks vis-à-vis the Philippines
increased almost six times, while liabilities rose by almost nine times between
end-December 1997 and end-December 2009 (Figure 1).  Figure 1 also reflects
the episodes of financial and currency crises in the Philippines, notably in 1997
and in 2008.  The evolution of the nature of the Philippine external position also
points to the rather divergent direction of the components of the Philippine external
position.  While assets and liabilities appear to be matched during the 1997 crisis,
liabilities appear to have outpaced assets in 2008, leading to a net liability position
in 2008.
Meanwhile, Figure 2 shows that cross-border financing rose significantly
between 2005 and 2007, while external positions and cross-border loans
outstanding at end-December 2008 were much higher than the end-December
1995 levels.  A comparison of the two shows that cross-border loans represent
about 70% of external positions of the BIS reporting banks vis-à-vis the
Philippines.
Figure 1:  Philippines: Net External Position, 1977-2009
_______________
4. In particular, the “external loans” correspond to the “other investment” category of capital
flows in the balance of payments. This allows for better matching of cross-border bank
flows and various macroeconomic and financial system characteristics in emerging markets.178
Figure 2:  Philippines:  Cross-Border Loans and Deposits,
1995-2009
Figure 3:  Philippines:  Cross-Border Loans and Deposits, By
Nationality, 1995-2009
On a bilateral basis, European banks account for the bulk of outstanding
stock of cross-border loans to the Philippines followed by the US and the Japanese
banks (Figure 3).  Based on BIS (2010) study, Japanese and, to a lesser extent,
European (French and German) banks typically fund most of their activities
from their home offices.  By contrast, American, Canadian and Spanish banks
obtain a substantial share of their funding outside their home countries.179
Studies show that emerging markets in Asia, Latin America and Central
and Eastern Europe (CEE) experienced quite different dynamics of capital flows
over the past 16 years. During the 1990s there are two distinct crisis episodes:
the Mexican crisis of 1994–95, and the Asian and Russian crises of 1997–99.
The Mexican crisis was short-lived and affected only Latin America and partly
CEE, which was at the time also going through the early phase of deep financial
sector reforms.
The effects of the Asian and Russian financial crises on cross-border bank
flows are much bigger and lasted longer.  Thailand, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia
and the Philippines were hit the hardest and experienced strong and long-lasting
reductions in cross-border bank flows between the third quarter of 1997 to the
fourth quarter of 1999. Latin America was strongly affected by contagion from
the Russian domestic debt default. Surprisingly, the CEE was less affected, despite
the proximity with the Russian market.
The early part of 2000 coincides with a period of muted inflows to the
Philippines as well as in other regions, interrupted by occasional sharp reductions
of inflows.  The inflows began to pick up strongly in the Philippines in 2003.
Financial liberalisation, sophisticated new financial products, and the search for
yield in an environment of low global interest rates have led internationally-
active banks to expand their operations to emerging markets, including the
Philippines (Mihaljek, 2008).
It can be recalled that cross-border lending to the Philippines peaked in
absolute amount between mid-2005 and mid-2007. During the third quarter of
2008, disruptions in international credit markets led to a full-scale global financial
crisis.  Major international banks started to reduce their financing of banks and
non-bank sector transactions in emerging markets. The largest reduction in
financing took place in the fourth quarter of 2008 to the first quarter of 2009,
with emerging Asia followed by Latin America and the CEE.  However, the
impact of the global financial turmoil was relatively limited in the case of the
Philippines.  The impact was felt through the asset markets, financial sector and
the real sector.  Like many other emerging markets, growth of the Philippine
economy slowed down in 2008.
Data show that real GDP growth rate in 2008 fell to 3.8%, compared to
7.1% in 2007. However, like many other emerging markets, the slowdown was
not primarily a result of the global financial crisis. Rather, the deceleration in
Philippine economic growth was largely brought about by a surge in inflation180
triggered by the sharp rise in food and fuel prices and to a lesser extent the US
recession.
The financial turmoil that emerged in the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers
debacle magnified tensions in the global interbank and credit markets. As a
result there was a virtual freeze in liquidity in US and European financial markets
which stopped and, in many cases, reversed capital flows to emerging and
developing economies. In large part, the latter reflected sales of debt and equity
securities by non-residents, selective withdrawals of bank deposits held with
domestic banks and a decline in inflows of foreign direct investment (World
Bank, 2008).
The immediate impact of the liquidity squeeze in international capital markets
was a rise in the price of risk—as measured by bond spreads—a sharp drop
in equity prices, and exchange rate volatility. Data revealed that the foreign
currency government bond spread for the Philippines jumped from 155 basis
points in June 2007 to 549 basis points in November 2008. Meanwhile, the main
index of the Philippine stock market fell by 24% between July 2008 and January
2009.5  The Philippine stock market is actually one of the least affected by the
global financial crisis in the Asia-Pacific region.
The exchange rate also exhibited volatility with the peso depreciating by
16.6% between 1 March 2008 and 30 November 2008 after appreciating by
39% against the US dollar between 20 September 2005 and 29 February 2008.
Between July 2008 and January 2009, the peso depreciated by only 3%. Similar
to stock prices the peso is one of the currencies least affected by the crisis.
Meanwhile, portfolio flows have shown to have a negligible impact on the
stock market and investment (Yap 2008). It can be recalled that stock market
and exchange rate volatility do affect macroeconomic stability and this has
implications for private investment. Data revealed that investment in durable
equipment contracted by 18.5% in the first quarter of 2009 and a further 18.9%
in the second quarter.6
________________
5. Yap (2008) argued that this is the relevant period for monitoring the immediate impact of
the financial crisis.
6. In terms of trade, prices of traded commodities are mostly set in the global market. Exchange
rate movements, therefore, affect profitability of exporters rather than demand for their
products. Profitability of exporters, however, has an impact on their investment and
employment decisions. Exchange rate movements affect the propensity to import, the
degree of protection of import-substituting industries, and the peso value of remittances
from abroad.181
The Philippine financial sector has largely weathered the crisis. Crucial
prudential indicators show the relative health of the banking systems in terms
of capital adequacy, profitability, and liquidity cushions. The non-performing loans
were fairly stable in 2008 and early 2009.  A similar pattern can be observed
with the capital-to-asset ratios. Meanwhile, the loans to deposit ratio has also
been steady, reflecting the absence of any sharp market reaction to the crisis.
In 2008, most banks continued to report reasonable rates of return on assets
and equity, and did not experience increases in impaired assets. This performance
reflects the insignificant exposure of Philippine banks to the toxic structured
mortgage products that were extensively sold globally. Given largely domestically-
focused business and relatively strong economic activities in 2007, profitability
of Philippine banks has generally remained high in 2008.
From a high of 51% growth in December 1996, outstanding credits to the
private sector contracted by 1.2%  in December 1999 and by 0.3% in December
2005, before it crept up to 16.8%  in December 2008. As of December 2009,
private sector credit growth was halved to 8.1% as the impact of the global
financial turmoil took a toll on bank lending. In terms of its relative share to
nominal GDP, lending by Philippine banks soared from 21.4% in 1991 to a high
of 76.0% in 1997 before dropping to 66.7% in 1998 when the economy reeled
from the effects of the Asian financial crisis. Since then, the ratio of net domestic
credit to GDP has tracked a downward trend before it recovered to 31% in
2009.
Meanwhile, growth of bank credit to the private sector has continued despite
the relatively stricter bank lending standards in 2009. Based on the Senior Bank
Loan Officers’ Survey conducted by the BSP in 2009, lending standards among
banks, in general, had indeed tightened. In particular, the majority of respondents
indicated moderately tighter lending standards in 2009 in terms of collateralisation
requirements and credit screening. Respondents also cited the uncertainty in the
economic outlook as the main reason for their cautious lending stance.  Meanwhile,
the latest Senior Bank Loan Officers’ Survey indicated a decline in the banks’
lending standards for the first quarter of 2010, with the decline more pronounced
for loans extended to large middle market enterprises (Bayangos 2010b).
The Philippine financial sector remains vulnerable to further shocks that
emanate from global financial centers. However, there has been no meltdown
similar to the events of the currency crisis in 1997. The resilience stems from
more prudent policies and a more conservative approach by the banking system.
It would be difficult to establish which factor has been more important.182
Nevertheless, policies implemented after the 1997 crisis did play a role in limiting
the impact of the global financial turmoil in 2008.
4. A Closer Look at Foreign Banks in the Philippines
The Philippines has a comprehensive banking system encompassing various
types of banks, from large universal banks to rural banks and even non-banks.
At present, there are seventeen universal banks, 23 commercial banks, 84 thrift
banks, 711 rural banks, 44 credit unions and twelve non-banks with quasi-banking
functions, all licensed with the BSP. Under Republic Act No. 8791, also known
as the General Banking Act of 2000, they share roughly the same powers.
The number of foreign banks with commercial and universal bank functions,
as well as offshore banking units, dropped from 33 in 1999 to 22 in 2009 (Table
2).  While branches of universal foreign banks rose during the period, branches
and subsidiaries of foreign banks with commercial bank functions declined from
1999 to 2009.  The biggest decline was noted in the number of OBUs.
4.1 Branches and Subsidiaries of Foreign Banks 7
Total resources of foreign branches and subsidiaries rose by 37.2% to reach
P631.4 billion as of end-December 2009 from P460.0 billion posted in end-
December 2000. Loans and investments as well as interbank transactions drove
the expansion in total assets during the period. Meanwhile, foreign branches and
subsidiaries’ active participation in interbank transactions suggest that they are
major players in the system’s open market operations.
Table 2:  Philippines:  Number of Foreign Banks,
By Type, 1999-2009
________________
7. Figures in this section are in peso since branches and subsidiaries of foreign banks have
commercial and universal bank functions.183
Following the global financial turmoil, total resources of these branches and
subsidiaries slightly declined by about 4.2% to P609.9 billion in end-December
2008 from the end-December 2007 level of P636.6 billion. This was largely a
result of the slowdown in investment activities particularly on financial assets
other than loans due to bearish securities market. In turn, the share of foreign
banks in the total assets of the Philippine banking system as of end-December
2008 slipped to 11.5% from 13.2% in 2007. Their consolidated share remained
well below the 30% ceiling set under Section 3 of R.A.No.7721.8
Total assets of foreign branches and subsidiaries are mainly backed up by
deposit liabilities and are principally channeled to loans. Loans-to-deposits ratio
rose from 12.5% in December 2000 to 46.3% in December 2006 to 96.6% in
December 2009. On the other hand, cash and due from banks-to-deposits ratio
slid slightly to 30.4% in December 2009 from 32.7% in December 2000 as
foreign banks opted to lend more rather than place their funds in cash.  By
industry sub-groups, existing branches of foreign banks continue to hold the largest
share of the industry’s total resources at 56.1% in 2008 (down from 62.9% in
2007).  In particular, new branches and subsidiaries held the remaining 28.9%
in 2008 (up from 24.5%) and 15.0% (up from 12.6%), respectively.
Foreign banks in the Philippines remained resilient amid the hostile financial
and economic environment here and abroad. The losses stemming from the
international financial crisis have so far been limited. Both foreign banks’
profitability and financial strength were still sound. At the same time, loan and
asset quality remained manageable while liquidity and solvency were adequately
maintained.
In turn, foreign branches and subsidiaries posted positive earnings as net
profit stood at P6.6 billion in 2008. Although lower by 40.3% from the P11.1
billion net profit in 2007, the net profit in 2008 was still higher than the profits
earned in the years prior to 2005. Consequently, returns on foreign banks’ assets/
shareholders were slightly lower with return on assets/return on equity ratios at
1.0 (from 1.7% in 2007) and 6.5% (from 11.9%), respectively.
The resilient macro economy supported bank lending growth and activity.
Loans (exclusive of interbank lending) posted a double-digit growth of 20.2%
to reach P305.2 billion in December 2008 from P253.9 billion in December 2007.
Among the sectors, manufacturing cornered the largest share of the industry’s
________________
8. R.A. No. 7721 stipulates that at least 70% of the total assets of the Philippine banking
system must remain with Filipino-owned domestic banks.184
loan extension at 17.9% and it even picked up by 7.0% amidst a slowdown in
the world economy and heightened competition from China.
The encouraging trend in lending was supported by low levels of non-
performing loans/non-performing asset ratios at 2.5% and 1.7%, respectively.
With BSP’s implementation of Basel II last 1 July 2007, foreign banks’ capital
became more risk-sensitive in line with international standards and remained
well above the minimum BSP regulatory requirement of 10% and the international
benchmark of 8%.
4.2 Offshore Banks 9
Offshore banks are branches, subsidiaries or affiliates of foreign banks
authorised to conduct offshore banking business in any currency except the
Philippine peso. They may make loans to or accept funds (with a minimum of
US$50,000) from non-residents, other OBUs and foreign-currency deposit units
authorised by a central bank to conduct such business.   Offshore banks were
established in the Philippines in 1976 through Presidential Decree No. 1034 (signed
on 30 September 1976).  The number of OBUs as of December 2010 consisted
of five - two originating from Europe, two from the United States America and
one from Asia.
Following the decline in the number of OBUs, total resources dropped by
48.1% to reach US$612.8 billion as of end-December 2009 from US$1.2 billion
posted in end-December 2000. Factors that contributed to the decline in total
resources of OBUs during the period mainly include due from other banks outside
the Philippines, loans and as well as investments. Dragged down by the global
financial crisis in 2007, total resources of OBUs shrank substantially in 2008.
As of end-December 2008, total assets (net of due from head office/branches-
abroad) of OBUs aggregated US$1.3 billion, representing a 65.2% (US$2.4
billion) decline from US$3.7 billion in 2007. The sharp decline in resources
translated to steep losses for OBUs.
After six consecutive years of profitable operations since 2002, results of
operations yielded a negative bottom line of US$2 million in 2008. This was a
stark contrast to the US$11 million net profit reported in 2007. Operating income
steeply fell by 70.0% to US$9 million from US$30 million in 2007 brought on
________________
9. Figures in this section are in US dollars since OBUs in the Philippines transact in US
dollars.185
primarily by the 126.7% or US$19 million drop in non-interest income, coupled
with a 13.3% or US$2 million decrease in net interest income.
Discount and interest from all sources, except on bonds and other instruments,
fell sharply. Interest on bonds jumped by 117.1% (US$35 million) partially
offsetting declines in income from trade and other bills (100.0%), deposits (73.7%)
and loans and advances (39.9 %) for a net decline in interest income of
32.9%(US$94 million).
Meanwhile, substantial reduction of borrowings accordingly slashed interest
paid/payable by 33.9% (US$92 million), softening the decline in net interest
income. The US$19 million drop in non-interest income from loss incurred in the
disposal and marking-to-market of investments, however, led to negative bottom
line despite an ample reduction in operating expenses of 33.3% (US$6 million).
Cross-border lending of OBUs when taken as share of nominal GDP has
been relatively weak.  From 2.3% in March 2002, cross-border lending relative
to GDP rose to 3.2% in March 2006 to a high of 6.5% in September 2007,
before dropping to 1.2% in December 2008 due to the effects of global financial
turmoil (Figure 4).  Since then, the ratio of cross-border lending to GDP has
tracked a downward trend to 0.4% in December 2009.
A closer look at Figure 4 shows that the share of loans to nominal GDP
rose significantly between 2005 and 2007, averaging at 3.5% during the period
from an average of 1.6% between 2002 and 2004. Meanwhile, the volatility of
loans to GDP (as indicated by the coefficient of variation) has risen from an
average of 0.25 during the period 2002 to 2004 to 0.44 in 2005 to 2007 and
further up to 0.59 in 2008 to 2009.
In terms of growth, cross border lending of offshore banks based in the
Philippines built up and was volatile in the run up to the crisis in 2007.  In
particular, year-on-year growth of cross border lending surged significantly in
2005.  From 0.4% in November 2004, growth of cross-border lending rose
significantly to 181.4% in June 2006 to 287.0% in July 2007.
However, cross border lending of offshore banks in the Philippines dropped
sharply in 2008 to the last quarter of 2009.  Cross-border lending has been
sluggish starting 2008. In particular, cross-border lending of offshore banks
contracted sharply by 33.5% in March 2008, by 61.2% in May 2009 and by
76.1% in December 2009.186
Meanwhile, offshore banks’ investments in bonds and other securities track
closely the trend of cross-border lending.  Investments in bonds and other
securities fell to just US$188 million in December 2009, from US$1.4bn in 2006.
In terms of growth, investments in bonds and other securities rose significantly
and were volatile in the run up to the crisis in 2007.  In particular, year-on-year
growth of investments surged significantly in 2005 to 2007.  From 20.9% in
2002-2004, average growth of investments increased significantly to 93.8% from
2005 to 2007 but declined by 44.2% in 2008 to 2009.
Borrowings and placements from other banks abroad are the principal source
of funds for OBUs, constituting 43.5% of their liabilities. Deposits of non-residents
other than banks were less than 1% of total liabilities in 2007 as OBUs have
limited authority to accept deposits.  In fact, deposit-to-loan ratio has averaged
8.0% from 2002 to 2009.
4.3 Insights
The observations so far imply that changes in international claims and cross-
border lending may entail significant changes in real output and inflation.  To get
Figure 4:  Total Assets, Loans and Investments of Offshore Banks
(% Share to Nominal GDP)
March 2002-December 2009 (Quarterly)187
a first insight into the relationships between claims and cross-border lending and
selected monetary, financial and real sector indicators, Granger causality tests
at 5% and 10% levels of significance are used.
Using a lag of two quarters, results of the Granger causality tests from the
first quarter of 1995 to the fourth quarter of 2009 showed that international
claims and cross-border lending are part of a set of economic interactions. In
particular, there is a bi-directional causality between international claims and
cross-border lending and changes in these indicators cause real GDP growth.
Based on Im, Pesaran and Shin W-statistic unit root test, international claims
and cross-border lending are stable in their first log difference.10
At 10% level of significance, the (Granger) causation appears to run from
international claims (DLOG(CLAIMS)  and cross-border lending
(DLOG(BORDER) to foreign banks total assets scaled to nominal GDP (FB)
via  the trade openness, measured as the sum of exports and imports of goods
and services scaled to nominal GDP (TRADE), to the volatility of the S&P 500
financial index (SPCV) to  risk adjusted interest rate differential (RISKADJ) and
to the size of stock market capitalization as share of nominal GDP (MCAP).
5. Methodology and Results
5.1 The Model
This study modifies the gravity model for trade in assets of Siregar and
Choy (2010) by building a single-equation regression framework for the
Philippines.  Siregar and Choy (2010) observed that major uses of gravity models
are simple in structure and in principle as well as consistent with a wide range
of theoretical approaches.  In addition, the framework allows for global supply
factors (or the “push” factors) and country-specific demand factors (or the “pull”
factors) driving trade in assets such as international claims and cross-border
lending.  The modified gravity model takes the form in equation 1 as,
(1)
________________
10. The null hypothesis is that the unit root test assumes individual unit root process.188
where, Af  refers to foreign assets, trade refers to the distribution of trade, the
originating country factors include volatility in the stock market or bond market
transactions,   host country factors include GDP growth, interest rate differential,
size of stock market capitalisation, country dummies such as the Asian currency
and financial crisis in 1997-1998 and the global financial crisis in 2008-2009, an
interaction term between dummies of past crises and exposure of foreign banks
in host country, and an error term ε.
The modified gravity model  of  Siregar and Choy (2010) is applied to
Philippine data to study the following questions:
(1)  Do “push” or “pull” factors or a combination of both drive the international
claims and cross-border lending to the Philippines?
(2) Is there any evidence to suggest that foreign banks contributed to the spread
of financial   crises in the Philippines?
(3) Has the story of recent global financial crisis been a different one than the
past crises in the Philippines?
The Philippine dataset covers quarterly data between the first quarter of
1995 and the fourth quarter of 2009.  Gross international claims and cross-
border loans are used as dependent variables. The BIS data sets have the
advantage of measuring international and cross-border lending data that are
consistent with the principles underlying national accounts and balance of payment
statistics.
5.2 The Variables
International claims. CLAIMS. Refer to gross international financial claims
of banks in a given country on banks and the non-bank sector in the Philippines.
International claims to the Philippines are taken from the BIS (Table 6A) in
million US dollars.
Cross-border lending.  SBORDER.  This refers to the lending by global
banks from their headquarters to a firm abroad.  This is contrasted to a local
lending where local banks use a local network of branches and subsidiaries.
Data on cross-border lending are taken from the BIS (Table 7A) in million US
dollars.189
Volatility of the S&P 500 financial index.11  SPCV.  This analysis uses
the volatility (indicated by the coefficient of variation) of the S&P 500 financial
index as the global supply factor. 12 The S&P financial index is an index of 500
stocks that are chosen on the basis of market size, liquidity, and industry grouping,
among other factors. The S&P 500 Index is designed to act as a barometer for
the overall U.S. stock market; it reflects the risk-return characteristics of the
large-cap universe. The S&P 500 is a market value weighted index: Each stock’s
weight in the index is proportionate to its market value.  Close price adjusted
for dividends and splits.
Volatility of the S&P 500 financial index tends to be high in periods of
stress, which is in turn is negatively related to credit supply.  Higher volatility
also implies that it is more difficult for banks to raise additional capital, which
also limits credit supply. A further advantage is that volatility is computed from
stock prices, which are based on large trading volumes and have a long track
record. This indicates that the results are robust to alternative measures of supply,
as discussed in the section on robustness below.
Real GDP growth.   RGDP.  The most important demand factor in the
analysis is real GDP. This follows straightforwardly from the standard credit
equation: higher levels of output require more credit, including more international
claims and cross-border lending.  Data are taken from the BSP Selected Philippine
Economic Indicators in percent.13
Total assets of foreign banks as share of nominal GDP.  FB.  14 Total
assets of foreign banks in the Philippines refer to the sum of all assets, adjusted
to net off the accounts “Due from Head Office/Branches/Agencies” and “Due
to Head Office/Branches/Agencies” of foreign bank branches.  Foreign banks
are classified into commercial and expanded foreign banks and offshore banking
units.  Commercial foreign banks, the biggest group of foreign banks, are further
classified into non-expanded foreign commercial banks and subsidiaries of foreign
________________
11. The Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) was at one time the most renowned index for
U.S. stocks, but because the DJIA contains only 30 companies, most people agree that
the S&P 500 is a better proxy for the U.S. stock market.
12. The coefficient of variation is computed as standard deviation divided by the mean.
13. This variable was converted into US dollars.  In the empirical estimation, the result was
identical.
14. The earliest quarterly data is 1999.  For the period 1995 to 1998,  the quarterly levels
are assumed to grow based on the annual growth.190
commercial banks.   Total assets of foreign banks (converted into million pesos)
are computed as share of nominal gross domestic product (in million pesos). 15
Total assets of foreign banks and nominal gross domestic product are taken
from the BSP-OSPD and BSP Selected Philippine Economic Indicators.
Total trade (exports and imports of goods and services) as share of
nominal GDP. TRADE. This ratio indicates trade openness of the Philippines.
Total exports and imports of goods and services are taken from the Quarterly
National Income Accounts in million pesos.   The sum of exports and imports
of goods and services are computed as share of nominal gross domestic product.
Asian financial crisis dummy.  ASIANDUMMY. A dummy variable is
included to account for the effects of the Asian currency and financial crisis in
1997 to 1998.  Hence, 1 is denoted for the quarters starting from third quarter
1997 to the fourth quarter of 1998 while 0 for non-crisis quarters.
Global financial crisis dummy.  GFCDUMMY.  A dummy variable is
included to account for the effects of the global financial crisis 2008 to 2009.
Hence, 1 is denoted for the quarters starting from second quarter 2008 to the
fourth quarter of 2009 while 0 for ordinary quarters.
Risk adjusted interest rate differential.  RISKADJ.  This is computed
as the difference between the BSP overnight RRP rate and the Federal Funds
Rate and the risk premium, or the difference between the Philippine 10-year
Treasury note and the US 10-year Treasury note.  This indicates home country
factor that could explain the supply of international claims to the Philippines.
The interest rates are taken from the BSP-Department of Economic Statistics.
Stock market capitalization as share of nominal GDP.  MCAP.  The
stock market capitalisation is taken from the World Federation of Exchanges.
The stock market capitalisation is computed as share of nominal gross domestic
product.    The market capitalisation of a stock exchange is the total number
of issued shares of domestic companies, including their several classes, multiplied
by their respective prices at a given time. This indicator reflects the comprehensive
value of the market at that time. It includes the shares of domestic companies,
shares of foreign companies which are exclusively listed on an exchange, i.e.
the foreign company is not quoted on any other exchange, common and preferred
shares of domestic companies and shares without voting rights.
________________
15. This variable was converted into US dollars.  In the empirical estimation, the result was
identical.191
Meanwhile, this indicator excludes collective investment funds, rights and
warrants, convertible instruments, options and futures as well as foreign listed
shares other than exclusively listed ones, companies whose only business goal
is to hold shares of other listed companies and companies admitted to trading
(companies admitted to trading are companies whose shares are traded at the
exchange but not listed at the exchange).
In its empirical specification, Equation 1 above is represented as follows:
(2)
(3)
5.3 The Estimation Method
This study follows the method used by Wooldridge (2001).  Wooldridge
(2001) argued that a comprehensive study that analyses the factors that drive
foreign bank presence can utilise generalised method of moments (GMM) or
fixed-effects model (including panel data).  In particular, Wooldridge (2001) noted
that GMM procedure may be more efficient than fixed-effect models especially
when addressing heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
To determine the role of foreign banks in propagating crisis, interactive terms
are identified in equations 2 and 3.  The role of foreign banks depends on the
sign and significance of  γ  and ϑ  in equations 2 and 3.  The idea is, assuming
all factors remain constant, if higher exposure is translated to a more stable
financing, we expect γ and ϑ  to be positive and significant.  In addition, β
determines the extent of supply factor while ρ denotes the extent of demand
factor in driving international claims (equation 2) and cross-border lending
(equation 3).  It should also be noted that the role of trade in propagating the
financial crisis is also specified in both equations.192
5.4 The Empirical Results
5.4.1 Diagnostics
Unit root and co-integration group tests are conducted to the variables
included in the single-equation framework.  Results show that all the series in
levels (ratios) and first differences are stationary at the 5% and 10% levels of
significance.  The results further suggest that the variables under investigation
are integrated of order one, I(1).  In terms of the number of co-integrated
relationship(s), the results show that at most 1 co-integrated relationship at 5%
level of significance exists (Technical Appendix).
The choice of instruments for the GMM equations are assumed to be all
the channels through which international claims and cross-border lending may
affect foreign bank exposure to the Philippines and the lagged dependent and
independent variables in the equations.
Each of the combination of variables is assessed for basic and higher-order
diagnostic tests.  The signs and magnitudes of individual coefficients in each
equation, such as t statistics, the adjusted 2 R , Durbin Watson and F statistics
are all examined. All calculated F values are higher than the critical values, at
the 5% to 10% levels of significance, thereby indicating a significant degree of
reliability of coefficients of determination. Results of higher order test statistics
of residuals are similarly examined. Results of the Jarque-Bera test show that
all of the series are normally distributed. With a lag order of up two and at a
5% to 10% level of significance, Breusch-Godfrey results show that not all
equations exhibit serial correlation.   J-test is also checked for the estimated
equation using GMM at 5% to 10% level of significance.  Results show that
the equations are valid.
5.4.2 Robustness Checks
The model is robust to other supply and demand specifications.  In the
empirical estimation, the volatility of the S&P 500 financial index is replaced
with S&P index and the implied volatility of a broader stock index such as the
Dow Jones Industrial Average.  Results of the robustness check imply better
fit when the volatility of the S&P index is used.
The model is also robust to other demand specifications. The need to finance
current account deficits could create additional demand for cross-border lending.193
Similarly, large interest rate differentials might induce foreign currency borrowing
– perhaps through cross-border lending. Though coefficients for current account
deficits and interest rate differentials are statistically significant and have the
right sign, they are not sufficient enough in explaining cross-border lending.
5.4.3 The Empirical Results
The regression results in Tables 4 and 5 indicate the following results:
(1) The positive and significant constant term in Tables 4 and 5 signifies that
both international claims and cross-border had indeed risen from the first
quarter of 1995 to the fourth quarter of 2009.
(2) Results in Tables 3 and 4 also imply that changes in the volatility of the
S&P 500 financial index and real GDP growth contributed to movements
of international claims and cross-border lending to the Philippines from the
first quarter of 1995 to the fourth quarter of 2009.   In addition,  other
demand factors such the risk adjusted interest rate differential and stock
market capitalisation affect changes in these indicators, albeit indirectly.  The
relevance of risk adjusted interest rate differential in this equation connotes
that changes in monetary policy is significant in driving claims and cross-
border lending to the Philippines.  The results signify that a combination of




However, when the two factors are compared, it appears that the impact
of supply is stronger.  The coefficients of SPCV and RGDP in Tables 3 and 4
are divided with the standard deviation of 2.0.  From Table 5, it appears that
the SPCV or the supply factor is bigger than the demand factor, RGDP.196
(3) Results in Tables 3 and 4 show that, indeed, the role of foreign banks to
the run up of financial crises has been a stabilising one.  The interaction
terms for international claims have been positive and economically significant
at 5% level of confidence.  This means that higher exposure of the Philippines
to international claims has been translated into a more stable financing.
This finding underscores the benefits of having foreign banks in the
Philippines.
Although it has a stabilising role during the Asian financial and currency
crises in 1997 to 1998,   cross-border lending did not possess a stabilising role
during the global financial crisis.  While the coefficient is significant the sign of
the coefficient is negative.  This implies that cross-border lending has been
significantly volatile, possibly putting stress on the balance of payments.   This
finding warrants a more detailed investigation.
Meanwhile, trade openness did not do much in stabilising the financial crisis.
This indicates that trade has been equally volatile.
(4)  The results also show that the story of the global financial crisis has been
a different one than the past crises in the Philippines.
The non-stabilising role of cross-border lending may connote that the story
of the recent global financial crisis has been a different one from the past crises
in the Philippines.  Cohen and Remolona (2008) emphasised that certain elements
are new to the episode of financial turmoil in 2007-2008, while many elements
have remained the same. The new elements include structured credit, the broader
use of the originate-to-distribute business model, and new arrangements in the
repurchase markets that allow the use of almost any financial asset as collateral.
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These are fundamentally good innovations but their reckless use has helped to
underpin the crisis. The elements that have remained the same are those processes
that underpin the basic procyclicality in the system, that is, the tendency for a
build-up of risk-taking and leverage to occur in benign economic environments
and the abrupt withdrawal from risk and an unwinding of leverage that typically
happens once the environment turns bad.
However, the developments during the global financial crisis suggest that
the new elements may not be that massive in the case of the Philippines to lead
to a financial crisis.  It may also be recalled that the BSP adopted inflation
targeting as a comprehensive framework of monetary policy after the Asian
financial crisis.  In its short-term response to the dramatic loss of liquidity towards
the run up of the global financial turmoil, the BSP had to trade the importance
of ensuring the continued availability of market liquidity as a public good against
the moral hazard that any market intervention is likely to induce. Over all, the
BSP has acted to broaden the scope of its liquidity operations.
The strength of the Philippines is that it went into the global financial crisis
with healthy corporate and financial sector balance sheets. As we noted, financial
institutions have strong capital cushions and no external exposure. Debt-equity
ratios in the corporate sector have fallen. That does not mean that the financial
crisis did not affect the Philippines. There were sharp outflows of portfolio
investment funds in the second and third quarter 2008 when global investors
sold out to transfer liquidity back home.
Foreign bank loans were repaid in the third and fourth quarter 2008 and
foreign trade credit fell sharply in the fourth quarter of 2008 and first quarter
of 2009. Foreign banks needed funds to restore their own balance sheets and
withdrew these funds from emerging markets including the Philippines. This is
a further illustration that the Philippines remain vulnerable to the volatilities of
global financial markets.  However, the financial impact was limited as the
Philippines had ample international reserves to cope with the withdrawals.
Actually, the current account remained in surplus as a result of the surge of
remittances beginning 2006 and this kept adding to the reserves.
Moreover, local financial institutions were rather liquid and could easily
replace external credit but the crisis increased their risk awareness and may
have induced credit rationing: outstanding loans of commercial banks have
stagnated since end-2008 and started to increase only modestly in 2010. Of
course, it is difficult to assess whether the stagnation in loans and the decline198
in foreign loans and trade credit are due to reluctance of banks to give loans
or to a fall in the demand for loans as the economy is declining.
6. Conclusion: Policy Implications
The global financial crisis that started in 2007 posed relevant questions for
policymakers. This study aims to answer three such questions:  (1) Do “push”
or “pull” factors or a combination of both factors drive the international claims
and cross-border lending to the Philippines?; (2) Is there any evidence to suggest
that foreign banks contributed to the spread of financial crises in the Philippines?;
and (3) Has the story of recent global financial crisis been a different one than
the past crises in the Philippines?
The study finds that supply factors mainly drove international claims and
cross-border bank lending during the global financial crisis. In other words, the
stress experienced by major, internationally- active banks has reduced the supply
of international claims and cross-border lending to the Philippines.  This finding
is consistent with the general understanding that the global financial crisis
originated outside the emerging markets, including the Philippines.  However,
the results show that foreign banks in the Philippines managed to stabilise the
surge of international claims but not cross-border lending especially during the
global financial crisis in 2007. This finding indicates that the global financial
crisis in 2007 has been a different one from the past financial crises in the
Philippines.
These findings imply a trade-off for economic policy. On the one hand,
cross border lending seems to be a two-way prong for contagion. Crises can
be transmitted from advanced economies to emerging markets, not just the other
way around. In addition, cross-border lending can transmit advanced country
credit booms. Policymakers might want to reduce the resulting vulnerabilities.
On the other hand, cross-border lending is typically a channel for efficient
international capital allocation. Philippine financial markets may continue to benefit
from this access to international lending and financing.
The findings of this study bring us to a broader issue on the importance of
prudential regulation.  It can be recalled that cross-border lending in the BIS
banking statistics measures foreign bank lending relevant for balance of payment
financing. This is a fundamental variable for emerging markets, which have
experienced balance of payment crises in the past decades.  The increased
presence of foreign banks in the domestic banking system necessitates the
development of effective cross-border prudential supervision. Although the key199
objective of the supervisors of internationally-active banks has been to ensure
that no transactions of these banks escapes effective supervision and that
coordinated immediate action can be undertaken when necessary, a closer
cooperation between home-and host-country authorities with  vigilant sharing of
information became far more important (Mathieson and Roldos 2001).16
Meanwhile, the role of foreign banks as a stabilising factor through
international claims during the past two crises has been an important finding.
The Asian currency crisis brought a collapse of confidence and an increased
awareness of risk which translated into declining levels of investment and
leverage. Regulations for financial institutions and corporate governance were
tightened. Macroeconomic policy was re-calibrated with a shift to inflation
targeting and a renewed emphasis on cautious fiscal and monetary policies. The
crisis resulted in a significant opening to foreign investment and foreign trade.
These changes defined how the Philippines responded to the global financial
crisis. Some elements certainly help the Philippines in coping with the crisis but
other elements are perceived to have increased the challenges. It has been
observed that the Asian crisis invited more caution leading to de-leveraging of
financial corporations (including banks) and greater accumulation of international
reserves.17 However, the Asian crisis also resulted in increased reliance on exports
as a major source of foreign exchange inflows, thereby opening the economy
to volatilities in global trade. 18
________________
16. One of the most glaring was the failure of Bank of Credit and Commerce International
(BCCI) in 1991.  In recent years, Song (2004) noted that the development of foreign banks
in Argentina also could raise many supervisory issues deserving interesting discussions.
17. Based on the BSP Flow of Funds Reports, loans of financial corporations (including banks)
contracted during the period 2000 to 2009, except in 2001, 2002 and 2003. This may
suggest that following the Asian financial crisis, financial corporations have, in general,
settled portions of their outstanding loans to lower their rate of leverage.   Meanwhile,
reserve accumulation as seen in the % share of gross international reserves to nominal GDP
has risen from 2.1% in 1990 to 17.4% in 1999 and further to 24.1% in 2009.
18. For the Philippines, exports of goods and services as % share of nominal GDP has increased
from an average of 20.7% between 1986 and 1993 to an average of 37.1% between 1994
and 2001 and further to an average of 42.0% between 2002 and 2010.  However, the average
share of 42% from 2002 to 2010 for the Philippines was relatively lower compared with
other Asian economies like Thailand and Malaysia at 71.0% and 108.6%, respectively. This
may indicate that Thailand and Malaysia are more vulnerable to uncertainties in global trade
than the Philippines.200
During the past few years, the debate on the policy implications of the rapid
surges of capital flows to emerging markets has intensified. For its part, the
Philippine authorities continue to have a wide range of options to cope with
capital flows, especially when the flows are partly driven by reduced outward
capital flows. These options can be grouped into macroeconomic and prudential
policies, administrative capital controls (i.e. restrictions of capital transactions
through quantitative limits or outright prohibitions) and market-based capital
controls (i.e. unremunerated reserve requirements and taxes on capital inflows).
A challenging point is that capital flows are probably attracted to emerging
markets especially to East Asia not by apparent yield differentials or changes
per se, but because of the real growth prospects behind the yields. It is the
soundness of the macro environment implied by the potential for domestic savings
to be put to work at home that is encouraging international investors.
In the light of previous shocks—the Asian financial crisis and the sudden
reversal of capital flows during the global financial crisis —it is no surprise that
Philippine authorities and other monetary authorities are emphasising that they
are watching movements of capital flows and their effects on asset prices very
closely.  But policy makers do more than just watch. They can and do act. With
the balance of cross-border flows in savings having shifted such that they are
putting upward pressure on currencies and asset prices across some Asian
economies, authorities are presented with a number of issues. Moreover, the
tools available to authorities are actually quite broad, and while each has a cost,
there is no question that inward capital flows can be managed.201
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Chapter 8
INTERNATIONAL AND CROSS BORDER BANK LENDING





Sri Lanka increased its dependence on borrowings from foreign banks
following the opening of the economy in 1977 when companies coming under
the purview of the Board of Investment in Sri Lanka (BOI) and which were
exempted from the exchange control regulations, borrowed from foreign banks
for their business activities. Foreign banks credits to Sri Lanka markets have
expanded significantly in recent years. Outstanding foreign claims of reporting
banks on Sri Lanka trebled after mid-1999, reaching $3.8 billion by first quarter
of 2010. However, the global financial crisis  may have caused banks to reconsider
their exposures in Sri Lanka.
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) inflows to Sri Lanka have recorded a
considerable increase during the period 1998-2009. The annual FDI inflows to
Sri Lanka increased from Rs 1 billion in 1995 to Rs 69 billion in 2009. However,
FDI flows to Sri Lanka fell to Rs 69 billion (US$ 601 mn) in 2009 in comparison
to Rs 101 billion (US$ 889 mn) in 2008. This was mainly due to the contraction
in liquidity in the global credit markets and banking systems owing to the global
financial crisis which originated  from  the subprime mortgage crisis in the United
States.  (Figure 1).
Foreign loan inflows to the private sector increased to Rs 44.8 billion in
2009 against  Rs 9.7 billion in 1998. In 2009, foreign loans inflows to the private
sector registered a significant growth of Rs 16 billion compared to previous
year. This was mainly due to the increase in foreign borrowings by the BOI
companies as well as other private companies. Foreign loan inflows to private206
sector as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) also increased from
0.7% in 1998 to 1.8% in 2009 (Figure 1).
1.2 Banking Sector
After obtaining a licence from Central Bank of Sri Lanka, a company
incorporated in Sri Lanka can carry out business as a commercial bank or
specialised bank. A foreign bank also requires a licence from the Central Bank
to engage in banking business. Licensed specialised banks are financial institutions
which have obtained a licence from the Central Bank to conduct specialised
banking business under the Banking Act and these banks are different from
commercial banks in that they are not authorised to accept demand deposits
from the public. These banks are also not permitted to deal in foreign currency
transactions. However, with the prior approval of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka,
they can engage in restricted foreign exchange transactions. At present, there
are 22 commercial banks and 9 specialised banks operating with 1924 branches
and 3,941 other banking outlets in the economy. Out of the 22 commercial banks,
11 are branches of foreign banks.
There are no restrictions with regard to the share ownerships in companies
engaged in banking business by non residents including companies incorporated
outside Sri Lanka under the current exchange control regulations. However, in
terms of the regulations under the Banking Act, acquisition of shares exceeding
10% of the share capital of the company by non residents or residents requires
Figure 1
Foreign Direct Investments and Foreign Loans Flows to
Private Sector
Source: Central Bank of Sri Lanka207
the prior approval of the Monetary Board of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka.  At
present, there is no licensed bank which is fully owned by non residents or a
subsidiary of a company incorporated overseas.
With shifting of the Sri Lankan economy from a closed to an open, market-
friendly one in 1977, all licensed commercial banks are permitted to carry out
off-shore banking business with effect from 1979.  Accordingly, all commercial
banks operate two units, i.e., Domestic Banking units (DBU) and Off-shore
Banking Units (OBU).
1.2.1 Off-shore Banking in Sri Lanka
Origins of offshore banking business in Sri Lanka coincided with the
establishments of an open economy in the post 1977 period. In 1979, the Central
Bank of Sri Lanka issued a scheme for the establishment of Foreign currency
Banking Units (FCBU) in commercial banks. Accordingly, the commercial banks
that were in operation were entitled to establish FCBUs subject to the conditions
set out by the Central Bank. In accordance with the FCBU schemes, the FUBUs
are allowed to accept demand deposits, time and call deposits from any non-
resident in foreign currency designated by the Central Bank; borrow any
designated foreign currency from any non-resident in any amount; grant any
loans and advances to any non-resident in any designated foreign currency in
any amount; engage in any transaction in any designated foreign currency with
any other FCBUs and engage in any other transactions approved by the Central
Bank. With the Banking Act coming into effect in 1988, the FCBU scheme was
also  expressed legislated in the Banking Act. Further, the legislative provisions
transformed the existing FCBU scheme with slight modifications and renamed
FCBUs as Offshore Banking Units (OBU). At present, OBUs are also allowed
to engage in banking business with companies established in Sri Lanka with the
approval of the Board of Investment of Sri Lanka and any other resident approved
by the Central Bank.
1.2.2 Borrowings from Abroad
DBUs of licensed commercial banks are permitted to borrow upto 15% of
their capital funds from lending institutions in terms of the current policy.
Borrowings from abroad in excess of the limit by commercial banks could be
made only with the prior approval of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka. Interests
rates, repayment period, purpose and banks’ financial status are some of the
factors taken into consideration when approval is granted for commercial banks’
borrowings from abroad. The licensed specialised banks can borrow from abroad208
only with the prior approval of the Central Bank. At present, OBUs of licensed
commercial banks are allowed to borrow from non-residents without any
restrictions or limitations and prior approval of the Central Bank.
Companies incorporated in Sri Lanka which are subject to the Exchange
Control regulations and residents of Sri Lanka require the prior approval of the
Central Bank for foreign borrowings  under the current exchange control
regulations.
1.2.3 Lending to non Residents
DBUs of licensed commercial banks and licensed specialised banks are not
allowed to lend to non-residents including companies incorporated outside Sri
Lanka at present due to the capital  account control. However, OBUs of licensed
commercial banks are allowed to lend to non-residents without any restrictions
in the provisions of the Banking Act and the Banking (Offshore Banking Scheme)
Order of 2000 issued by the Central Bank.
The rest of the Paper is organised as follows. Section 2 discusses the
evolution of foreign banks, composition and growth in assets, deposits, lending
and foreign borrowings of domestic banks and foreign banks and domestic and
foreign banks’ assets, deposits, lending and borrowing as percentages of Gross
Domestic Products. Section  3  delves into the literature review with regard to
international and cross border lending while Section 4 focuses on the research
methodology and results of the impact of the global financial crisis on the cross
border lending to Sri Lanka. Policy implications are discussed in Section 5 and
Section 6 concludes.
2. Analysis of Foreign Banks’ Involvement Pre and During the Global
Financial Crisis in the Economy
At the end of August 2010, 11 foreign banks have established branches in
Sri Lanka including 5 branches of Indian banks.  In 1990, there were 18 foreign
banks in the economy.  However, the presence of foreign banks has declined
due to acquisition of their business by local banks and merger of some foreign
banks. At present, the 11 foreign banks provide various banking services to their
customers through 46 branch network. (Figure 2).209
2.1 Assets of Domestic and Foreign Banks
2.1.1 Domestic Banks
Total assets of the DBUs of domestic commercail banks  and specialised
banks rose to  Rs 2,451 billion at the end of 2009 from Rs 617 million in 1998.
Domestic banks’ assets as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
which stood at 43% in 1998 increased to 100%  in 2009 as a result of the
opening of more domestic banks and enhancement of business operations of the
domestic banks through new branches. The growth in assets of domestic banks
was 11.1% in 2009 compared to a negative growth of 0.1% in foreign banks’
assets.  The assets of  foreign banks and domestic banks grew at a slower pace
in 2009 compared with the growth rates recorded in the previous years, reflecting
the lower demand for credits. (Figure 3).
Figure 2
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2.1.2 Foreign Banks
Total assets of branches of foreign banks which stood at Rs 36 billion by
end December 1998, accounting for 10.5% of total assets of the entire banking
sector, increased to Rs 270 billion in 2009, representing 14.5% of the total assets
of the banking sector. However, the share of foreign banks’ assets as a
percentage of total bank assets declined marginally by about 2% in 2009 in
comparison to 2008 mainly due to the decline in loans and advances extended
by foreign banks. (Figure 4)
Figure 3
Assets of Domestic Banks
Figure 4
Assets of Foreign Banks211
Assets of foreign banks’ as a percentage of GDP which stood at about 2%
in 1998 increased to around 11%  by 2009. Limiting the banking activities to
major cities and limited branch expansions of these foreign banks were the major
reasons for the slow growth in assets of foreign banks compared with domestic
banks.
2.2 Deposits of Domestic and Foreign Banks and their Market Share
2.2.1 Domestic Banks
Deposits mobilised by domestic commercial and specilised banks increased
from Rs. 425 billion in 1998 to Rs 2,019 billion in 2009 while domestic banks’
deposits as a percentage of GDP have registered a steady growth over the
years reaching a level of 76% by end 2009. As there were no banks failures
in the economy, domestic banks were able to increase their deposit base even
during the global financial crisis period (Figure 5).
Figure 5
Deposits of Domestic Banks
2.2.2 Foreign Banks
Total deposits of foreign banks which stood at Rs 23 billion in 1998 increased
to Rs 183 billion in 2009 despite the failure of some foreign banks in developed
countries.  However, foreign banks’ deposits increased maginally to Rs 184 billion
by end June 2010.  Foreign banks’ deposits as a percentage of GDP increased
from 1.6% in 1998 to 7.5% in 2009. (Figure 6).212
The growth in deposits of domestic banks was 15.3% in 2009 while foreign
banks’ deposits recorded a slower growth of around 1%. However, deposits of
foreign banks’ increased marginally in the first half of 2010 compared to growth
of domestic banks. (Figure 7).
Figure 6
Deposits of Foreign banks
Figure 7
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2.3 Loans and Advances of Domestic Banks and Foreign Banks.
Loans extended by domestic banks recorded a significant increase over the
years and domestic banks’ loans and advances as a percentage of GDP increased
to 51% by end 2008. However, this ratio declined to 50% by end 2009. Loans
and advances of domestic banks decelerated owing to lower demand for credit
and the cautious approach of banks to expand lending due to rising non-performing
loans. (Figure 8).
Figure 8
Loans and Advances of Foreign and Domestic Banks
Though foreign banks’ loans and advances increased over the years, loans
and advances extended by foreign banks decelerated by 18% from Rs 149 billon
in 2008 to Rs.119 billion in 2009 and Rs 90 billion by end June 2010. A positive
rebound in loans extended by foreign banks was not witnessed in 2010 despite
the gradual recovery of the Sri Lankan economy from the adverse impacts of
the global financial turmoil.
The loan to deposit ratio of domestic banks has been in the range of 65%-
86% over the years. However, this ratio declined to a level of 65% in 2009 as
there was a sharp drop in lending of domestic banks. The loan to deposit ratio
of foreign banks was above 70% for the period 1998-2009 as foreign banks
borrowed funds from abroad for lending purposes. However, this ratio declined
to 49% by end June 2010 as a result of a sharp decline in lending of foreign
banks during the year (Figure 9).214
2.4 Foreign Borrowings
Domestic and foreign Banks are permitted to borrow up to 15% of their
capital funds from lending institutions abroad including OBUs of all commercial
banks. Foreign borrowings in excess of this limit require prior approval of the
Central Bank. Foreign borrowings of domestic banks were in the range of Rs
10-15 billion during the period 1998-2005. Foreign borrowings of domestic banks
in 2006 and 2007 were at Rs 43 billion. However, foreign borrowings of these
banks declined significantly to Rs 29 billon in 2009 due to the global financial
turmoil and lower demand for credits by the customers in the domestic market.
Foreign borrowings as a percentage of GDP rose from 0.7% in 1998 to 2.1%
in 2006 but declined to 1.2% by 2009 (Figure 10).
Figure 9
Loan to Deposit Ratio of Domestic and Foreign Banks
Figure  10
Foreign Borrowings of Domestic and Foreign Banks215
Foreign borrowings of foreign banks increased from Rs 700 million in 1998
to Rs 8.5 billion by 2009. An increase in foreign borrowings by foreign banks
was witnessed during the period 2006-2009 despite the global financial crisis.
This was mainly attributed to foreign borrowings by a few foreign banks for
lending to the Government and to corporate customers in the private sector. The
foreign borrowings of foreign banks as a percentage of GDP increased from
0.05% in 1998 to 0.29% in 2009.(Figure 10).
2.5 Sources and Uses of Funds of Commercial Banks
Deposits are the major funding source of the commercial banks operating
in Sri Lanka at present and they account for more than 70% (Rupee deposits
(57%) and foreign currency deposits (17%) of the total funds. Capital and
reserves account for only about 8% of total funds.
The main uses of funds are loans and advances, accounting for about (55%)
of total funds, followed by Government securities (25%). (Figure 11).
Figure 11
Sources and Uses of Funds of Commercial Banks (as at end 2009)
2.6 Off-Shore Banking Unit of Licensed commercial Banks
With the opening of the Sri Lankan economy in 1977, licensed commercial
banks were permitted to operate OBUs to facilitate foreign investors in Sri Lanka
under the BOI Law. OBUs can engage in off-shore banking transactions with
non-residents and permitted residents including the BOI companies which are
exempted from exchange control regulations.216
2.6.1 Assets of OBUs
Assets pertinent to nonresidents’ customers, which include lending and
investments, increased from Rs 31 billion in 1995 to Rs 89 billion in 2009. Although
there was a significant decrease of Rs 18 billion in nonresidents customers’
assets in 2008 compared to the previous year, a noteworthy improvement of Rs
37 billion was witnessed in 2009.  Assets relating to residents also rose from
Rs 49 billion in 1995 to Rs 285 billion in 2009. However, assets of the resident
category declined sharply by Rs 67 billion in 2009 mainly due to significant drop
in lending to resident customers. (Figure 12).
2.6.2 Liabilities of OBUs
Liabilities applicable to resident and non-resident customers which include
deposits and foreign borrowings increased to Rs 282 billion and 93 billion in
2009 respectively from Rs. 37 billion and Rs. 43 billion in 1995 respectively.
However, liabilities of resident and nonresident customers decelerated in 2009
marginally due to curtailment in foreign borrowing by OBUs. (Figure 13).
Figure 12
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2.7 Consolidated Foreign Claims
As per the data series on consolidated foreign claims of reporting banks
taken from the BIS statistics, foreign claims of all reporting banks on  Sri Lanka
have recorded growth over the period 1983 to 2008. However, foreign claims
dropped to US$ 8,664 million by December 2008 and to US$ 7,856 by March
2009 from a level of US$ 9,439 recorded in September 2008 (Figure 14). There
was a sharp increase in US Banks’ foreign claims on Sri Lanka after 2005 but
lendings of US banks to Sri Lanka dropped sharply after the collapse of Lehman
Brothers in November 2008. Smilarly, foreign claims of UK banks have also
declined during the last quarter of 2008 and first quarter of 2009. (Figure 14).
Figure 13
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3. Literature Review
Foreign bank participation through cross-border lending activity or direct
entry into the local market has several benefits to countries in terms of enhanced
efficiency, liquidity provision, risk sharing and growth opportunities. Foreign banks
are also more resilient and well prepared to handle shocks originating in the
respective countries. However, the transmission of shocks from source countries
to other countries has raised concerns about the mechanisms for such
transmissions and the appropriate policy responses.
Garcia – Herrero and Martinez Peria (2007) found that lending through a
local network of branches and subsidiaries is much more stable than cross-
border foreign bank lendings. Maria Soledad Martinez Peria, Andrew Powell,
and Ivanna Vladkova –Hollar (2005) found that while foreign banks respond to
host countries, they do not appear to pull out faster in times of crisis or during
other periods of economic downturn. Furthermore, higher foreign bank exposure
appears to be a stabilising force as they found that foreign banks’ responsiveness
to host conditions becomes less procyclical as exposure increases.
Reza Y. Siregar and Keen Meng Choy (2010) found that political instability
and weaknesses in legal judicial and bureaucratic systems help explain the
continued stagnation in lending after the financial crisis.
Figure 14
Foreign Claims on Sri Lanka
Source: Bank For International Settlements219
4. Research Methodology and Empirical Results
The global financial crisis which erupted in mid 2007, became more apparent
during 2007 and 2008 and has resulted in contracted liquidity in the global credit
markets and banking systems. Foreign bank participation through cross-border
lending activity or via opening branches or subsidiaries have been recognized as
producing significant benefits to the local economy by way of enhanced efficiency,
liquidity provision and risk sharing. However, at the same time, the international
and foreign banks may transmit shocks to other economies. In order to find out
whether foreign banks transmitted shocks from their home countries  to Sri
Lanka during the recent global financial crisis, we will examine the link between
foreign banks’ international lending to Sri Lanka. Therefore, this Section presents
the determinants of foreign bank lending by using an empirical strategy - a
standard econometric test which is a modification of Martinez-Peria et al (2005).
4.1 Model - A Modification of Martinez-Peria et al. (2005)
We modified the model used by Martinez-Peria et al. (2005) to test the
changes in foreign bank claims on Sri Lanka to analyse the relationship between
foreign banks claims and economic factors of host countries and home countries.
The modified model comprises the following variables.
In the above modified model of Martinez-Peria et al (2005), j = 1 to 4
refers to the 4 host countries of the Netherlands, Japan, United Kingdom and
the United States as foreign banks involved in international and cross –border
lendings to the Sri Lankan economy in the past and  t = 1 to 41 refers to the
time period considered for this study.
The above model disregards the dummy for the Asian financial crisis due
to non-availability of time series data on foreign banks claims. Therefore our
data set runs from the period  2000 Q1 to 2010 Q1, consisting of 41 quarterly
observations.
The data set comprise the following variables:
(1) log(ΔForeign_Bank_Claims)jt is the first difference of the logarithm of
Foreign Claims by foreign country/bank (j) in Sri Lanka;220
(2) Country_Origin_Lender_Factors are control variables that mainly capture
the macroeconomic conditions in the country of the foreign bank(j), e.g.,
real GDP growth and real interest rate;
(3) SriLanka_Factors   are control variables that capture the macroeconomic
conditions in Sri Lanka such as real GDP growth, real interest rate, and
percentage change in the exchange rate of Sri Lanka Rupees against the
US dollar.
(4) GFC_Dummy is a dummy variable that takes the value of one in 2007,
2008 and 2009;
(5) Exposure is the ratio of foreign country/bank(j) claims on Sri Lanka over
the total claims extended by foreign country/bank(j).
In the regression equation, the impact of the global financial crisis on foreign
banks lending is based on the sign and significance of the α4 coefficients. Indeed,
controlling for other factors, if higher exposure is translated into more stable
financing, we expect this interaction term between the GFC dummy and exposure
to be positive and significant.
4.2 Foreign Country Factors
Regarding the foreign country factors, we would like to verify α1 according
to the impact of real GDP growth and real interest rate of the Netherlands,
Japan, United Kingdom and the United States on the changes of their respective
claims on Sri Lanka.
Foreign country economic conditions could have a positive or a negative
impact on foreign bank lending to the host country (Martinez-Peria et al, 2005),
because adverse economic conditions and a lack of profit opportunities in the
foreign country could encourage international and foreign banks to extend credit
abroad, while a recession in the home country could lead to a deterioration in
the capital of foreign banks and overall reduction in claims held at home and
abroad.
Moreover, low real interest rates in lender countries tend to signal periods
of excess liquidity, and this might increase banks’ willingness to extend riskier,
higher interest rate claims to host countries. Therefore, it is expected that home
real interest rate have a negative impact on the change in claims to host country.221
4.3 Sri Lanka Factors
Regarding α2 thecoefficient, in addition to the real GDP growth and real
interest rates, we also take the percentage change in currency exchange rate
as the third independent variable.
We assume lower real interest rate in host country will stimulate economic
recovery and trigger the increase for foreign bank lending. Accordingly, we expect
the host’s real interest rate would have a negative impact on the change in
claims to the host country.
For the percentage change in Sri Lanka Rupees exchange rate against US
dollar, the appreciation of Sri Lanka Rupees would lead to more foreign claims.
Therefore, we expect the change of exchange rate to have positive impact on
the change in claims to host country. Table 1 provides the description and sources
of each variable.
Table 1
Data Definition and Sources of Model222
4.4 Empirical Results
The results of the model for lagged one period (1 quarter), lagged 2  period
(two quarters) and lagged four period (four quarters) are presented in Table 2,
3 and 4 respectively. The results signify that both push and pull factors affect
changes in foreign banks claims on Sri Lanka.223
For lagged one period, out of the push factors, the GDP growth rates of
Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom and the United States are positive and
significant at 1% level of significance. This indicates that  foreign countries’
economic growths result in an increase in foreign bank lending to Sri Lanka.
According to the results, foreign countries’ interest rates do not have any positive
or negative impact on foreign bank lending to Sri Lanka. For lagged one period,
out of the pull factors, real interest rates of Sri Lanka is positive and signifacant
at a level of 10% while exchange rates of Sri Lanka is positive anf significant
at a level of 5%. Meanwhile, Sri Lanka’s  GDP growth rates are not significant.
The results show that foreign bank lendings are highly correlated with real interest
rates and exchange rates of Sri Lanka.
Table 2
Dependent Variable: DLOG(FBC)
(Method: Panel Least Squares; Sample (adjusted): 2000Q2 2010Q1
Periods included: 40; Cross-sections included: 4
Total panel (balanced) observations: 160)224
For a lag of two periods, only foreign countries’ GDP growth rates and
exchange rates of Sri Lanka have a positive impact on the foreign bank lending
to Sri Lanka. This reveals that foreign banks are highly concerned with the
movements in the Sri Lankan exchange rate when extending loans to Sri Lanka.
We can see similar results for the four period lags as well in that the exchange
rate is one of the main factors that foreign banks consider in their foreign lending.
Table 3
Dependent Variable: DLOG(FBC)
(Method: Panel Least Squares; Sample (adjusted): 2000Q3 2010Q1
Periods included: 39;  Cross-sections included: 4
Total panel (balanced) observations: 156)225
The coefficents of DGFC (Dummy) is not positive and significant. Similarly,
DGFC_ EXPOSURE is also not significant. Therefore, this shows that the global
financial crisis did not have any impact on foreign bank  claims and cross-
border lending to Sri Lanka. As per BIS data, foreign claims of reporting banks
of Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom and United States on Sri Lanka is less
than 1% of the total exposure of these banks over the years.
Table  4
Dependent Variable: DLOG(FBC)
(Method: Panel Least Squares; Sample (adjusted): 2001Q1 2010Q1
Periods included: 37; Cross-sections included: 4
Total panel (balanced) observations: 148)226
4.5 The Impact of the Global Economic Crisis on the Sri Lankan Economy
The impact of the global economic crisis on the Sri Lankan economy was
visible  from late 2008 with a gradual decline in exports from Sri Lanka to
developed countries. Sri Lanka did experience a foreign exchange crisis at this
time due to various factors such as the favourable prices for leading exports
such as tea, rubber; increase in remittences; borrowings of US$ 500 million in
September by the Government as well as the inflow of foreign funds to purchase
Treasury Bonds and Bills. However,  this situation changed when the crisis was
aggravated by a number of US financial institutions going under; outflow of
funds invested by foreigners in Treasury Bonds and Bills in late 2008 and
compounded by the declining prices of tea and rubber from August 2008. Foreign
reserves of Sri Lanka declined to US$ 1.7 billion by end 2008 owing to these
developments. However, foreign exchange reserves improved due to the Sri
Lanka’s strategies namely, engagement in swap arrangement with other central
banks,  opening up  the Treasury Bonds and Bills market to the Sri Lankan
Diaspora and introducing bonus interest rate on Non Resident Foreign Currency
Accounts and Resident Foreign Currency Accounts to attaract more non- rupee
savings.
4.5.1 Exports and Imports
Like in most other countries, Sri Lanka’s external trade was adversely
affected by the global economic downturn. Export earnings and expenditure on
imports started to decline from the last quarter of 2008 and in line with the
global trends, export earnings declined by 12.% to Rs 813,911 million (US$ 7,085
million) in 2009 compared to that of 2008. All major sectors reflected declines
in growth while the largest contribution to the decline in overall exports was
from the industrial sector (83.1% ) followed by the agricultural sector (16.0%).
(Figure 15)227
Expenditure on imports in 2009 amounted to US$ 10,207 million, reflecting
a sharp decline of 27.6% from that of the previous year, due to reductions in
both volumes and prices. All major categories of imports i.e., consumer,
intermediate and investment goods, declined. Sluggish growth in the major
economies around the world led to lower international commodity prices, including
oil prices, and the slowdown in the domestic economic activities resulted in a
drastic drop in import volumes, leading to an overall decline in import expenditure.
4.5.2 Loans and Advances of Licensed banks
Loans and Advances declined in 2009 due to lower  demand for credit and
the cautious approach taken by banks to expand lending in view of rising non





Loans and Advances and Non-performing Loans
4.5.3 GDP Growth
The Sri Lankan economy recorded an average growth rate of over 7% for
the period 2006 Q1 – 2007 Q3. Quarterly GDP growth rares slowed down to
a level of 6.2% in the last quarter of 2007 and 1st quarter of 2008. However,
a GDP growth rate of 7% was recorded in the 2nd quarter of 2008. Starting
from the 3rd quarter of 2008  nonetheless,  the economic growth decelerated
and the lowest quarterly GDP growth rate of 1.6% was recorded in the 1st
quarter of 2009.This was mainly due to the spill-over effects of the global financial
crisis. However, a notable growth of 6.2% was witnessed in the last quarter of
2009 as a result of the end of the prolonged conflict, recovery of the global





The Sri Lankan ecnomy is at present a relatively open one even though  the
capital account is not fully opened. With this level of openness, developments
in international markets would have some adverse impact on the Sri Lankan
economy. Therefore, policy makers in Sri Lanka have to be vigilant to minimise
the impact of adverse international developments on the economy. Although Sri
Lanka has encouraged direct investment in equity, a cautious approach has been
adopted with respect to debt inflows. Foreign borrowings by residents other
than BOI companies are subject to the prior permission of the Central Bank.
Moreover, the Central Bank has imposed prudential limits on commercial banks’
foreign borrowings. The above capital controls and prudential policies have
attempted to prevent excessive recourse to foreign borrowings.  Therefore, the
policies have been able to mitigate the potential impact of the global financial
turmoil on the domestic financial market.
6. Conclusion
During the period of the financial crisis, foreign claims of reporting banks
in Japan, Netherlands, United Kingdom and United States on Sri Lanka dropped
marginally (per BIS data). The share of foreign claims of reporting banks on
Sri Lanka to total claims of those banks is less than 1%.  The empirical study
suggests that the economic growth of the home country and real interest rate
and the exchange rate of the host country are the determinants of foreign bank
lendings to Sri Lanka. However, the global financial crisis did not have a
significant impact on the international and cross border lending to Sri Lanka
mainly due to  limitations and restrictions on foreign borrowings by companies,
banks and residents in Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka has now relaxed exchange control
regulations on certain capital transactions such as permitting foreign investors
to make investments in corporate debentures issued by local companies,
expediting approvals for private and public limited liability companies and sole
proprietorships to borrow from foreign sources. With this capital account
liberalisation, international and cross border lending would increase in the future.
In order to minimise the transmission of shocks, policies and prudential regulations
will have to be strengthened in the economy.230
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Chapter 9
FOREIGN BANK CLAIMS ON CHINESE TAIPEI DURING THE






During the recent global financial turmoil that started in the summer of
2007 and deteriorated further in 2008, liquidity squeeze spilled over from the US
to other advanced economies and then to emerging and developing economies,
and economic growth halted and reversed in most economies. The bank credit
in almost all economies dropped sharply, including cross-border bank lending,
during the recent global financial crisis. The  debate  arose as to whether
multinational banks acted as a stabilising force in local economies or contributed
to the transmission of liquidity shocks and home conditions into affiliate markets.
Chinese Taipei’s liquidity risk has been relatively low as its banking system
has benefited from ample liquidity. However, the growth in loans extended by
local banks in Chinese Taipei has slowed down since the second half of 2008
and turned negative in the period from March to November of 2009. Loans
extended by foreign bank affiliates, in particular, declined significantly.
This research paper attempts to clarify the stabilising role of foreign banks
during the recent global financial crisis, with a special focus on foreign bank
claims on Chinese Taipei, which has two separate channels: direct cross-border
claims, and local lending of affiliates. The foreign bank claims are generally232
affected by the pull and push factors. The pull factors include those associated
with the domestic economy while the push factors are associated with the balance
sheet of the bank and the economy of origin. Therefore, the paper would also
investigate the factors affecting the change of foreign bank claims on Chinese
Taipei, and factors having key influences on foreign bank affiliates’ lending
behaviour in Chinese Taipei.
This research paper uses two empirical models to examine the link between
host and home factors and foreign bank lending, and attempts to raise policy
implications of foreign bank claims for Chinese Taipei’s banking system.
1.2 The Scope Covered in the Research Paper
The foreign bank claims in this paper refer to foreign banks’ cross-border
claims by their headquarters to a firm abroad, and local lending through a local
network of branches and subsidiaries. The cross-border claims in this paper are
sourced from the data sets in the consolidated banking statistics of the Bank for
International Settlements (BIS). The lending of foreign bank affiliates in Chinese
Taipei is based on the financial statistics of the Central Bank, Chinese Taipei.
Foreign bank affiliates in Chinese Taipei include local branches, subsidiaries
and offshore banking units (OBUs) of foreign banks. Domestic banks discussed
in this paper include their OBUs for comparison purpose.
According to the BIS consolidated banking statistics, cross-border claims
cover reporting banks’ on-balance sheet financial claims on Chinese Taipei vis-
à-vis all sectors in all currencies. As for local lending by foreign bank affiliates
in Chinese Taipei, it also covers all sectors in all currencies. Both are net of
inter-office accounts.
In Section 2, we will first introduce the development of foreign bank affiliates
in Chinese Taipei, and review their local lending and cross-border claims pre-
and during the global financial crisis. Section 3 is a review of related literature
with a particular focus on Chinese Taipei. In order to find out the link between
pull or push factors and foreign bank claims, this paper will employ two empirical
models. Section 4 will explain the research methodology and Section 5 presents
the empirical results. Policy implications are elaborated in Section 6 and Section
7 concludes.233
2. Analysis of Foreign Banks’ Involvement Before and During the
Global Financial Crisis
2.1 Foreign Bank Claims on Chinese Taipei
According to the BIS consolidated banking statistics, foreign banks’ cross-
border claims on Chinese Taipei as a share of annual Chinese Taipei GDP ranged
from 6.5% to 10.4% before 2008 Q1. However, it decreased sharply to 4.8%
at the end of 2008 Q4 amid the global financial crisis. Benefitting from the
global economic stimulus packages, this increased gradually to 11.4% at the end
of 2010 Q1.
On the other hand, local claims of foreign bank2 affiliates on Chinese Taipei
as a share of annual GDP increased from 10.6% at the end of 2006 to 16.3%
at the end of 2007 due to Citibank and Standard Chartered Bank setting up
subsidiaries with acquisition of domestic banks. During the period of global
financial crisis, the ratio of foreign bank affiliates’ local claims to annual GDP
declined slowly from 20.3%, a record high at the end of 2008 Q2, to 15.8% at
the end of 2009 Q3 (Chart 1).
In general, local claims by foreign bank affiliates are more than foreign
banks’ cross-border claims on Chinese Taipei. Compared to offshore foreign
banks, foreign bank affiliates in Chinese Taipei play a more important role in
financial intermediation and are more actively involved in Chinese Taipei’s
economic activities.
________________
2. BIS reporting banks.234
2.2 The Development of Foreign Bank Affiliates in Chinese Taipei
2.2.1 The Number and Total Assets
At the end of March 2010, there were 33 foreign bank affiliates in Chinese
Taipei: 31 local branches and 2 subsidiaries, including 311 branch offices and
offshore banking units (OBUs). Ten years ago, there were 38 foreign bank
branches with 103 branch offices and OBUs in Chinese Taipei. Alhough the
number of foreign bank affiliates was comparable to domestic banks, the number
of local branch offices and OBUs of foreign banks were fewer than domestic
banks (Chart 2).235236
The total assets of foreign bank affiliates amounted to NT$2,316 billion at
the end of December 2006, accounting for 17.75% of GDP, but increased by
48% in 2007 because of Citibank and Standard Chartered Bank setting up their
subsidiaries with acquisition of domestic banks. After a gradual reduction of
claims caused by the global financial crisis from 2008 Q4 to 2009 Q2, total
assets of foreign bank affiliates began to increase in the second half of 2009
and reached NT$3,881 billion at the end of March 2010, equivalent to 30% of
GDP (Chart 3). The asset increase was mainly supported by a surge in securities
investments due to the recovery of global financial markets.
The major business of foreign bank affiliates in Chinese Taipei is related to
foreign exchange and financial derivatives. For traditional commercial bank
operations, foreign bank affiliates accounted for only 3.0% of total deposits and
6.1% of total loans extended by Chinese Taipei’s financial institutions in March
2010.
2.2.2 Sources and Uses of Funds
The funds of foreign bank affiliates raised from interbank deposits and
borrowings accounted for 44% of total funds at the end of March 2010, while
29% of funds came from customer deposits. As for the uses of funds, interbank
lending to overseas affiliates accounted for the biggest share at 31%, followed
by customer loans at 24%, while 10% of funds were invested in domestic and
foreign securities and 11% were in cash and due from banks (Chart 4).237
2.3 Loan Extension by Foreign Bank Affiliates in Chinese Taipei
2.3.1 Loan Market Share
Compared to domestic banks, the loan share of foreign bank affiliates has
been quite low. The loans extended by foreign bank affiliates accounted for
around 3.2% of total banking loans in Chinese Taipei before June 2007. After
Citibank and Standard Chartered Bank merged with their respective choices of
domestic banks in the second half of 2007, the loan share of foreign bank affiliates
climbed to 6.85% in September 2008. However, this was still much lower than
that for domestic banks. This share declined to around 5% between 2008 Q4
and 2009 Q2, mainly due to the effect of the global financial crisis. At the end
of March 2010, the share rose to 6.1% (Chart 5).238
2.3.2 Loan Growth
Affected by shrinking financial transactions and economic activities amid
the global financial crisis, growth of bank loans in Chinese Taipei slowed down
in the second half of 2008 and turned negative in the first three quarters of
2009. The loans extended by foreign bank affiliates decreased greater than
domestic banks. The annual growth rate of foreign bank affiliates’ lending declined
dramatically from 16.57% of September 2008 to -11.05% at the end of 2008,
and dropped further to -30.88% in June 2009. In contrast, the annual growth
rates of domestic banks’ lending were -0.03% and -0.83% in Q2 and Q3 of
2009, respectively (Chart 6). However, the growth rate of foreign bank affiliates’
lending rebounded to 13.11% by the end of 2009 and rose to 24.99% in March
2010, much higher than the 2.95% of domestic banks at the same time239
2.3.3 Comparison with Domestic Banks
Though the global financial crisis resulted in a minor credit crunch in Chinese
Taipei, the total lending provided by domestic banks remained more stable than
foreign bank affiliates. Foreign bank affiliates’ lending decreased by NT$315.7
billion, or 24.8%, in 2008 Q4 (Chart 7), while domestic banks’ lending increased
in 2008 Q4 and decreased subsequently by a mere 1.95% in 2009 Q1 (Chart
8). On the other hand, the lending of foreign bank affiliates as a share of annual
GDP decreased from 10.15% of Q3 to 7.46% of Q4 in 2008, and declined
further to 7.20% in 2009 Q2 (Chart 7). However, the lending of domestic banks
as a share of annual GDP rose from 135.42% of 2008 Q4 to 142.50% in Q1
and Q2 of 2009 (Chart 8). This means that domestic banks played a predominant
role in extending credit during the period of Chinese Taipei’s economic recession.240241
2.3.4 Loan-to-Deposit Ratio from 2008 Q4 to 2009 Q2
After Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy protection on 15 September
2008, the impact of the financial crisis enlarged. Chinese Taipei branches of
foreign banks did not suffer as much losses from portfolio investments as their
parent banks, but their operating revenues and deposits decreased significantly
due to outflows of foreign capital. The deposits received by foreign bank affiliates
decreased considerably as their clients moved their funds to domestic banks or
abroad. The loan-to-deposit ratio of foreign bank affiliates, however, had declined
to below 50% since 2008 Q4 and reached 41.33% in 2009 Q2. This indicated
that the loans extended by foreign bank affiliates decreased even more
dramatically in the period from 2008 Q4 to 2009 Q2. The deposits decreased
continuously in the second half of 2009, and posted a -25.41% annual growth
rate in March 2010. However, lending returned to positive growth in December
2009, with the growth rate climbing to 24.68% in March 2010. As a result, the
loan-to-deposit ratio of foreign bank affiliates rose to 73.99% in March 2010
(Chart 9).
The deposits in domestic banks had risen markedly since the second half
of 2008 and grew by 7.79% and 9.61% year on year as of December of 2008
and 2009, respectively, owing to a large amount of overseas funds flowing back
into bank deposits. In contrast, the annual growth rate of loans dropped from
3.85% of September 2008 to 1.25% of December 2009. As a result, the average242
loan-to-deposit ratio of domestic banks decreased from 79.90% of 2008 Q4 to
73.81% at the end of 2009. As capital inflows slowed down in 2010 Q1, the
deposit-to-loan ratio of domestic banks rose to 74.19% (Chart 10).
In summary, domestic banks played a predominant role in Chinese Taipei’s
bank lending. Although the market share of foreign banks’ local lending in Chinese
Taipei had been less than 7%, foreign bank claims on Chinese Taipei have
significant influence on the economy, accounting for 22.5% of GDP in average
between 2005 Q1 and 2010 Q1.
In order to understand the influence of global foreign banks on Chinese
Taipei during the recent financial crisis, the implications of related variables,
such as push and pull factors should be analysed empirically.
3. Literature Review
3.1 Arguments about Foreign Banks’ Role for Credit in Host Economies
Multinational banks played a significant role in the transmission of the 2007-
2009 crisis to emerging market economies. The relationship between liquidity
shocks on banking systems of major developed economies and those of emerging
markets has been examined by economists. The more common observation is
that global banks enhance the international transmission of shocks through their
activities, contributing to a more integrated global business cycle (Goldberg, 2009).
However, there is an ongoing debate as to whether global banks in domestic
economies acted as stabilising forces.243
De Haas and Lelyveld (2009) provided evidence for the hypothesis that
multinational banks actively manage the credit growth of their subsidiaries due
to the existence of internal capital markets, stating that foreign bank subsidiaries
do not need to rein in their supply of credit during a financial crisis as domestic
banks would need to do. More specifically, they found that, in line with substitution
effects, subsidiaries expand their lending faster if economic growth in their home
economy decreases.
The view that globalised banking was a stabilising force may seem odd
during the 2007-2009 global financial crisis. Cetorelli and Goldberg (2008)
measured capital flows into emerging market regions and found they exhibited
dramatic declines during the recent crisis. During the same period, there was
a decline in internal lending from parent and other overseas affiliates to the
foreign bank affiliates in emerging markets. Both types of contractions were
associated with reduced lending within emerging markets. Therefore, Cetorelli
and Goldberg (2009) examined the liquidity shocks which isolated credit supply
from demand across Europe, Asia, and Latin America, and indicated that credit
supply in emerging markets was affected through contraction in direct, cross-
border lending by foreign banks, in local lending by foreign banks’ affiliates in
emerging markets, as well as in credit supply by domestic banks, as a result of
the funding shock to their balance sheets induced by the decline of interbank
or cross-border lending.
3.2 Literature in Chinese Taipei
The research papers in Chinese Taipei for bank credit in the recent global
financial crisis are more concerned about the implications of structured financial
products, the impacts of the financial crisis on the real economy and banking
system, and relevant central banking policy responses. However, a few papers
discuss the role of foreign bank affiliates during the recent financial crisis in
Chinese Taipei.
Chang, Shen and Chang (2010) utilised the matching methods3 developed
by Rubin (1973) and Rosenbaum and Rubin (198301985a,b), based on bank
equity data and financial performance of six Asian emerging economies (including
Chinese Taipei, China, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand) from 2007 to
2008, to analyse the performances of foreign banks and domestic banks. The
________________
3. This paper used the matching method to establish the sample of domestic banks. Using
a matched sample to reduce selection bias, the characteristics of domestic banks were found
to be similar to foreign banks.244
empirical results in the paper show that the performances of most foreign banks
were worse than those of domestic banks in the stated Asian economies. When
shocks originate from home economies or regions of foreign banks, these foreign
banks will become the shock transmission channel to host economies.
Chen, Wang, Lu and Tsai (2010) summarised the conditions of loans extended
by the four4 types of banks in Chinese Taipei during the period of January 2008
to August 2009, in which the development of credit extension by Chinese Taipei
branches of foreign banks was comprehensively reviewed. During the period of
global financial crisis, the lending behaviour of Chinese Taipei branches of foreign
banks was mainly affected by the risk concerns resulting from the economic
recession, other than their own financial conditions. In view of the financial
conditions, Chinese Taipei branches of foreign banks did not suffer much from
portfolio investment losses as did their parent banks in 2008. However, their
operating revenues and deposits decreased significantly due to the outflow of
foreign capital. Their attitudes for extending credit turned to be more conservative
and the loans extended by local branches of foreign banks continued decreasing
from September 2008 to July 2009, mainly due to the higher credit risks of
enterprises. Their consumer loans declined slower than loans to enterprises
because Chinese Taipei’s real estate market recovered from 2009 Q2.
The impacts of the global financial crisis on the Chinese Taipei economy,
and the related policy responses could be important factors for the lending of
foreign banks in Chinese Taipei during the crisis, as summarised in Box1 and
Box 2.
________________
4. Including (1) public-owned domestic banks, (2) large private domestic banks, (3) local
branches of foreign banks and (4) small private domestic banks.245
Box 1. The Effect of the Global Financial Crisis on the Chinese
Taipei Economy
In the second half of 2008, worsening international financial conditions and
a declining world economy severely affected Chinese Taipei’s export
momentum and the production of its manufacturing sector. Domestic
enterprises responded with large-scale layoffs or requiring employees to
take unpaid leave. As a result, the domestic unemployment rate increased
dramatically, which in turn had a negative impact on private consumption.
Private investments also shrank rapidly against the backdrop of a precipitous
drop in corporate profitability and the uncertain economic outlook (Financial
Stability Report May 2009, CBC). Chinese Taipei’s economic growth
registered -0.80% in 2008Q3, and further deteriorated to -9.06% in 2009Q1,
causing the annual economic growth to decline markedly to 0.73% in 2008
from the previous year’s 5.98%, and continued to drop to -1.91% in 2009.
Demand for funds remained soft and banks’ loans and investments growth
declined in the first half of 2009, but trended upwards in the fourth quarter
of the year (Annual Report 2009, CBC). Credit risk for corporate loans
decreased slightly while credit risk concentration was still high. Liquidity
risk of domestic banks remained low as the banking system benefited from
ample liquidity (Financial Stability Report 2010, CBC).Affected by the slump
in the global stock markets and the economic downturn in Chinese Taipei,
together with a massive sell-off by foreign investors, the Chinese Taipei
Stock Exchange Weighted Index (TAIEX) dropped from a high of 9,295
in mid-May to 4,090 in late November 2008. Trading value and turnover
ratio decreased dramatically in the second half of 2008. However, the
TAIEX index stopped falling in early 2009 and gradually climbed to 8,100
in January 2010. The main reasons behind this rebound were the net buying
of foreign investors, inflows of residents’ portfolio investments from abroad
and the emerging effects of a warming cross-Strait relationship (Financial
Stability Report May 2009, CBC).246
Box 2. Chinese Taipei’s Policy Measures to Cope with the Global
Financial Crisis
The financial and monetary policies responses for the financial crisis would
affect the attitude of banks’ credit. In order to alleviate the impacts of the
financial crisis, Chinese Taipei’s government launched the Economic Stimulus
Package in September 2008 and implemented a succession of monetary
policies, financial stability measures and fiscal policies to increase domestic
demand, stabilise the financial system and maintain the momentum of
economic growth (Financial Stability Report May 2009, CBC). To increase
domestic demand and provide sufficient injection of liquidity into the market,
the CBC adopted an easy monetary stance. The CBC lowered the discount
rate by 2.375 percentage points in seven cuts from September 2008 to
March 2009 to help reduce individual and corporate funding costs, encourage
private consumption and investment, and stimulate domestic economic
growth. With a view to increase the momentum of bank lending, the CBC
also lowered the required reserve ratios and expanded the scope of Repo
facility operations to provide financial institutions with sufficient liquidity.
As for stabilising financial markets, improving market confidence, as well
as assisting individual and corporate funding, the government also
implemented a number of measures to stabilise the financial system, such
as adopting an interim blanket deposit guarantee5. This measure effectively
stabilised the market and restored the confidence of depositors. Another
important policy to assist corporations to weather the economic downturn
and to tackle their business difficulties was coordinating corporate financing
support (Financial Stability Report May 2009, CBC). The government
organised a Special Task Force on Facilitating Enterprises to Obtain
Operational Funds to help small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and large
corporations to get financing support. The Bankers Association of the ROC
released two self-disciplined mechanisms allowing corporations that faced
financial difficulties, to still operate normally and pay loan interest as
scheduled by extending loans by six months. Moreover, the government
provided sufficient funds for loans to large corporations under the Directions
for the Provision of Special Loans and Credit Guarantees to Non-SMEs,
and introduced several measures to assist individuals to acquire loans from
banks and to reduce their interest burdens.
________________
5. The government announced that it would guarantee all deposits in insured financial institutions
by their full amount until the end of 2010. Additional deposits to be guaranteed included
foreign currency-denominated deposits, inter-bank deposits and lending, and financial bonds
issued before or on 23 June 2005.247
4. Research Methodology
As the trend towards greater international financial integration persists,
banks’ lending behaviour has become increasing responsive to external economic
factors or their internal financial conditions. In order to verify whether foreign
banks, during the recent global crisis, transmitted shocks from their home
economies (where banks’ headquarters are located) to Chinese Taipei, we will
examine the linkage of foreign banks’ cross-border lending in Chinese Taipei
and their exposures in the recent financial crisis in view of factors existing in
the economies.
Furthermore, we would examine whether the internal capital market or
funding conditions of multinational banks performed supportive functions in
extending credit, and whether the change of the loan-to-deposit ratio of foreign
bank affiliates reflected individual financial characteristics during the recent crisis.
In this regard, this section presents the determinants of foreign bank lending
via two panel data empirical strategies - first being the pooled panel data treatment,
which is a modification of Martinez-Peria et al. (2005), to analyse macroeconomic
data, and second, pooled panel treatment similar to Navaretti et al. (2010) to
analyse microeconomic data.
4.1 Model I: Using Aggregated Panel Data
Martinez-Peria et al. (2005) estimated a reduced-form model that used
comprehensive data for foreign bank claims on the private sector in Latin America
for the period 1985-2000 to study how foreign bank claims are affected by both
push and pull factors, taking into consideration the role of exposure to host
economies and the potential influence of movements in foreign claims on other
economies. According to the empirical model of Martinez-Peria et al. (2005),
the paper modified the interaction term “Host Factor × Exposure” as
“GFC_Dummy × Exposure”. We tried to use the modified model to examine the
relationship between the changes in foreign bank claims on Chinese Taipei and
the exposure of foreign bank claims on Chinese Taipei during the global financial
crisis. At the same time, we also looked at the impact of economic factors of
home economies and Chinese Taipei on the changes in foreign bank claims on
Chinese Taipei.248
4.1.1 The Model Specification and Data
We modified the model of Martinez-Peria et al. (2005) to set up the following
regression equation by taking into account the recent global financial crisis, where
j = 1 to 4 identifying Japan, United States, United Kingdom and Switzerland.
These four are the main creditor economies for Chinese Taipei, where their
foreign bank claims on Chinese Taipei over their own total foreign claims are
also greater than those on other economies. Chart 11 shows the exposure of
foreign claims on Chinese Taipei over total foreign claims.  t = 1 to 42, refers
to the time period considered.
(1)
Because of the time series limitation of foreign claims data provided by the
BIS on its website, the individual economy data sets run from 2000 Q1 to 2010
Q2, consisting of 42 quarterly observations. In all, the panel data sets which
include the above-mentioned four economies, come up to a total of 168 for Model
I.
Chart 11. Exposure of Foreign Claims on Chinese Taipei over
Total Foreign Claims
Average of 2000 Q1~2010 Q2249
The data set contains the following variables:
(1) D(LOG(Claims))j,t: the first difference of the logarithm of foreign claims
by foreign bank (j) in Chinese Taipei basing on time t compared to time t-
4.
(2) Push_Factorj,t: control variables that mainly capture macroeconomic
conditions in the economy of the foreign bank (j), e.g., real GDP growth
and real interest rate;
(3) Dummy_Economyj: a dummy variable that takes the value of one if foreign
claims come from economy(j) where j=1 to 4 identifying Japan (JAPAN),
United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), and Switzerland (SWISS),
respectively;
(3) Pull_Factorst: control variables that capture macroeconomic conditions in
Chinese Taipei such as real GDP growth and real interest rate;
(4) GFC_Dummyt: a dummy variable that takes the value of one in 2007, 2008
and 2009;
(5) Exposurej,t: the ratio of foreign economy/ bank(j) claims on Chinese Taipei
over the total claims extended by foreign economy/ bank(j).
(6) εj,t: error term.
In the regression equation, the test of the effect of the global financial crisis
is based on the sign and significance of the α4 coefficient. Indeed, controlling
for other factors, if higher exposure is translated into more stable financing, we
expect this interaction term between the GFC dummy and exposure to be positive
and significant. It means that the economy which has more claims on Chinese
Taipei relative to its total claims tend to withdraw less from Chinese Taipei than
from other economies.
4.1.2 Push Factors
Regarding push factors, we would like to analyse α2  to gauge the impact
of real GDP growth and real interest rate of home economies on the changes
of their respective claims on Chinese Taipei.
Home economy economic conditions could have a positive or a negative
impact on foreign bank lending on the host economy (Martinez-Peria et al.,
2005). Adverse economic conditions and a lack of profit opportunities in the
home economy could encourage multinational banks to extend credit abroad and
a recession in the home economy could lead to a deterioration in the capital of
foreign banks and overall retrenchment in claims held at home and abroad.250
Consequently, we remain agnostic concerning the impact of real GDP growth
for the home economy on the change in claims on a host economy.
Moreover, lowering real interest rates in home economies tend to signal
periods of easy financial conditions. This might increase banks’ willingness to
extend riskier but higher interest rate loans to host economies. Therefore, we
expect home real interest rate to have a negative impact on the change in claims
on a host economy.
4.1.3 Pull Factors
With respect to the α2 coefficient, we mainly considered real GDP growth
and real interest rates in Chinese Taipei as independent variables.
We assume that the movement of real interest rate in host economy will
affect capital flow, i.e., an increase in real interest rate in the host economy will
attract more capital inflows and increase foreign bank claims, while a decrease
in real interest rate in the host economy will give rise to a decrease in foreign
bank claims. Consequently, we expect that  real interest rate of Chinese Taipei
would have a positive impact on the change in foreign banks claim on Chinese
Taipei.
For the relationship between real GDP growth in the host economy and the
change of foreign bank claims, foreign banks will respond to real GDP growth
in the host economy and increase or decrease claims over the cycle. Therefore,
we expect real GDP growth of Chinese Taipei to have a positive impact on the
change of foreign bank claims.
Table 1 provides the definition and sources of each variable.251
Table 1. Definition and Sources of the Model I Variables
4.2  Model II: Using Micro-panel Data
4.2.1 The Model Specification and Data
Navaretti et al. (2010) used a panel model to verify if the bank specific
ratio of loans to deposits has changed significantly during the crisis, and in
particular if these changes have been different for foreign affiliates operating
in different areas. Our research modified the model specification of that used
in Navaretti et al. (2010) by adding more bank specific characteristics as
variables, such as return on equity (ROE), growth of bank assets, ratio of
interbank borrowings to total assets, and ratio of equity to assets, to examine252
the impacts of bank specific characteristics on the bank specific ratio of loans
to deposits around the time of the global financial crisis. This model
(2)
Basically, Model II uses dummies to capture systemic differences among
panel observations results in what is known as a fixed-effects model, a way of
dealing with pooled data. In the fixed effect method the constant is treated as
economy-specific. This means that the model allows for different constants for
each economy. Since Model II uses panel data, data set runs from 2000 Q1 to
2010 Q2, including 1,148 quarterly observations comprising 35 foreign bank
affiliates in Chinese Taipei.
The data set contains the following variables:
(1)                : the ratio of customer loans and deposits of foreign affiliate
i of economy j in Chinese Taipei at time t;
(2) DUMMY_CRISIS : a dummy variable taking the value of one in 2007, 2008
and 2009;
(3) DUMMY_ECONOMYi,j,t: a dummy variable that take the value of one if
bank i of economy j in Chinese Taipei at time t is a foreign bank subsidiary
/ branch of a holding company located in the foreign economy; where j=1
to 6 identifies the United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, Japan,
Hong Kong and France.
(4) BANK_Specific_Chari,j,t-1: characteristics of bank i of economy j in Chinese
Taipei, such as growth of bank assets, ROE, etc., at time t-1.
(5) εi,j,t: error term.
In the panel regression equation, the test of the effect of the global financial
crisis on the internal capital market of foreign banks is based on the sign and
significance of each of the βk coefficients. A positive and significant value would
imply that foreign banks with access to the internal capital market reduced their
loan-to-deposit ratio less than the control group of banks, and therefore had a
stabilizing effect on the shock caused by the global financial crisis. Obviously,
a negative coefficient implies the opposite.253
4.2.2 Variables for Bank Specific Characteristics
In reference to factors of bank specific characteristics related to credit
extension, first, we consider the measure of profitability, such as the ratio of
return on equity (ROE). When βm  shows positive and significant, it may imply
that banks with more profit would extend more credit. On the other hand, when
βm  shows negative and significant, it means that unprofitable banks would take
more credit risks to get more profits. Therefore, this variable is indeterminate.
Secondly, we include a measure of liquidity from the interbank capital market
(the share of interbank borrowings over total assets, INTERBANK_ASSETS),
because access to the interbank capital market provides the complementary
source of capital for customer loans.
Thirdly, we also consider solvency (total equity to total assets,
EQUITY_ASSET) as a measure of the bank’s risk aversion. A bank with a high
level of capital could be relatively risk-aversive and may extend credit more
conservatively during the financial crisis. Moreover, bank subsidiaries with low
capitalization may be especially prone to moral hazard and rapidly expand (risky)
lending (see Black and Strahan, 2002). The effect implied a negative relationship
between bank capital and loan growth. On the contrary, high capital ratios could
simply represent that liabilities constraints are less serious, so that banks have
ample room to expand their lending. Therefore, the sign of these variables is
thus indeterminate as well.
Finally, we would also like to examine the implication of bank’s assets growth
(DLOG(ASSET)) for loans. We expect that bank’s assets growth would stimulate
lending or its assets decline would incur bank’s conservative behavior of lending,
thereby having a positive impact on bank lending.
Table 2 provides the definition and sources of each variable.254
5. Empirical Results
5.1 Model I
5.1.1 Panel Unit Root Test
When we use pooled panel estimation method, we have to make sure that
all the variables in Model I are stationary by panel unit root test. Basically, we
employ Levin-Lin-Chu Test (LLC test) for the panel unit root test. Table 3
shows the results of the panel unit root test, using data from 2000 Q1 to 2010
Table 2.  Definition and Sources of Model  II Variables255
Q2. All the variables in Model I are I(1) level stationary. Consequently, we took
the first difference for these I(1) variables in the empirical panel estimation.
5.1.2 Estimation for Model I
Since the number of cross sections is less than the number of coefficients,
a random effects model could not be estimated. Moreover, these four economies’
foreign claims on Chinese Taipei have simultaneous correlation. Furthermore,
the close relationship with Chinese Taipei is economy-specific, and would give
rise to unequal variances of the individual economy’s claims on Chinese Taipei.
In addition, according to the above-mentioned situation, when in the presence
of cross-section heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation for the
pooled panel estimation, we not only had to address the problem of
heteroscedasticity by imposing a White’s cross-section heteroskedastic structure
on the error term in the panel model, but also used the cross-section SUR
(Seemingly Unrelated Regressions) model allowing for contemporaneous
correlation between cross-sections. We try to estimate a feasible GLS
(Generalized Least Square) with cross-section SUR specification correcting for
both cross-section heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation. Under
the GLS with cross-section SUR specification, the research has made sure that
Table 3. Panel Unit Root Test Result of Model I256
the residuals for Model I converged to normal distribution successfully. Therefore,
the specification for Model I should be appropriate. Figure 1 shows all the
statistics for Model I. The results show that Skewness and Kurtosis are near
zero and three, respectively. As to the normality test, the Jarque-Bera value is
quite low, indicating that null hypothesis of normality is accepted at a high level
of confidence.
Figure 1.  All the Statistics for the Model I
5.1.3 Analysis of the Determination of Foreign Bank Claims on
    Chinese Taipei
The GLS with cross-section SUR model, after correcting for serial correlation
and adjustment for heteroskedasticity, is summarised in Table 4. A high Adjusted
R-squared value of 0.658 indicates that the SUR model represents a good fit
to the data, supported by a significant F-statistic of 22.717.257
The findings of the empirical results in Model I are summarised as follows:
(1) For the four individual economy’s claims on Chinese Taipei, the coefficient
of GFC_DUMMY×D(EXPOSURE) is positive and significant. The link
between the change of the exposures and their foreign bank claims on
Chinese Taipei during the recent financial crisis is significant with a positive
coefficient. The results apparently point to stable financing for these four
economies’ banks claims on Chinese Taipei during the global financial crisis.
(2) For the relationship between the movement in the real GDP growth of
Chinese Taipei and the change of foreign bank claims, the coefficient of
Table 4. The Determination of the Percentage Change of
ForeignBank Claims on Chinese Taipei258
D(LOG(GDP_TW)) is positive and significant. As we expected, the finding
show that foreign claims would be pro-cyclical in accordance with host
economy growth. The findings are consistent with that of Martinez-Peria
et al. (2005).
(3) For the change of real GDP growth in the home economy, the analysis
found that banks from Switzerland and the United States reduced claims in
response to increased profit opportunities in the home economy (in response
to higher home growth) but only the coefficient of the movement of real
GDP growth for the U.S. is significant with a negative sign. On the other
hand, it is statistically significant with a positive coefficient between the
movement of real GDP growth for Japan and the change of foreign bank
claims on Chinese Taipei. This means that an increase in real GDP growth
of Japan will positively affect Japanese banks to extend credit in Chinese
Taipei.
(4) For the change of real interest rate for the home economy, the change in
the home real interest rate has the expected negative impact on the change
of foreign bank claims on Chinese Taipei. This variable is statistically
significant for the United Kingdom at the relative level of confidence.
5.2 Model II
5.2.1 Panel Unit Root Test
Using pooled panel estimation method for Model II, we also have to ensure
that all variables in Model II are stationary by the panel unit root test. We made
use of the Levin-Lin-Chu Test (LLC test) for the panel unit root test. Table 5
shows the results of the panel unit root test, using data from 2000 Q1 to 2010
Q2. The research also found that all variables in Model II are I(0) level stationary.
Consequently, the first difference for these I(0) variables is not taken in the
pooled panel estimation.259
5.2.2 Estimation for Model II
Indeed, the research had intended to use a fixed-effects method in Model
II to capture systemic differences among panel observations results. However,
the paper had to consider what the statistical values for Model II represented,
such as low D-W and high JB values, using a fixed-effects panel model.
Consequently, we had to consider how to increase estimation efficiency.
In addition, foreign banks in Chinese Taipei face the same competition
environment and have some characteristics in common. However, foreign banks
may have specific business and management strategies to affect their overseas
affiliates’ lending behaviour. Therefore, as in Model I, cross-section
heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous correlation exist in Model II as well.
In view of the above-mentioned situation in Model II, we also have to tackle
the cross-section heteroskedasticity and the contemporaneous correlation in order
to increase estimation efficiency. As in the presence of heteroskedasticity and
correlation for the pooled panel estimation of Model I, the Model II analysis also
attempts to estimate a feasible GLS (Generalized Least Square) specification
correcting for both cross-section heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous
correlation. Under the GLS with cross-section SUR specification, the paper
ensures that the residuals for Model II converge successfully to a normal
distribution as well. Therefore, the specification for Model II should be acceptable,
although not completely satisfactory. Figure 2 presents the statistics for Model
Table 5.  Panel Unit Root Test Result of Model II260
II graphically. The results show that Skewness and Kurtosis are also near zero
and three, respectively. With respect to normality for the residuals of Model II,
although null hypothesis of normality is accepted at a relative low level of
confidence of 0.08, it is at least more than 0.05.
5.2.3 Analysis of the Determination of Foreign Bank Lending on
    Chinese Taipei
For Model II, the GLS with cross-section SUR model, after correction for
contemporaneous correlation and adjustment for heteroskedasticity, is summarised
in Table 6. A high Adjusted R-squared value of 0.839 indicates that the SUR
model represents a good fit to the data for Model II, supported by a significant
F-statistic of 373.695. Furthermore, the independent variables are quite significant
statistically as well.
Figure 2.  All the Statistics for Model II261
Examining the sign and significance of each  in Model II, we find that the
coefficients of DUMMY_CRISIS×DUMMY_ECONOMY for almost all the
six economies except UK are positive and statistically significant at the relative
level of confidence as expected. They reveal that almost all foreign bank
subsidiaries provided stabilising effects on Chinese Taipei from the shock caused
by the global financial crisis between 2007 and 2009. This finding is consistent
with that of Navaretti et al. (2010).
Table 6. The Determination of Foreign Banks Lending in
Chinese Taipei262
Concerning the significance of the bank financial characteristics, the
coefficient of ROE(-1) is significant and negative, i.e., unprofitable banks would
take more credit risks to increase profits. The coefficient of
LOG(INTERBANK_ASSETS) is also significant indicating that access to the
interbank capital market provides foreign banks with complementary capital for
customer loans.
As for solvency, the coefficient of LOG(EQUITY_ASSETS(-1)) is also
significant and positive. This can mean that high capital ratios could correspond
to liabilities constraints which are less serious so that banks have sufficient scope
to expand their lending. Furthermore, with respect to growth of bank assets, the
coefficient of D(LOG(ASSETS(-1))) is statistically significant and positive. The
results show that bank assets growth would stimulate lending or conversely, the
decline in assets would result in more conservative lending behaviour, thereby
having a positive impact on bank lending.
5.3 Summary of the Empirical Results
According to the above empirical results, several findings are obtained as
follows:
(1) The empirical results indicate that foreign banks in Chinese Taipei
could provide a stabilising effect during the financial crisis
The results in Model I point to stable financing during the global financial
crisis for foreign bank claims on Chinese Taipei. Furthermore, the results of
Model II show that almost all the foreign banks in Chinese Taipei from different
groups of economies except UK had a stabilising effect for their local lending
during the global financial crisis.
However, this could also be explained by the fact that since major working
capitals of foreign bank affiliates are funded from the local market, they could
not be injected into the parent companies.
(2) The effect of Chinese Taipei’s economic growth on foreign bank
claims is highly significant and positive
Model I examines the impact of macroeconomic factors on foreign bank
claims. The results from the analysis show that a change in real GDP growth
of Chinese Taipei had a significantly positive effect on the movement of foreign
bank claims over the cycle, showing that foreign bank claims are pro-cyclical.263
Furthermore, movement in the real interest rate in Chinese Taipei positively
affected the change of foreign bank claims on Chinese Taipei but was insignificant
statistically. This implies  that foreign bank claims are mainly affected by real
GDP growth rather than real interest rates of Chinese Taipei.
(3) The effect of push factors on foreign bank claims is less significant
According to the empirical results of Model I, the relationship between
economic factors of the home economy and the change of foreign bank claims
is insignificant, although there are some variables with statistical significance.
This could mean that economic factors of the home economy did not play a vital
role for foreign bank claims on Chinese Taipei, so that foreign banks’ role in
transmitting shocks into Chinese Taipei through claims seems insignificant.
(4) Individual bank characteristics would have an important influence
on foreign bank affiliates’ lending in Chinese Taipei
From the panel empirical results of Model II, the research also finds that
individual bank characteristics of foreign bank affiliates in Chinese Taipei could
affect their lending behaviour significantly. The paper took into consideration
several factors such as return on equity, funding from interbank, solvency, and
bank’s assets growth. The findings also reveal that these bank characteristics
have a statistically significant relationship with foreign banks’ lending in Chinese
Taipei.
6. Policy Implications
While the research uses macro and micro data to test the determinants of
host economy lending by multinational bank subsidiaries, we have not estimated
the same regressions for domestically owned banks as a benchmark group. In
light of this, simply based on Model I and Model II, it is difficult to find the
linkage between financial and monetary policies and foreign bank lending.
However, some policy implications can still be derived from this paper.
6.1 Prevention from Economy Concentration of Foreign Banks
The findings from Model II tell us that financial characteristics of foreign
bank affiliates which are more or less affected by parent companies’ financial
situations, have significant impacts on their lending. For example, in June 2008,
the assets of Chinese Taipei branches of Citibank and HSBC plunged suddenly
because they remitted large amounts of earnings for liquidity injections into parent264
companies. In order to prevent shock transmissions by foreign bank affiliates
from their parent companies during the financial crisis, host governments should
closely supervise the concentration of foreign banks from specific economies or
regions.
6.2 Supervision for Liquidity and Funding Conditions of Foreign Bank
Affiliates
The empirical results from Model II also show that the decline in capital
would decrease foreign bank affiliates’ loan extensions. However, the interbank
call loan market provides complementary funding for foreign bank affiliates in
Chinese Taipei for credit extension. In view of this, the Central Bank or authorities
of financial inspection would need to closely supervise banks’ liquidity and funding
conditions. For example, they could require foreign bank branches to finance
most of their capital from stable sources and maintain specific capital adequacy
ratios, especially in times of a financial crisis. The Central Bank may provide
the bank undergoing liquidity problems with sufficient funds through
accommodation and open market operations to prevent sudden and sharp
decreases of their loans.
6.3 The Importance of Monitoring Foreign Banks’ Influence on Chinese
Taipei
Although total assets of foreign banks in Chinese Taipei are currently much
less than domestic banks, they are, nonetheless equivalent to 30% of Chinese
Taipei’s GDP while the size of foreign banks’ assets continues to grow. This
could have a sizeable impact on the host economy and warrant their close
monitoring.
7. Conclusion
As the trend towards greater international financial integration persists, the
debate on the behaviour of foreign banks is likely to continue. In this paper, we
have made use of macro and micro data to examine the determinants of foreign
bank lending, especially during the recent global financial crisis.
Our empirical findings indicate that foreign bank claims, which are pro-
cyclical in line with Chinese Taipei GDP growth, seem affected mainly by the
local demand, but are little affected by the real interest rate of Chinese Taipei
or economic factors of home economies. Therefore, our empirical results from
Model I indicating that multinational banks did not pull out much of their claims265
on Chinese Taipei at times of crises may be because Chinese Taipei’s economy
was not as hard hit as developed economies.
In addition, the empirical results of Model II show that foreign bank affiliates’
lending in Chinese Taipei is affected by individual bank-specific characteristics.
Almost all foreign bank affiliates in Chinese Taipei provided a stabilising effect
in their lending during the crisis. This could be because their major funding sources
came from Chinese Taipei’s interbank call loans, which remained ample during
the crisis, in addition to the fact that they had lesser opportunities to inject funds
into their parent companies. However, in view of foreign bank affiliates’ market
share of lending in Chinese Taipei being less than that of domestic banks, it
would not be expedient to just simply conclude that foreign bank affiliates present
a stabilising force for Chinese Taipei.
However, the decline of capital would decrease foreign bank affiliates’ loan
extensions in Chinese Taipei. Therefore in view of this, the Central Bank or
monetary authorities would still need to prudently supervise banks’ liquidity and
funding conditions and stepping in to provide funds to banks with temporary
liquidity problems to avoid a credit crunch.266
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